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English Summary  
 
Licensing contracts represent one of the most widely used mechanisms to exchange 
technologies and transfer know-how between firms. Due to the opportunities that licensing 
creates for firms operating on both sides of the markets for technology, it has increasingly 
become an integral part of firms’ R&D strategies. On the supply side, the existing literature has 
been focused on understanding how technology licensing can be used by firms as a mechanism 
to recover investments in innovative activities and to foster learning opportunities. On the 
demand side, it has been shown that licensing is an important source that firms can tap into to 
feed their internal needs for innovative knowledge. While several studies have examined 
technology licensing through the lens of the licensor, research on how firms rely on licensing 
contracts to acquire knowledge and improve their innovation performance still leaves much to 
be investigated. Furthermore, with few exceptions, neither organizational nor contractual 
characteristics related to the licensing deals have received enough attention as determinants of 
the capacity of the acquiring firm to benefit from licensing in a new technology.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between 
technology licensing and firm innovation, also examining how the characteristics of the 
acquiring firm and the use of specific contractual clauses affect this main relationship. The 
papers in this dissertation build on a different set of theoretical perspectives connected to the 
licensing literature. The dissertation consists of a general introduction, four papers, and a 
conclusion. Although all the papers build on the same main dataset related to licensing contracts 
in the global pharmaceutical industry, supplementary information from different data sources 
was connected to the licensing contracts to answer the specific research questions. Indeed, each 
paper, from a different perspective, contemplates and contributes to the existing literature by 
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examining the relationship between technology licensing and specific dimensions of firm 
innovation. Understanding how licensing deals affect the performance of licensees and licensors 
is critical to understanding how markets for technology function.  
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Danish Summary  
 
Licenskontrakter repræsenterer en af de mest udbredte mekanismer til udveksling af teknologier 
og overførsel af knowhow mellem virksomheder. På grund af de muligheder, som 
licensudstedelsen skaber for virksomheder, der opererer på begge sider af markederne for 
teknologi, er licensudstedelsen i stigende grad blevet en integreret del af virksomhedernes F&U-
strategier. På udbudssiden har den eksisterende litteratur været fokuseret på at forstå, hvordan 
teknologien licensudstedelse kan bruges af virksomheder som en mekanisme til at inddrive 
investeringer i innovative aktiviteter og fremme læringsmuligheder. På efterspørgselssiden er 
det blevet påvist, at licensudstedelse er en vigtig kilde, som virksomhederne kan bruge til at 
brødføde deres interne behov for innovativ viden. Mens flere studier har undersøgt 
teknologilicensudstedelse fra licensgiverens perspektiv, er der behov for mere forskning, der 
undersøger, hvordan virksomhederne er afhængige af licensaftaler for at tilegne sig viden og 
forbedre deres innovationsresultater. Derudover har der med få undtagelser været nok 
opmærksomhed på de organisatoriske eller kontraktmæssige egenskaber i relation til de 
licensaftaler, som determinanter for kapaciteten af den overtagende virksomhed. 
Formålet med denne afhandling er at undersøge forholdet mellem 
teknologilicenser og virksomhedsinnovation. Dette bliver gjort ved at undersøge de særlige 
kendetegn ved den overtagende virksomhed og anvendelse af særlige kontraktbestemmelser, 
som påvirker dette forhold. Essayene i denne afhandling bygger på et andet sæt af teoretiske 
perspektiver forbundet med licenslitteraturen. Afhandlingen består af en generel introduktion, 
fire essays og en konklusion. Alle essayene bygger på det samme datasæt, der omhandler 
licensaftaler i den globale farmaceutiske industri, men supplerende oplysninger fra forskellige 
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datakilder blev tilsluttet licensaftaler til at besvare de konkrete forskningsspørgsmål, foreslået i 
hvert essay. 
Hvert essay overvejer og bidrager til den eksisterende litteratur ved at undersøge 
forholdet mellem teknologilicenser og særlige dimensioner af virksomhedsinnovation. Ved at 
forstå hvordan licensaftaler påvirker performance af licenshavere og licensgivere er afgørende 
for at forstå, hvordan markederne for teknologier fungerer. Derfor udforsker denne afhandling 
ikke kun forholdet mellem licenser og virksomhedsinnovation, men også forskellige uforudsete 
relationer til kontrakten, teknologierne og de organisatoriske karakteristika. 
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CHAPTER 1 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between innovation and firm performance is well established among strategy 
scholars. Previous studies have shown that innovative firms are significantly more likely to 
outperform non-innovative firms in terms of profitability (Geroski & Machin, 1992), market 
value (Blundell, Griffith, & Reenen, 1999), and likelihood of survival (Cefis & Marsili, 2005). 
Accordingly, one of the central determinants of a firm’s capacity to innovate regards the 
organization of internal research and development (R&D) activities (Pisano, 1990). 
Undoubtedly, through investment in internal R&D, firms are able to create and refine the in-
house capabilities necessary to develop new products and services (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
However, even though internal R&D has traditionally been pointed to as a major source of 
knowledge and technical know-how, it is not the only possible source (Chesbrough, 2003). 
Actually, even large innovative firms cannot rely entirely on internal sourcing to access relevant 
knowledge; they also need to go beyond their boundaries to feed their inventive activities 
(Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). Consequently, a central part of the innovation process regards 
the search and acquisition of new knowledge residing in different sources (Laursen & Salter, 
2006).   
 The fact that firms simultaneously pursue both internal and external knowledge 
acquisition suggests that those activities are complementary and tightly coupled (Cassiman & 
Veugelers, 2006). While internal R&D is necessary for firms to assimilate, recombine, and 
apply new knowledge (Zahra & George, 2002), the access to external sources is important to 
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bring heterogeneity and avoid local search bias (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Stuart & Podolny, 
1996). As a consequence, in addition to internal R&D, innovative firms invest considerable 
amounts of resources to access external knowledge (Laursen & Salter, 2006). Accordingly, a 
large number of studies have focused on different mechanisms such as licensing contracts 
(Atuahene-Gima, 1993; Leone & Reichstein, 2012), strategic alliances (Mowery, Oxley, & 
Silverman, 1996; Sampson, 2007), and the hiring of skilled employees (Singh & Agrawal, 2011; 
Tzabbar, Aharonson, & Amburgey, 2013) to understand the relationship between external 
knowledge acquisition and different dimensions of firm innovation. 
The four papers in this dissertation focus specifically on technology licensing 
contracts as a mechanism for external knowledge acquisition. In doing so, they add mainly to 
the innovation literature by focusing on specific dimensions of technology licensing that have 
not been fully considered by the existing research. Comparatively to other formal means that 
firms can use to acquire external knowledge, previous studies have paid much less attention to 
technology licensing. Considered vis-à-vis different mechanisms for knowledge acquisition, 
licensing contracts can be defined as an arm’s length contractual deal through which firms can 
trade know-how and intellectual property (IP) rights (Arora, 1995; Arora & Gambardella, 2010). 
Compared with other R&D partnerships such as joint ventures and other forms of strategic 
alliances, technology licensing is significantly more similar to market transactions (Fosfuri, 
2006). Indeed, although firms may enter into licensing agreements to develop technologies with 
external partners, licensing deals are mostly represented by the trade of existing technologies 
(Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013; Grindley & Teece, 1997).  
In terms of economic relevance, it is well known that licensing is one of the most 
important and fast-growing mechanisms for technology transfer between firms (Anand & 
Khanna, 2000). Indeed, the total value of technology exchange within OECD nations increased 
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by 63% between 1996 and 2006 (OECD, 2009). Furthermore, a 2003 OECD survey covering 
firms located in Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific revealed that almost 60% of the firms 
in the sample reported a significant increase in licensing activities during the 1990s (Arora & 
Gambardella, 2010). This consistent expansion in licensing activities has major implications for 
firms’ corporate strategies (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001), dissemination of new 
technologies (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003), and the way that the production and use of technologies 
are organized between firms (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013).  
Previous studies have examined several reasons that firms on both sides of markets 
for technology (technology suppliers and buyers) have to engage in technology licensing. On the 
supply side, it has been shown that through licensing contracts firms are able to generate 
significant income (Arora et al., 2001), benefit from learning opportunities (Leone & Reichstein, 
2012) and maximize return on investment in R&D activities (Atuahene-Gima, 1993). In reality, 
explaining the reasons behind firms’ decisions to trade their technologies has been the main 
focus of the extant licensing literature, with several papers approaching technology licensing 
under the lens of the licensor. Nevertheless, a small number of studies focusing on the demand 
side of markets for technology has provided consistent evidence that licensing can be used by 
the acquiring firm to speed the innovation process (Leone & Reichstein, 2012), gain strategic 
flexibility (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013), and explore new technological areas (Laursen, Leone, & 
Torrisi, 2010). Although those studies have shed light on important dimensions of technology 
licensing, several questions concerning the way that firms manage their licensing activities and 
its implications for firm performance and strategy remain unaddressed. Looking at some of 
those questions, the essays that follow examine four main points related to technology licensing 
and firm innovation:  
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1) How do individual and group level characteristics within firms affect the ease of 
knowledge absorption and recombination of licensed-in technologies? 
2) What is the effect of recoverable slack and organizational myopia on the firm’s 
capacity to deal with licensed-in technologies? 
 3) How do the characteristics of licensed technologies (e.g., unfamiliarity, 
complexity and uncertainty) affect firm performance?  
 4) Under what circumstances will certain contractual clauses related to the 
evolution and application of the licensed technologies be used in licensing contracts? 
 
While the connecting point of the four papers lies in technology licensing literature, the papers 
in this dissertation also use different theoretical perspectives to integrate technological licensing 
within different analytical frameworks. The first paper focuses on the licensee’s point of view, 
and builds on the absorptive capacity and network analysis literatures to examine the effects of 
network structure and composition on firm capacity to deal with the challenges of unfamiliarity 
related to licensed-in technologies. The second paper, also focusing on the licensee’s 
perspective, builds mainly on the organizational learning literature to propose that by engaging 
in technology, licensing-in firms can increase their capacity to produce innovations mainly due 
to learning effects resulting from the access to new knowledge. The third paper considers both 
the licensee and the licensor within the same analytical framework, building on the extended 
resource based view of the firm to predict firm behavior in terms of contractual preferences. 
Finally, the fourth paper follows the classic tradition in the licensing literature and builds on 
industrial economics studies to look at the competitive implications experienced by licensors 
commercializing core-technologies.   
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In order to approach the different research questions empirically, the four essays 
rely on the same main dataset: Recombinant Capital’s Biotech Alliance (Recap). This database 
is one of the most accurate sources of information regarding partnerships and technology 
exchange in the pharmaceutical industry (Audretsch & Feldman, 2003; Schilling, 2009). More 
specifically, this database offers the possibility to access the original licensing contracts, from 
which it was possible to extract precise information regarding the characteristics of the licensed 
technologies, contractual specifications, and information related to the identification of licensees 
and licensors (e.g., firm name, address, and operating segment). Furthermore, the fact that the 
licensing deals are restricted to the Pharmaceutical industry allowed me to investigate in more 
detail the licensing dynamics specifically related to knowledge creation. There are at least three 
main reasons that make this context (pharmaceutical firms) particularly appropriate to test the 
hypotheses proposed in the four essays. First, the pharmaceutical industry is characterized as 
technology driven and R&D intensive, which makes technological knowledge a critical 
component to develop and sustain competitive advantages (Roberts, 1999). Second, R&D 
collaboration with other firms and universities represents an important driver of technology 
development (Arora & Gambardella, 1990). Third, firms in this industry routinely and 
systematically protect and document their inventions through patents (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 
2003). 
 In connection with the last point mentioned above, the strong reliance that 
pharmaceutical firms have on patents to protect innovation was particularly important for me to 
successfully integrate the Recap database with other databases related to firm patenting activity. 
The novel combination of existing databases was critical for me to aim at addressing questions 
that previous studies left open. For example, using patent data allowed me to reconstruct 
intrafirm inventor networks, which made it possible to connect technology licensing to different 
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analytical levels within firms. Indeed, the first paper of this dissertation is the first attempt that I 
am aware of at considering the effect of licensing on firm innovation in light of group level 
characteristics within the acquiring firm. Beyond patenting activity, additional data related to 
firm-level information was obtained from COMPUSTAT. This database was important to obtain 
consistent financial information about the firms listed in the licensing database. In total, the 
papers in this dissertation explored four different data sources.  
1.1 Papers on Technology Licensing and Firm Innovation 
 
Several specific characteristics found in technology licensing contracts make them a particularly 
useful mechanism for investigating the relationship between external knowledge acquisition and 
firm innovation. For example, an important and distinguishing characteristic of licensing 
contracts regards the contractual nature of the exchanged knowledge. While ex-ante contracts 
such as research alliances involve higher uncertainty about their potential outcomes, in ex-post 
contracts such as licensing, the traded technology can be more easily defined. Furthermore, most 
licensing contracts signed between firms involve technologies that have already been proven 
(Atuahene-Gima, 1993; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). These characteristics were important for the 
development of the papers in this dissertation, both empirically and conceptually. On the 
empirical side, the fact that licensing contracts usually trade well-defined and identifiable 
technologies was fundamental for me to compute most of the measures used to test the proposed 
hypotheses. On the conceptual side, this dissertation sheds light on important dimensions of 
knowledge acquisition such as the use of contractual instruments to shape knowledge flows 
between firms that would not be easily developed without the analytical framework that is 
provided by technology licensing contracts. Accordingly, the four papers summarized below 
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develop conceptual and empirical applications of different phenomenon of interest for 
innovation scholars within the scope of technology licensing.         
 
1.1.1 Essay 1: All for one and one for all: How intrafirm inventor networks 
affect the speed of external knowledge recombination 
 
The first paper of this dissertation examines a relatively unexplored dimension of knowledge 
acquisition regarding the speed with which firms are able to recombine external and internal 
knowledge in order to produce innovations. Despite the fact that innovation speed has been 
suggested to be critical for firms to establish first-mover advantages, achieve or sustain 
technological leadership and overtake rivals, very few empirical studies have aimed at 
understanding the speed dimension related to recombination of external knowledge (e.g., Leone 
& Reichstein, 2012; Tzabbar et al., 2013). This paper also offers a relevant contribution to the 
absorptive capacity research by focusing on the interaction patterns between individuals within 
firms as an appropriate unit of analysis to understand the process of knowledge recombination at 
the firm level. We find that the higher the unfamiliarity with the licensed technology, the longer 
it takes the acquiring firm to successfully recombine it with internal knowledge elements. 
However, the results also indicate that structural and compositional characteristics of the firms’ 
intra inventor networks related to diversity and closure ameliorate the negative effects of 
unfamiliarity on recombination speed. This finding provides insight into how individual-level 
network formation affects a firm’s ability to quickly recombine and integrate external 
knowledge. In particular, it theoretically and empirically substantiates the idea that 
intraorganizational inventor networks affect the speed dimension of a firms’ absorptive capacity.   
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1.1.2 Essay 2: A Longitudinal Study of the Influence of Technology Licensing 
on Firm Innovation: The Moderating effect of Slack and Organizational 
Myopia 
 
The second paper in this dissertation focuses on how licensing-in of technology affects firms’ 
subsequent capacity to produce innovations. Although licensing has repeatedly been 
acknowledged to be a major vehicle for firms to acquire external knowledge (Ceccagnoli & 
Jiang, 2013), surprisingly little is known about how firms use licensing as part of their overall 
inventive efforts. Furthermore, with the exception of absorptive (Laursen et al., 2010) capacity, 
the organizational determinants that facilitate or constrain firms' ability to deal with licensed-in 
technologies have received little attention. This paper starts investigating in a longitudinal 
setting the effect of technology licensing on the number of patents produced by the licensee 
within the three years subsequent to the technology acquisition. I further develop the idea that 
licensing is a complementary part of firms’ innovation efforts using organizational learning 
lenses. The findings indicate that technology licensing is positively related to the number of 
inventions produced by the licensee in the years subsequent to the licensing deal. Subsequently, 
I investigate the moderating effect that organizational slack and myopia have on this main 
relationship. The findings also suggest that high levels of Organizational Slack (available 
financial resources) strengthen the positive effect of licensing on innovation. However, higher 
levels of Organizational Myopia (the extent to which a firm draws on its own knowledge) can 
decrease the main effect of licensing. Those findings go in the same direction of previous 
studies that have suggested the relationship between knowledge acquisition and firm innovation 
cannot be taken for granted but should be considered in light of specific organizational 
characteristics.  
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1.2.3 Essay 3: Exploring the boomerang effect: The role of core technologies 
and uncertainty in explaining the use of the grant-back clause in technology 
licensing 
 
The third paper concerns the use of the technology-flow back provision (grant-back clause) in 
technology licensing. This clause has been described in previous studies as a relevant 
contractual specification with significant implications for both licensor and licensee. Despite the 
potential mutual benefits for firms from entering into licensing deals, previous studies have also 
indicated that licensing might create undesirable competition due to the transfer of the firms’ 
knowledge capabilities related to cutting-edge technologies (Choi, 2002). In this context, the 
grant-back clause can be used as an instrument to ensure that the licensee will grant back to the 
licensor the rights to any improvement in the licensed technology (Schmalbeck, 1974). In other 
words, the grant-back clause can have substantial influence on the nature and amount of 
knowledge that will be transferred between the firms after entering in a deal. Despite this 
evidence, to the best of my knowledge no previous empirical study has attempted to explain the 
conditions under which this clause is used. This paper looks into the contingencies related to the 
technological aspects of the licensing deal that make it more or less likely that the grant-back 
clause will be used in the contract. One of the main features of this paper regards the 
development and empirical testing of a theoretical approach that integrates the extended 
resource based view of the firm into contract theory. The findings suggest that the extent to 
which the licensing deal involves core technologies (to the licensee and the licensor) and the 
uncertainty related to its future trajectory are significant predictors for this use of this clause in 
licensing deals 
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1.1.4 Essay 4: Understanding the Rent Dissipation Effect in Technology 
Licensing Contracts 
The fourth paper introduces and empirically tests a framework to understand the profit 
dissipation experienced by firms that license out their technologies. While the generation of 
revenues is an important incentive for firms to license out, granting other firms access to 
relevant technologies can also produce negative implications for the licensor’s competitiveness 
(Choi, 2002). Along this line, rent dissipation is a phenomenon related to the increasing 
competition that licensors with downstream assets in the product market might experience in the 
periods subsequent to the licensing deal (Fosfuri, 2006). The fact that the licensee can use the 
acquired technology to improve its own internal capabilities and become an aggressive 
competitor has been repeatedly suggested in conceptual papers dealing with this issue. 
Accordingly, the importance of this phenomenon lies of the fact that in several sectors the 
market for inventions might remain underdeveloped, given the licensor’s concerns about 
undermining its competitive advantages. This paper aims at explaining the dissipation effect 
experienced by licensors using a perspective that incorporates three important dimensions of the 
markets for technology: 1) whether the licensors possess downstream assets, 2) licensee size, 
and 3) technological overlap between the licensor and the licensee. The results lend empirical 
support to the idea that licensing out core technologies is negatively related to subsequent 
changes in the licensor’s market share. I also find that as the licensee size increases the 
dissipation effect is strengthened. However, if the licensee and the licensor operate in different 
technological areas (i.e., they are technologically fragmented) the negative effect caused by 
licensing core technologies becomes weaker. Those findings add to the current literature by 
discussing the importance of also taking into account the licensee’s characteristics as a way to 
understand more comprehensively the dissipation effect. 
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1.2 Contributions and Implications  
 
This dissertation as a whole contributes to the innovation and licensing literatures in different 
respects. Generally speaking, it provides empirical and theoretical insights into how firms use 
technology licensing to feed their demands for external knowledge. This dissertation also 
provides an overview of licensing practices related to the way that contractual clauses can be 
used to shape the incentives that those involved have to enter into licensing deals. More than 
that, it also looks at the motives that firms on both sides of markets for technology have to buy 
and sell technologies through licensing contracts. In fact, by mainly focusing on the demand 
side of markets for technology, the papers in this dissertation join a growing body of literature 
suggesting that so far little is known about the determinants of firms’ decisions to license in 
(e.g., Laursen et al., 2010; Leone and Reichstein, 2012; Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013). 
Accordingly, in all of the four papers in this dissertation the licensee perspective is incorporated 
into the conceptual and empirical analysis.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Firms increasingly rely on recombination of internal and external knowledge to create 
inventions that can be subsequently commercialized into innovations (Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Particularly in high-tech and fast-paced industries, external 
partners play a critical part in a firm’s R&D process as firms gain access to complementary 
assets (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Sampson, 2007). Acquisition of external knowledge is an attractive 
alternative to in-house R&D, because firms spread the risk and cost inherent to R&D and may 
shorten the development of inventions  (Ahuja, 2000; Kessler & Chakrabathi, 1996). Yet, firms 
significantly differ in the ability to draw on and benefit from acquiring external knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Despite our growing understanding of firms’ ability to harness 
external knowledge for own invention, the absorptive capacity literature has overlooked the 
intraorganizational antecedents of knowledge integration (cf. Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010). 
As a consequence, little is known about the role of individuals and groups in the process through 
which firms integrate external knowledge.     
 In an attempt to address this gap some scholars have alluded to intrafirm informal 
networks among employees as determinant of firms’ absorptive capacity (Mors, 2010; 
Paruchuri, 2009; Volberda et al., 2010). This claim resonates well with Cohen & Levinthal's 
(1990) idea that the interactions and links across individuals alter the way external knowledge is 
absorbed into the firm as interaction facilitates knowledge-sharing within the firm (Allen & 
Cohen, 1969; Tushman, 1977). In this respect, the literature on knowledge recombination has 
recently underlined the role of intrafirm networks among inventors as the locus of firms’ 
recombinant capacity (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Guler & Nerkar, 2012; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 
2005). 
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 In this paper, we build on the prior literature on absorptive capacity to examine 
how intrafirm networks configurations among inventors influence a firms’ ability to integrate 
external knowledge. We specifically focus on a dimension of absorptive capacity that has 
received relatively little attention; the speed of external knowledge integration. Yet, prior 
research has pointed to the fact that firms that are able to innovate in a fast pace achieve first-
mover advantages and capture new market opportunities (Markman, Gianiodis, Phan, & Balkin, 
2005). More in general, examining how quick firms can internalize external knowledge is 
important as it is a source of competitive advantage, especially in industries where time-based 
competition is paramount (Kessler & Chakrabathi, 1996; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Tzabbar, 
Aharonson, & Amburgey, 2012; Zahra & George, 2002). Two recent studies are worth 
mentioning in this respect. First, a recent study by Leone & Reichstein (2012) shows that 
licensing-in accelerates firms’ invention speed, yet this effect reduces when firms license-in 
unfamiliar technologies. In similar vein, a recent paper by Tzabbar et al. (2012) shows that the 
rate of knowledge integration depends on the type of external knowledge sourcing mechanism 
(i.e. scientist recruitment vs. R&D alliance) and the degree of familiarity with the knowledge 
that is transferred. We depart from these two specific studies and examine how the structure and 
composition of intrafirm inventor networks may accelerate or slow down the integration of 
distant or unfamiliar external knowledge. Our choice to focus on inventors is motivated by the 
fact that inventors carry out inventive search using their skills and knowledge, and subsequently 
propose and implement solutions to problems faced during the process of external knowledge 
integration (Fleming, 2001). In addition, we take a social network perspective, because 
inventors are unlikely to operate in isolation (Singh & Fleming, 2009), but instead rely on a web 
of colleague-inventors through which they search for advice, obtain referrals and acquire useful 
knowledge for problem-solving (Singh, Hansen, & Podolny, 2010; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). In 
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sum, we develop a theoretical framework that explains how specific configurations of intrafirm 
networks may speed-up the recombination of external knowledge into firms’ own inventions.  
Building on the literature on recombinant search, absorptive capacity literature and 
social network theory we develop a set of hypotheses that predict how intra-firm network 
characteristics influence recombination of external knowledge into firms’ own invention. Based 
on the intuition that inventors encounter difficulties in integrating external knowledge 
components with which they have no prior experience, we predict that firms’ recombination 
speed decreases with the degree of unfamiliarity. Yet, we subsequently posit that certain 
intrafirm network configurations attenuate problems related to time-costly recombination of 
distant external knowledge. We follow prior social network research on search-transfer issues by 
focusing on intrafirm network density, diversity and average tie strength (Hansen, 1999; Phelps, 
2010; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Considering the social network literature, those three 
measures have been recurrently pointed out as the main group-level compositional and structural 
characteristics that shape knowledge flow patterns among individuals. On the structural side, 
network density and tie strength are particular relevant characteristics as they determine the 
amount and the quality of the knowledge that will flow within the network (Granovetter, 1973; 
Reagans & McEvily, 2003). On the compositional side, network diversity refers to the 
qualitative aspects (e.g., heterogeneity of the resources) of the knowledge that the network 
members can access when relying on their peers (Phelps, 2010). We specifically address the fact 
that structural and compositional characteristics have distinct benefits to inventors who are part 
of the network and therefore disentangle them both theoretically and empirically.  
We examine our predictions in the context of 113 US pharmaceutical firms in the 
period 1986-2003. The pharmaceutical industry is a suitable setting as firms in this industry 
regularly innovate and engage in external knowledge sourcing (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; 
Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). The analysis draws on a unique and detailed dataset 
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which combines data on licensing agreements, inventors and patents. A total of 708 licensed 
technologies serve as instances of external knowledge acquisition. We follow prior studies with 
the idea that co-invention or collaboration between inventors represents non-directional 
communication and information exchange channels (Allen, 1977; Guler & Nerkar, 2012; Singh, 
2005). The observed co-invention ties between inventors then serve as inputs to construct our 
intrafirm knowledge networks, where inventors are represented by nodes and ties indicate co-
inventions with colleagues. In the analysis we utilize event history analysis to test our 
hypotheses and employ a difference-in-differences method to strengthen our choice of licensing 
as a knowledge acquisition mechanism. 
Our findings provide overall support for all hypotheses, except our prediction 
regarding average tie strength. Even though acquisition of a distant technology requires a firm 
and its inventors to devote more time to recombine this technology with internal knowledge, we 
find support for our predictions that intrafirm network density and diversity both shorten the 
time of distant external knowledge recombination. We interpret these findings as evidence of 
how dense networks facilitate access to colleagues and willingness among inventors to support 
each other. Also, the presence of a set of heterogeneous contacts in an inventor’s intra-
organizational network facilitates the access to a diverse set of heuristics increasing the 
collective problem-solving ability of inventors within the firm.  
The main contribution of this research lies in postulating the role of intra-
organizational employees’ informal networks in the process of external knowledge integration. 
Unlike prior empirical work on absorptive capacity, we disentangle internal informal networks, 
to advance our understanding about the effect of group-level antecedents on firm-level 
absorptive capacity (cf. Volberda et al., 2010). In addition, we examine a rather unexplored 
dimension of absorptive capacity, the speed with which firms are able to integrate external 
knowledge components. Time-to-recombination is crucial in consolidating firms competitive 
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position and first-to-market successes (Kessler & Chakrabathi, 1996). We also add a 
complementary perspective to prior work on social networks as the locus of recombination 
(Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Guler & Nerkar, 2012; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005; Phelps, Heidl, & 
Wadhwa, 2012) which has mostly examined internal knowledge recombination. Our study 
highlights the function that intrafirm networks serve in recombining external knowledge. 
Finally, we add to research on the role of intraorganizational social networks for overall firm 
innovation outcomes (Kleinbaum & Tushman, 2007).  
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses  
 
An invention is the outcome of a search process that involves problem-solving by inventors and 
eventually, recombination of existing knowledge components in a novel manner (Fleming, 
2001; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Schumpeter, 1934). The invention process has shifted from 
taking place solely within the firm to a more open model in which firms acquire knowledge 
from a variety of sources (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006; Laursen & Salter, 2006). 
Acquisition of external knowledge facilitates firm invention due to the complementarity 
between externally and internally generated knowledge components (Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2006). Firms do not have all relevant knowledge in-house and therefore engage in alliances, 
licensing, and hiring to update their R&D process (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Levin et al., 
1987). The process of knowledge recombination thus increasingly relies on the recombination of 
both internal and external knowledge components. In this respect, Cohen & Levinthal (1990) 
argue that firms vary in the ability to draw on external knowledge. The absorptive capacity of 
firms refers to the ability to recognize, assimilate, and exploit external knowledge and “is 
largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990: 128). 
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 According to the knowledge-based theory of the firm, knowledge is collectively 
stored among employees and firms can be seen as social communities (Kogut & Zander, 1996; 
Matusik & Heeley, 2005). Social communities are the origin of knowledge creation and 
knowledge transfer within the firm (Tsai, 2000, 2001). In a similar manner, the literature on 
organizational learning asserts that learning involves knowledge transfer among individuals and 
business units within the firm (Argote, Mcevily, & Reagans, 2003; Huber, 1991). Organizations 
can thus be understood as network arrangements (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; 
Reinholt, Pedersen, & Foss, 2011; Tsai, 2001). Networks among employees, and especially 
those individuals that are active in a firm’s R&D process, inventors, influence the extent to 
which knowledge is diffused and generated within a firm (Guler & Nerkar, 2012; Nerkar & 
Paruchuri, 2005).  
 Intrafirm social networks can be seen as an antecedent of a firm’s absorptive 
capacity (Volberda et al., 2010) because intrafirm networks shape knowledge flows among 
individuals and determine the efficiency of communication between them. Relevant knowledge 
for problem-solving is distributed among individuals within the firm (Lenox & King, 2004) and 
can be detected and shared through networks (Brass et al., 2004; Turner & Makhija, 2012). To 
illustrate this, Nerkar & Paruchuri (2005:773) argue that “bounded rational inventors search 
across the internal knowledge network on the basis of incomplete information about which 
knowledge should be recombined”. Networks among inventors also constitute communication 
patterns. The efficiency of communication (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) refers to inward-looking 
absorptive capacity and determines the effectiveness of internal sharing of external knowledge 
(Volberda et al., 2010). In this sense, intrafirm inventor networks influence firm innovation 
through sharing, development, and recombination of external knowledge. As a consequence, 
interpersonal networks can be seen as an antecedent of a firm’s capacity to deal with external 
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knowledge, constituting the micro-foundations of a firm’s inventive capabilities (Allen & 
Cohen, 1969; Brown & Duguid, 2001; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). 
 The use of external knowledge in a firm’s R&D process may shorten the time of 
the invention process (Kessler & Chakrabathi, 1996; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). Speeding up 
the invention process is crucial to consolidate the competitive position of firms. Yet, the effect 
of external knowledge acquisition on subsequent invention speed depends on the channel 
through which external knowledge is acquired (Lee & Allen, 1982; Tzabbar, Aharonson, & 
Amburgey, 2012; Vasudeva & Anand, 2011) and a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1989, 1990). In this paper we examine the influence of specific intrafirm network 
configurations of inventors on the speed with which a firm integrates and recombines externally 
acquired knowledge. We define external knowledge recombination speed as the time it takes a 
firm to recombine externally acquired knowledge into the firm’s own invention. In the next 
paragraphs we develop hypotheses on how structural and compositional features of intrafirm 
networks among inventors affect the recombination speed of external knowledge.  
 
Technological distance and recombination speed. Firms acquire external knowledge to 
complement their own technological knowledge base. In fact, in order to fill in the gaps related 
to the lack of specific knowledge components, firms tend to reach out for technologically distant 
knowledge (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). Yet, we argue here that even though firms are prone 
to engage in distant knowledge sourcing, this comes at a cost with regard to recombination 
speed. The ease with which firms recombine external knowledge hinges upon having related 
prior experience with the acquired knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 
2002). Prior experience becomes the natural starting point for subsequent searches for new 
knowledge, and a firm’s knowledge stock, which is accumulated over the years, is used as a lens 
through which the firm makes sense of knowledge from the environment (Rosenkopf & 
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Almeida, 2003). The technological development of a firm over time thus affects the 
technological distance between a firm’s knowledge base and external knowledge. Assimilation 
of external knowledge requires a common base of understanding, or overlap in the knowledge 
base, in order to achieve successful application of this piece of knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). As a result, when the technological distance between the firm’s knowledge base and 
acquired external knowledge increases, the absorptive capacity of a firm declines (Gilsing, 
Nooteboom, Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Vandenoord, 2008; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). This 
means that the cost and effort to recombine external knowledge increases with distance (Leone 
& Reichstein, 2012; Weitzman, 1998). To illustrate this, integration of distant external 
knowledge will require more effort and time as inventors in the firm are likely to encounter 
problems when they deal with unfamiliar knowledge. The solution generation process will 
subsequently prolong the time it takes for the firm to recombine distant external knowledge into 
an invention. Consequently, a firm requires more time to understand distant knowledge and may 
need more time to invest in its absorption, and this will slow down the process of external 
knowledge recombination. Our baseline hypothesis therefore states: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The larger the distance between the externally acquired knowledge and the firm’s 
knowledge base, the longer it takes the firm to recombine external knowledge 
 
Intrafirm network density and the recombination speed of distant external knowledge. Dense 
networks (also called cohesive or closed networks) are networks in which the members are well-
connected with each other. From an innovation perspective, previous studies have indicated that 
network density may either be beneficial or harmful for firm innovation (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 
1988). On the one hand, network density leads to knowledge-sharing among members of the 
network and fosters information flow through the network (Gargiulo, Ertug, & Galunic, 2009; 
Obstfeld, 2005; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Furthermore, dense networks are likely to have 
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effective norms, promote trust (Coleman, 1988), and facilitate the exchange of tacit and 
complex knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Hansen, Podolny, & Pfeffer, 2001; Uzzi, 1997). On the 
other hand, the opposite of a dense network, a sparse network, may also be effective for firm 
innovation (Burt, 2004). A sparse network, which features structural holes between clusters or 
sub-networks, enhances firm innovation through the likelihood that such a network structure 
exhibits diverse information and fosters creativity.  
Although sparse networks have been shown to be associated with high levels of 
heterogeneity, which facilitate the creation of new knowledge, the absence of connections 
between the network members reduces the speed with which individuals can share knowledge 
and access information (Singh et al., 2010). In fact, even though knowledge heterogeneity is 
important for inventors to deal with unfamiliarity, existing ties are necessary to provide 
individuals the right channels to tap into each other’s experience and knowledge. This is 
particularly true for intrafirm networks, given that relevant knowledge might exist within the 
firm boundaries and still remain unutilized if network configurations do not favor its detection 
and dissemination (Hansen, 1999). 
 Therefore, we claim that intrafirm network density is particularly relevant to 
firms’ ability to quickly recombine and eventually integrate distant external knowledge. 
Intrafirm inventor network density shortens the time it takes to recombine distant external 
knowledge for at least three reasons. First, dense networks ease the search for and detection of 
relevant knowledge available in the network of inventors. Through their ties, inventors may hear 
about and observe potentially relevant inventors with the knowledge and skills needed to 
recombine distant external knowledge. Thus, dense networks tend to speed up the search time 
for relevant information within the network (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Second, dense inventor 
networks tend to encourage knowledge sharing and the willingness to devote time and effort to 
support peers (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Such cooperative behavior is likely to create 
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cooperative norms and fosters knowledge transfer between inventors in the firm. For this reason, 
one may expect that the prolonged recombination time inherent to distant knowledge tends to be 
shorter in dense networks as a result of a mutually supportive environment. Third, network 
density promotes the formation of norms, which, in turn, enhances mutual understanding 
between inventors and lowers the possibility of misinterpretation and loss of relevant 
information  (Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Inventors in dense networks 
thus tend to save time due to the formation of successful communication routines. In line with 
our predictions, we claim that firms with a dense intrafirm co-invention network experience a 
shorter recombination time for distant external knowledge. Our second hypothesis thus states the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Firms with an intrafirm inventor network that has a high level of network density 
recombine distant knowledge faster than firms with an intrafirm inventor network that has a low 
level of network density 
 
Intrafirm average tie strength and recombination speed of distant external knowledge. Tie 
strength refers to the intensity of interaction between two members of the network and is “a 
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confounding) 
and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (Granovetter, 1973: 1361). Tie strength 
characteristics tend to increase with increasing frequency of collaboration between inventors. 
Tie strength promotes trust and facilitates knowledge transfer, especially knowledge that is 
complex and tacit (Hansen, 1999; Levin, Walter, & Murnighan, 2010; McFadyen et al., 2009). 
While weak ties help in the search of useful knowledge it also impedes individuals to exchange 
complex information, limiting the extent to which complex knowledge flows within the network 
(Hansen, 1999). In fact, Hansen (1999) points out that, particularly in the case of innovation, 
useful knowledge may fail to be appropriately shared among individuals even though 
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information regarding the whereabouts of the knowledge is disseminated across the network. 
This argument emphasizes the need of strong ties in order to individuals’ knowledge and 
expertise to move from one point to another in the network. Strong ties among inventors within 
a firm are likely to mitigate disadvantages related to integrating distant external knowledge 
according to two main arguments.  First, trust and knowledge-sharing among inventors increases 
with recurring interaction (Hansen, 1999; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). This, in turn, increases 
the willingness of inventors to spend more time and effort on supporting each other (Rost, 2010; 
Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001; Sosa, 2010), for example in problem-solving related to the 
integration of unfamiliar pieces of knowledge. Second, knowledge that is tacit and highly 
complex is better transferred through strong ties (Hansen, 1999; Phelps et al., 2012). Distant 
knowledge is likely to be a complex matter for inventors within the firm, and therefore, tie 
strength increases the likelihood that such complexity is shared throughout the firm, which 
accelerates the integration process (Hansen, 1999). Taken together, we expect that high average 
tie strength will shorten the recombination process of distant knowledge and we therefore posit 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Firms with an intrafirm inventor network that has high average tie strength 
recombine distant knowledge faster than firms with an intrafirm inventor network that has low 
average tie strength 
 
Intrafirm network diversity and recombination speed of distant external knowledge. Network 
diversity refers to the diversity of resources available in the network. Or, in other words, the 
extent to which network connections span boundaries (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). In the 
context of this paper, network diversity refers to variety in technological experience among the 
collaborating inventors inside the firm (Harrison & Klein, 2007) or the extent to which inventor 
ties span technological boundaries. Network diversity or range increases knowledge sharing 
among members of the network (Reagans & McEvily, 2003) and promotes the problem-solving 
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ability of members through access to diverse resources available in the network (Phelps, 2010). 
An intrafirm network composed of a diverse group of inventors will accelerate the time it takes 
to recombine distant external knowledge for at least three reasons. First, due to the inherent 
uncertainty of knowledge recombination, inventors benefit from having diverse partners in their 
intrafirm network. Diverse connections provide a single inventor with access to a diverse set of 
problem-solving heuristics (Page, 2007) and support the accomplishment of complex tasks 
related to recombining distant knowledge (Mors, 2010; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). Thus, the 
collective problem-solving ability of inventors increases with diversity and shortens the time it 
takes to recombine complex distant knowledge acquired from outside the boundaries of the firm. 
Second, when inventor with different technological backgrounds collaborate they expand their 
ability to convey knowledge across distinct bodies of meta-knowledge (Reagans & McEvily, 
2003; Tortoriello, Reagans, & McEvily, 2012). Over time, building experience in interacting 
with dissimilar colleagues increases inventors’ capability to efficiently and successfully frame 
their communication with other inventors, which, in turn, may accelerate the recombination of 
distant knowledge based on future interactions among heterogeneous inventors. Third, diversity 
within the intrafirm network increases the likelihood of overlap between the acquired external 
knowledge component and available relevant knowledge already existent in the intrafirm co-
inventor network (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Diversity among collaborating inventors thus 
eases the comprehensibility of distant external knowledge and leads to shorter recombination 
time. Our final hypothesis therefore states:   
 
Hypothesis 4. Firms with an intrafirm inventor network that has a high level of network 
diversity recombine distant knowledge faster than firms with an intrafirm inventor network that 
has a low level of network diversity 
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In short, we posit that while technological distance prolongs the time it takes to recombine 
external knowledge into own invention, network density, average tie strength and diversity 
shorten the recombination process of distant knowledge pieces1.  
 
2.3 Data and Methods  
We test the aforementioned hypotheses in the context of the global pharmaceutical industry. 
Firms in this industry develop and commercialize drugs, chemical components, and biological 
products. The focus on pharmaceutical firms provides a good research context for at least four 
reasons. First, the pharmaceutical industry is characterized as technology driven and R&D 
intensive, which makes technological knowledge a critical component to develop and sustain 
competitive advantages (Roberts, 1999). Second, firms in this industry routinely and 
systematically protect and document their inventions (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). In particular, 
patenting is an important and common mechanism used in this industry (Levin et al., 1987). 
Since patents provide reliable documentation of a firm’s innovative activities we rely on patent 
information to identify the technological profile of the firms in our sample (Roberts, 1999; 
Adegbesan and Higgins, 2010; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). Third, R&D collaboration with 
other firms and universities represents an important driver of technology development (Arora & 
Gambardella, 1990). Indeed, firms in this industry actively engage in external knowledge or 
technology acquisition to foster their own inventive activity. Finally, the pharmaceutical 
industry has proven to be a valuable context to identify and measure the effect of inventor 
networks on innovative output (Paruchuri, 2009).  
                                                          
1 We acknowledge the fact that prior work has identified costs related to excessive network density and diversity in 
particular (Phelps, 2010). We address this issue empirically in the section on robustness checks and theoretically in 
the discussion section. 
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The data used in this study derive from four data sources. First, we used detailed 
information on licensing agreements from the Deloitte Recap Database, which covers licensing 
deals in the global pharmaceutical industry for the period 1983 – 2008. This database is one of 
the most accurate sources of information regarding partnerships and technology exchange in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Audretsch & Feldman, 2003; Schilling, 2009). More specifically, this 
database allowed us to access the original licensing contracts, from which it was possible to 
extract precise information regarding the date of the licensing event, characteristics of the 
licensed technologies, contractual specifications, and information related to the identification of 
licensees and licensors (e.g. firm name, address and operating segment). Second, we drew on the 
NBER patent project to merge the specific patent numbers connected to the traded technologies 
from the Deloitte Recap Database with patents registered at the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). Furthermore, the information retrieved from the NBER project was 
used to identify the technological profile of the firms that acquire technologies through licensing 
(i.e. licensees), and the firms that sell the technologies (i.e. licensors). Therefore, we were able 
to include in the analysis variables capturing the characteristics of firms on both sides of the 
licensing contract, allowing us to disentangle potentially confounding firm effects from the 
variables of interest. Third, we relied on the Harvard Patent Network Dataverse, which provided 
us with the disambiguated inventor names and inventor identification numbers. This allowed us 
to construct intrafirm inventor networks based on co-invention as well as to derive inventor-
level information. Prior research has used qualitative evidence (i.e. interviews) to validate co-
patenting ties as a measure of collaboration among inventors (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; 
Fleming, King III, & Juda, 2007). Finally, we utilized the WRDS Compustat database mainly 
for control variables. 
The final sample consists of 113 firms involved in the acquisition of 708 USPTO 
patents using licensing contracts. Given that the information regarding inventors’ patenting 
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activity is only available from 1981 and explanatory variables regarding intrafirm networks are 
calculated based on a five-year moving window, the first licensing contract in the sample is 
observed in 1986. Furthermore, we ended the sample in 20032 to allow sufficient time to 
observe whether the patents produced by the licensee indicate that the licensed technology was 
successfully recombined. The number of observations used to run the econometric analysis 
corresponds to approximately 47% of the number of contracts registered at RECAP that was 
initially considered to test the hypotheses3.       
2.3.1 The Dependent Variable 
Time to knowledge recombination. The time it takes firms to recombine licensed technologies is 
calculated on the basis of the number of months between the licensing date and the first time 
that the licensee incorporates the licensed technology in the backward citation of a new patent. 
Using the dates of the patent application, instead of the grant dates, we avoid noise introduced 
by differences in patent office procedures. To avoid potential issues regarding bias originating 
from the use of the same data source to calculate the initial and the final dates, the dependent 
variable was calculated on the basis of information from two different (independent) databases. 
The date of external knowledge acquisition is defined on the basis of the licensing date specified 
at the RECAP database, while the recombination date comes from the Patent Network 
Dataverse. This variable is intended to capture how fast firms are able to recombine a new 
externally acquired body of knowledge with existing ones. Leone & Reichstein (2012) apply 
this dependent variable in a similar context as a robustness check to capture how inward 
licensing can shorten the time firms take to invent a new technology. In a similar way, we 
                                                          
2 The decision to end the licensing observations three years before the latest record of patent data was based on the 
fact that on average, firms in our sample take 26 months (2.2 years) to recombine the licensed technology. 
Alternatively, we also run the models using a five year gap, instead of three, and the results remained identical.  
3 In order to investigate the presence of systematic differences in invention speed of the observations (firms) that 
were excluded from the analysis due to missing information and the ones included in the final sample, we 
conducted a t-test comparing the number of months that licensees take to produce the first patent after the licensing 
date. The results indicate no statistically significant differences between the two groups. 
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consider the citation of the licensed technology in a new patent an indication that the licensee 
was able to assimilate and successfully apply the licensed knowledge4. The reliance on 
technology licensing to feed internal inventive efforts is particularly prominent in industries 
with well-functioning markets for technology, such as the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). For this reason we consider that the use of technology 
licensing in combination with the backward citations of patents constitutes a reliable set-up for 
the invention speed of pharmaceutical firms. In the section on alternative explanations and 
robustness checks we provide econometric evidence to alleviate endogeneity concerns regarding 
our dependent variable.     
2.3.2 Explanatory variables 
Technological distance. The distance between the licensed technology and the knowledge base 
of the licensee is calculated using the patenting behavior of the acquiring firm prior to the 
licensing agreement. We measure technological distance with the focal index proposed by 
Ziedonis (2007) as a way to capture the extent to which a firm is able to realize value from a 
licensed patent. The technological distance between a licensed technology and a firm’s 
knowledge base is then measured on the basis of the patent class connected to the licensed 
technology and the technology classes the licensee has been active in prior to the licensing 
event. To illustrate this, the technological distance is high if the share of the firm’s patent 
portfolio assigned to the same patent class as the licensed technology is low. On the other hand, 
the distance is low if a high share of patenting activity has been concentrated on the same 
primary class of the licensed technology.  The measure is computed as follows: 
 
                                                          
4 One could argue that firms may cite a technology without having to license it. In our sample eight cases were 
observed in which the licensed technology was referred to in the backward citation of a patent applied to the 
licensee before the licensing date. These observations are excluded from the main analysis.   
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in which ∑ ∑   ∙  represents the citation-weighted sum of firm i’s patents that were 
applied for within five years of the time of the license agreement t and that belong to the same 
primary patent class c as the licensed patent; and ∑ ∑   ∙   is the sum of all citation-
weighted patents issued to firm j that were applied for by date t following the same time window 
of five years. The use of weighted citations offers the possibility to capture the relative 
importance of each patent within the firm’s portfolio (Griliches, 1990).  
Network density. We measure network density by calculating the overall density of the intrafirm 
network (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2011; Obstfeld, 2005). Density captures the extent to which 
potential linkages are realized within a network, and is a commonly used measure of network 
structure (Guler & Nerkar, 2012; Marsden, 1990). We calculated our density measure for five-
year windows. Network density for firm i in year t is computed as follows: 
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The observed ties are defined as the number of unique ties existing between two inventors that 
appear together within the same patent, and the number of possible or potential ties follow the 
number of inventors (N) active in the firm (+×(+,). ).  
Average tie strength. Average tie strength captures the average intensity of collaboration 
between inventors within the firm. We measured tie strength between each observed pair of 
inventors on the basis of the number of patents they have co-invented with each other. We then 
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averaged this across the number of inventors in the firm. We also use a five-year moving 
window.   
Network diversity. The diversity measure aims to capture the level of technological diversity 
among the active inventors within the focal firm. To operationalize this measure we take into 
account the possibility that the inventors may also have accumulated knowledge from research 
activities developed prior to joining the focal firm. Therefore, rather than capturing firm-level 
diversity we focus on network level diversity formed by the active inventors at the year of the 
licensing contract. Furthermore, we only look into diversity among the inventors that have at 
least one intrafirm active tie, which means that inventors that produced no patent or patented 
only in collaboration with other individuals outside the firm or were a single inventor in all 
patents are not included in the analysis. The diversity measure is calculated using a Herfindahl 
index of the IPC codes (two digits) of the patents produced by the firm’s inventors with at least 
one patent, connected to the licensing firm, within the five years prior to the licensing contract. 
We define the network diversity present in firm i’s intra inventor network in year t as:  
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Following previous studies (Griliches, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001) we consider that 
the main IPC code attributed to a patent reflects a distinct technological field j = 1, 2, 3…th. 
Therefore, if the inventors within the ith firm have accumulated Ni patents within the five years 
prior to the licensing contract, each of the patents can be assigned to one technological field. 
The final measure is obtained by subtracting 1 from the value reflecting the concentration of 
patent classes across the different technological domains. 
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2.3.3 Control Variables 
We include a variety of firm, technology and contract-level control variables that may affect the 
time it takes to recombine knowledge in order to isolate the effects of the explanatory variables. 
We applied moving windows of different time lengths to compute the control variables. The 
length of the windows ranged from four to seven and differed according to the control variable; 
the different lengths were determined on the basis of prior research. To check the robustness of 
our results we tested alternative specifications (  14  year) for the control variables and the 
results of the main independent variables remained the same. In the case of the control variables 
regarding the intrafirm network, all the measures were calculated for the same length of time as 
the explanatory variables (five years). Regarding intrafirm inventors network characteristics, we 
control for clustering and average path length. We expect that those two structural 
characteristics will affect the knowledge flow across inventors by speeding up the time it takes 
to transfer knowledge from one point to another within the network. Our measure of clustering 
is scaled by the degree of clustering expected in a random bipartite network of the same size and 
density. Additionally, we included a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has co-
patented at least once prior to the licensing date. This variable is intended to capture the 
availability of external ties through which inventors can acquire relevant knowledge.  
We also control for several firm characteristics. First, we included the logarithm of 
the number of employees in the year of the licensing deal to control for firm size. Second, we 
control for cross-firm differences in terms of R&D intensity by adding the total R&D 
expenditures divided by total sales. We also control for the amount of unabsorbed resources 
using licensee slack, which is calculated on the basis of the ratio between sales and number of 
employees. Another characteristic that can also influence the speed with which the licensee is 
able to recombine the external knowledge faster regards the familiarity that it has with other 
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licensor’s technologies (other than the licensed technology). Therefore, we controlled for the 
total number of prior citations within four years prior to the licensing contract that the licensee 
has made to any of the licensor’s patents. In order to capture fast-paced knowledge 
recombination driven by industry competitive pressures (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999) we 
generated a dummy variable that takes value 1 when both firms operate in the same segment and 
0 otherwise. We also control for the general licensee’s invention speed by calculating the 
average time between the patents produced before acquiring the licensed technology. We 
included a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm has produced a patent within the 12 
months that precede the licensing date. By adding this variable we expect to control for the fact 
that certain technologies may be licensed in different stages of the invention process. Finally, we 
add a dummy variable taking value 1 if the licensee has headquarters in the United States.  
We also control for contractual specifications of the licensing deal using dummy 
variables. The inclusion of the technology-flow back provision clause (i.e. grant-back clause) 
indicates that the licensor has rights over any improvement that the licensee develops with 
regard to the licensed technology. Therefore, we expect that signing a contract with a grant-back 
clause reduces the incentives that licensees have to further develop the licensed technology 
(Choi, 2002).  Contracts that include the technology furnishing clause indicate that the licensor 
commits to supply know-how on the licensed technology to support the licensee in 
understanding and applying it, mitigating part of the problems originating from distance. 
Finally, the inclusion of milestone payments in a licensing contract offers the possibility for the 
licensee to receive monetary compensations for further developing the licensed technology. 
Looking into technology related characteristics, we control for technology value 
using the total number of forward citations received by the licensed technology (Yang, Phelps, 
& Steensma, 2010). We expect that more valuable technologies are also more likely to be 
recombined in a faster way. Additionally, we also control for the total number of scientific 
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references listed in the backward citations of the licensed technology as a way to capture cross-
technology differences in terms of the development stage. The final set of control variables is 
related to the licensor’s characteristics. First, we control for the number of successfully applied 
patents that the licensor filed in the seven years prior to the licensing contract as the licensor’s 
size and technological capabilities may also affect the licensee’s willingness to quickly invent 
using the licensed technology. Second, in order to control for differences between firms and 
universities as licensors we added a dummy variable to identify the contracts in which the 
licensor is a university. Finally, following the convention in this literature, we added sector 
dummies indicating the segment within the pharmaceutical firm in which the licensee operates 
and year dummies. 
2.4 Model Specification and Estimation 
Given that the hypotheses refer to the time it takes to recombine knowledge, we generated the 
dependent variable following an event history analysis structure. This type of model is 
conventionally used to examine the conditional probability that an event occurs in a particular 
time interval (t) (Blossfeld, Golsch, & Rohwer, 2007; Yu & Cannella, 2007). In this respect, we 
apply event history analysis to model the time taken, T, between the licensing date and the first 
time the licensing technology is cited by the licensee in a new patent. The use of event history 
analysis to investigate the effect of the explanatory variables on the time it takes to recombine 
knowledge offers at least two major advantages. First, it makes it possible to directly model time 
as the dependent variable without the need to transform it into a discrete outcome (Pennings & 
Wezel, 2009). Second, this technique also allows for modeling the observations that do not 
experience the transition during the time frame covered by the data by dealing with issues 
emerging from right-censoring as a non-random process (Blossfeld et al., 2007). Compared to 
alternative model specifications (e.g. logit or OLS), employing event history analysis allows us 
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to include the observations for which we only have partial information, which covers the time 
they enter the sample (the licensing date) until the last date that patent data for backward citation 
are available.  
In order to decide among the possible models within even history analysis we 
considered the underlying mechanisms driving the hazard to knowledge recombination. We 
expect that firms that license-in technologies with low distance will be able to recombine the 
new knowledge with existing components at a rapid pace, which increases the hazard to 
knowledge recombination as the time increases. However, as the time elapses, the technologies 
with lower distance exit the sample, leaving in the sample technologies that take more time to be 
recombined. This effect is expected to become dominant and lowers the hazard rate until a point 
at which the hazard function starts to decline. Accordingly, we decided to employ a log-logistic 
model as a way to accommodate the expected process of an initial increase followed by a 
decreasing rate (Mills, 2011). Alternatively, we also employed a log-normal specification as a 
robustness check and, as expected, both models produced comparable results. 
Considering that the capacity to deal with distant knowledge is likely to be also 
determined by firm characteristics that are not captured by the explanatory variables used in the 
econometric model, we correct for potential endogeneity issues originating from the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity across the firms. Prior studies using a similar setting to the one 
presented in this paper have dealt with unobserved firm-level differences affecting duration 
dependence by employing frailty estimators (e.g. Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Pennings & 
Wezel, 2009; Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011). Following the recommendation by Blossfeld 
et al. (2007), we model the unobserved heterogeneity using a shared gamma mixture 
specification associated with the log-logistic model. The alternative to the use of a gamma 
mixture model would be the inverse Gaussian frailty model, but as demonstrated by Jenkins 
(2005), it is straightforward to assume a gamma or normal distribution for the frailty of log-
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logistic models. The inclusion of a gamma mixture refers to the incorporation of an “error term” 
in the model that relates multiplicatively to the hazard rate for each firm in the analysis 
(Blossfeld et al., 2007; Hougaard, 1986). Additionally, the use of shared frailty also offers the 
possibility to model intragroup correlation, which in the case of our sample is created from 
repeated group observations (Gutierrez, 2002).    
2.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation coefficients of the 
variables used in the analysis. The results raised no concerns regarding collinear variables, 
except for the correlations between Average path length with Network density and Clustering 
with Average Tie Strength. The moderate correlations between those variables are in line with 
theoretical expectations, but in order to check for potential bias we entered the variables in a 
stepwise manner and the results for the main explanatory variables do not change as the 
variables enter the model. Additionally, the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) associated 
with any of the independent variables was 4.34 (mean VIF = 2.15), which is well below the rule-
of-thumb value of ten (Gujarati, 1995). In order to identify potential model estimation issues 
regarding the stability of the coefficients and standard error we also added the main explanatory 
variables one at a time. Finally, the likelihood ratio comparison test at the bottom of Table 2 
indicates that models II – V provide significant improvement relative to the baseline model. 
Looking specifically into the likelihood ratio comparison for model V (likelihood ratio: 35, df: 
4, p<0.001) we observe a substantial improvement compared to the restricted model.       
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
We were able to track the patenting behavior of the firms in our sample until December 2006; 
therefore, our analysis is censored at the latest dates available in the patent citation data. 
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Looking into the knowledge recombination speed, the longest time to transition for the firms in 
our sample was 168 months. Out of 708 firm-technology observations, a total of 116 firms cited 
the licensed technology in a new patent (made the transition) during the time frame of our 
analysis. For the observations that experienced the transition, the average time for knowledge 
recombination was 25 months. In contrast, the average time of at-risk months for all firms in the 
sample (including censored observations) was 74 months. Considering the average time for 
knowledge recombination between the uncensored observations with high versus low 
technological distance (using mean values), small distance technologies are, on average, cited 
within 24 months, while large distance technologies are cited within 83 months. Among the 592 
firm-technology observations that did not experience the transition during the time window of 
our analysis, 129 observations exit the sample earlier than December 2006. These observations 
were subject to a different type of right-censoring. In the empirical setting used in this paper 
these observations exit the sample earlier because their latest records on COMPUSTAT ended 
earlier than the latest information available in the patent data. We modeled those observations 
differently by setting the exit time at the date of the latest Compustat record, implying that 
although these observations exit the sample, they do not experience the transition. The fact that 
the financial records for a given firm are discontinued is likely to be due to bankruptcy or an 
M&A process, which eliminates the possibility of a firm being observed in the patent citation 
data5.       
To supplement, we plot the cumulative hazard function after the estimation of the 
log-logistic model to visualize the patterns of the hazard function regarding the non-monotonic 
shape. Indeed, the results (see figure 1) indicate an initial increase followed by a decrease in the 
hazard rate for the observations in our sample, suggesting the suitability of the log-logistic 
                                                          
5 If we consider those firms exiting the sample earlier, approximately 20% of the observations experience the 
transition within the time frame of the event history analysis   
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model specification. Additionally, in order to visualize the shape of the hazard rate for 
observations with high and low levels of technological distance we generated two groups on the 
basis of the mean values of distance. As expected, the visualization of the cumulative hazards 
indicates that the observations that present lower levels of distance exhibit a higher hazard rate 
compared to those with higher levels of distance, with the curves for the two groups exhibiting a 
similar non-monotonic pattern. This result offers initial support for our hypothesis regarding the 
effect of distance on the firm’s capacity to recombine external knowledge. As suggested in the 
graph, the firms dealing with lower levels of distance have a higher probability of experiencing 
a transition earlier compared to those dealing with high distance levels.    
     
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
2.6 Results  
Table 2 reports the results for the log-logistic model with the shared gamma mixture 
specification. The dependent variable across the six models reported in this table reflects the 
time gap between the licensing date and the first time the licensed technology was cited in a new 
patent (for the non-censored observations). Model I reports the estimators for controls and the 
main effects of the interaction terms. Additionally, we included year dummies to control for 
period effects, such as overall differences in patenting behavior in the pharmaceutical industry. 
In models II – VI the interaction terms capturing the relationships described in the hypotheses 
were entered one-by-one along with all the controls. For the sake of simplicity we will focus the 
discussion of the results on the full model in column VI.    
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that the larger the distance between the externally acquired knowledge 
and the firm’s knowledge base, the longer it takes the firm to recombine external knowledge. 
The coefficient for the technological distance variable is positive and significant at the 1% level 
when all controls are included in the equation, providing strong evidences in favor of our first 
hypothesis. The result lends support to the fundamental idea developed in this paper that 
distance (unfamiliarity) is an important predictor of a firm’s capacity to recombine external 
knowledge at a faster pace. This finding is similar to the results obtained by Leone & Reichstein 
(2012) regarding the joint effect of unfamiliarity and contractual specifications (the use of grant-
back clause) on the time a licensee takes to produce its first invention after a licensing contract.  
Hypothesis 2 stated that firms with an intrafirm inventor network that has a high 
level of network density recombine distant knowledge faster than firms with an intrafirm 
inventor network that has a low level of network density. Accordingly, the interaction term 
between technological distance and network density exhibits a negative and significant 
coefficient, indicating that the positive effect of distance on the time it takes to recombine 
knowledge becomes less positive (or more negative) when interacted with network density. This 
result supports the expected effect described in hypothesis 2. Thus, the negative and significant 
interaction term indicate that firms with a densely connected intrafirm inventor network are 
better able to deal with technological distance in a faster way.     
Hypothesis 3 did not find support in the results. We predicted that firms with an 
intrafirm inventor network that has high average tie strength recombine distant knowledge 
faster than firms with an intrafirm inventor network that has low average tie strength. The 
interaction between technological distance and tie strength did not produce significant 
coefficients at the conventional level. Hence, the insignificant coefficient for this interaction 
term indicates that distance is positively related to knowledge recombination regardless of the 
tie strength among the inventors within the firm. In other words, we do not find evidence of a 
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significant moderating effect of tie strength on the relationship between distance and the 
dependent variable.     
Finally, the results offered support for the moderation effect predicted in 
hypothesis 4 regarding the fact that firms with an intrafirm inventor network that has a high 
level of network diversity recombine distant knowledge faster than firms with an intrafirm 
inventor network that has a low level of network diversity. Accordingly, the interaction between 
technological distance and network diversity produced a significant and negative coefficient. 
This finding supports the idea that network diversity negatively moderates the relationship 
between distance and the time it takes to recombine knowledge and thus accelerates the 
recombination of distant knowledge.   
2.7 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks  
Despite the large number of prior studies indicating that technology licensing leads to 
knowledge transfer (Arora, 1996; Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012; Laursen et al., 2010), we 
acknowledge that the link between licensing-in and patent citations has not yet been established 
in the literature. Therefore, we performed a robustness check to evaluate the number of citations 
received by a technology after and before the licensing date using a conditional difference-in-
differences design (Singh & Agrawal, 2011). By doing so, we expect to strengthen the 
confidence in the main results by focusing on two important aspects. First, it could be argued 
that the licensing firm is more likely to cite a technology of relatively higher quality or 
relevance regardless of whether or not it licenses the technology. Accordingly, technologies 
with such characteristics may also be more likely to be commercialized in the markets for 
technology, which creates a selection problem in which backward citations do not reflect the 
true effect of licensing. Second, a licensee may be more likely to license a technology in a 
domain in which the firm is intending to expand its technological activities. Therefore, it is 
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likely that the licensing efforts would also be associated with other measures aiming to improve 
a firm’s access to a specific technological area.  
To perform the difference-in-differences we followed the steps described in the 
study by Singh & Agrawal (2011). First, each licensed technology in our sample was matched 
on the basis of propensity scores using the application year, patent class, and subclass to the 
closest technology in the entire technological space (USPTO patents). Second, we certified that 
no observation in the control group was in fact licensed by the focal firm in the sample. Third, 
we computed the total number of citations that the focal firm made to both groups of 
technologies (the treatment and control) after and before the licensing date. There were only 
eight observations in which the licensed technology had been cited by the licensee before the 
licensing contract; those observations were removed from the event history analysis but were 
used to estimate the difference-in-differences model. On the basis of this matching sample 
between licensed and non-licensed technologies sharing similar characteristics, we evaluated the 
change in the number of citations. The results indicate (see Table 3) a significant and substantial 
increase in the number of citations received by a licensed technology when the number of 
citations received by the technologies in the control group is taken into account. Considering the 
baseline period, it is observed that the patents in the control group received an average number 
of citations of 0.055, while the licensed technologies had on average 0.031 citations. However, 
considering the years after the licensing date it is possible to observe that the average number of 
citations for the licensed technologies increases to 1.541 while the control group remains the 
same.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
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 Further robustness checks are not reported here because of space limitation. First, 
the literature on network analysis has also pointed out to limitations in the extent that increasing 
levels of network density and diversity can benefit knowledge sharing and diffusion within 
networks. This claim naturally leads to the idea that density and diversity curvilinearly moderate 
the effect of distance on time to knowledge recombination. We empirically investigated if that is 
the case by including in the log-logistic model interaction terms between Technological 
Distance and the squared version of our measures for Network Density and Network Diversity, 
the results were statistically insignificant. Second, an alternative explanation for the effect of 
distance on time to knowledge recombination is related to the fact that the distant technologies 
may not be licensed with the intention of applying them in a new invention. Therefore, it could 
also be suggested that our results regarding the effect of technological distance on time to 
knowledge recombination comes from the censored observations, for which we have only partial 
information. To address this concern and check the plausibility of this argument we conducted a 
t-test comparing the level of distance between those observations that experience the transition 
and those that do not during the time window of our analysis. We found no evidence of 
statistical significance between the two groups.  
2.8 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
The present study was motivated by the fact that the absorptive capacity literature has 
overlooked the actions and interactions of individuals within the organization in the process of 
external knowledge integration. In addition, research on absorptive capacity has not paid enough 
attention to how quickly firms can recombine knowledge from the external environment with 
internal knowledge. The ability to speed-up the process of external knowledge recombination is 
a competitive advantage, especially in fast-paced industries. In this paper we address these 
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shortcomings and examine the influence of intrafirm inventor networks on firms’ ability to 
recombine external knowledge with internal knowledge into own invention. We specifically 
investigated how network structure and network composition within the firm affect the 
absorption speed of distant external knowledge. We made the argument that firms often engage 
in distant knowledge acquisition, yet distant knowledge requires substantial time to be devoted 
to recombination due to inventors’ lack of familiarity with it. By drawing on social network 
theory and literature on search within organizations we subsequently claimed that network 
density, average tie strength and network diversity shorten the time to recombine distant 
external knowledge with internal knowledge pieces. 
 The empirical results indeed showed that technologically distant external 
knowledge prolongs the time of external knowledge recombination compared to close 
knowledge. More importantly, the results showed that intrafirm network density and diversity 
shorten the time in which firms assimilate distant external knowledge. This is in line with our 
predictions. Yet, our results did not support our prediction that tie strength moderates the 
relationship between technological distance and the speed of external knowledge recombination. 
We discuss our results in light of previous research on absorptive capacity and external 
knowledge sources.  
Our finding that strong average intrafirm ties among inventors do not accelerate 
the recombination of distant knowledge is in contrast to what we expected on the basis of the 
literature on knowledge-sharing within firms (e.g. Hansen, 1999; McFadyen & Cannella, 2004). 
Two explanations can be put forward for why this is the case. First, in addition to its benefits, tie 
strength can also impair the inventors’ ability to develop distant external knowledge. Recurring 
interaction between a pair of inventors may lead to a trustworthy relationship characterized by 
supportive behavior (Granovetter, 1973). Yet, inventors with a limited number of partners with 
whom they collaborate can become myopic and focus on a limited set of colleagues. As a result, 
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the effect of tie strength does not have a clear direction. Another possible explanation for our 
finding is that co-invention in itself indicates strong ties between inventors. Co-invention 
requires frequent meetings between inventors and significant time investments from both sides. 
 Previous research on network density and diversity has pointed to the costs of 
certain network configurations (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Phelps, 2010). To illustrate this, excessive 
diversity among inventors in the intrafirm network may lead to miscommunication, confusion, 
and a general lack of mutual understanding (Weitzman, 1998) and may negatively affect the 
ability to deal with distant knowledge. In a similar vein, network density may at some point 
negatively influence the ability to incorporate distant knowledge. Dense networks develop 
norms over time and this may result in group thinking, which, in turn, impairs the ability to find 
creative solutions and implement distant external knowledge. We tested for such decreasing or 
negative returns for each of the network variables, but did not find any such effects. Two 
reasons can be put forward why we do not find any curvilinear effects. A possible explanation 
may lie in the fact that we focus on the speed with which firms recombine internal with external 
knowledge, rather than general innovation output or knowledge exchange among inventors. We 
suspect that the mechanisms that underlie our results rely on network access and the knowledge 
content available in the network. From this viewpoint, negative (marginal) effects from density 
and diversity may not necessarily affect the speed of knowledge recombination, as this 
recombination will not take place at all. Another reason why we do not find any curvilinear 
effect may relate to the specific investments made by R&D managers and firms in general to 
understand a certain technology, which we do not observe. In this case, negative marginal 
returns will not be experienced.  
 Another question that may arise as a result of our findings relates to fact that we do 
not find strong evidence of direct effects of intrafirm network characteristics on external 
knowledge integration. We attribute this finding to the specific role intrafirm networks play in 
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the integration process of external knowledge. We claim that intrafirm network characteristics 
do not affect general acquisition of knowledge but become important when inventors face 
difficulties in providing solutions for the implementation of unfamiliar knowledge. In the latter 
case inventors are likely to activate their professional network and search for solutions among 
their fellow inventors (Singh et al., 2010).  
 This study contributes to several bodies of literature. Our main contribution lies in 
the literature on absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). Social 
integration mechanisms and social networks within the firm are considered to be important 
antecedents of absorptive capacity (Volberda et al., 2010; Zahra & George, 2002). Despite these 
claims, we are not aware of any study that has focused on intrafirm networks as determinants of 
absorptive capacity. We provide evidence that intrafirm network cohesion and diversity indeed 
accelerate knowledge assimilation. In particular, our study supports the notion of inward-
looking absorptive capacity, which refers to the efficiency of internal communication (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). External knowledge can only be effectively absorbed when a firm has the 
ability to internally share this knowledge among the members of the firm (Lenox & King, 2004; 
Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2008; Volberda et al., 2010).  
Another important contribution of our study pertains to exploring the speed 
dimension of external knowledge integration. We are not only aware of few empirical studies in 
this area (e.g. Leone & Reichstein, 2012), but our findings also raise implications for research 
on recombinant search. Indeed, firms tend to update their knowledge base with unfamiliar 
knowledge (e.g. Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), but recombination of distant knowledge comes 
at a cost; it appears to be a relatively long process. Future research on this paradox is important 
as time becomes an increasingly scarce resource in innovation processes (Kessler & 
Chakrabathi, 1996).  
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  This study also contributes to the literature on organizational learning and the 
knowledge-based view of the firm by following the idea that firms contain social communities 
(Argote, 1999; Argote et al., 2003; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Informal networks among 
employees affect knowledge sharing and the creation of new knowledge. We add to this 
literature the idea that social networks indirectly affect the ability of organizations to learn from 
knowledge previously external to the firm. The notion that social networks within the firm are 
fundamental to learning from external knowledge resonates well with recent studies that claim 
that inventors and their knowledge networks constitute the micro-foundations of a firm’s R&D 
capabilities (Guler & Nerkar, 2012; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005; Paruchuri, Nerkar, & Hambrick, 
2006).  
 The results of our study also have managerial implications. Our findings point to 
the indirect influence of network structure on the ability of firms to quickly integrate external 
knowledge. Thus, managers should direct their attention to the collaborative behavior of their 
employees. We acknowledge the fact that a manager may not have full control over the social 
interactions that take place among employees. Yet, managers may assign inventors to participate 
in short-term projects to foster collaborative efforts between otherwise unconnected employees. 
Managers should evaluate how inventor network structure in the R&D department can be 
improved in such a way that an atmosphere of knowledge sharing and transfer among inventors 
and research units is guaranteed.  
 The results and contributions of this paper should be considered in the light of its 
limitations. Our findings may be specific to the pharmaceutical context, which is characterized 
by a mature market for technology, in which patent protection and licensing is the norm rather 
than the exception. Future research could therefore examine how quickly firms learn from other 
external sourcing mechanisms such as hiring in variety of industries (see Tzabbar et al., 2012, 
for a recent example). Second, we utilize co-patenting to capture collaboration and knowledge 
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networks, following recent literature (Fleming et al., 2007; Paruchuri, 2009; Singh, 2005). 
Although our focus on co-invention is particularly relevant in the context of knowledge 
recombination, we acknowledge the fact that patent collaborations only capture a subset of the 
present interpersonal ties within a firm. Future research could advance our understanding of 
intrafirm networks and recombination speed by focusing on different types of interpersonal 
networks, including friendship networks.  Third, we focus specifically on the role of intrafirm 
co-invention ties as antecedents of absorption speed. Inventors that maintain ties that span firm 
boundaries may also have an impact on a firm’s absorptive capacity (Perry-Smith, 2006; 
Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). Yet, individual external ties are 
beyond the scope of this paper. We encourage future research to investigate how the interaction 
of individuals’ internal and external ties affects firm absorptive capacity.  
Finally, we believe our empirical strategy reduced concerns with endogeneity 
issues as a result of unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. First, we employed a 
frailty estimator in our hazard models, which captures unobserved heterogeneity through the 
inclusion of a shared gamma mixture specification. In addition to this, our difference-in-
differences approach towards the relationship between licensing-in and citation patterns 
strengthens our view that licensing represents a mechanism through which firms acquire 
external knowledge, which, in turn, fuels firms’ inventive performance. 
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Figure 1. Estimated Hazard Functions of Small versus Large Distance Licensed Technologies 
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                 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Coefficients (N = 708) 
Variable Mean S.D. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
[1] Technological Distance     0.824     0.280 1.00 
[2] Network Density     0.259     0.285 - .19 1.00 
[3] Average Tie Strength 1.581 1.007 -0.01 -0.21 1.00 
[4] Network Diversity     0.62      0.228 0.15 -0.57 0.13 1.00 
[5] Clustering 2.246     0.854 -0.07 -0.05 0.77 0.09 1.00 
[6] Average Path Length  2.557 1.632 0.20 -0. 4 0.25 0.43 0.10 1.00 
[7] Same Sector     0.357     0.479 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.06 -0.07 -0.18 1. 0 
[8] Co Patent     0.892    0.310 -0.18 -0.08 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 -0.04 1.00 
[9] Prior Citations 1.261 7.847 - .04 0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.04 1.00 
[10] Scientific References 30.381 52.714 -0.01 -0.06 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.01 1.00 
[11] Technology Value 60.671 155.548 -0.11 0.14 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.00 1.00 
[12] Technological Furnishing     0.559     0.497 0.08 -0.29 - .01 0.15 -0.06 0.26 0.15 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.11 
[13] Grant-back Clause     0.242     0.429 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.13 0.08 0.17 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 
[14] Milestone     0.613     0.487 -0.00 -0.05 0.12 -0.15 0.13 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.08 
[15] R&D Intensity 124.633 132.409 -0.21 0.26 -0.02 -0.20 0.05 -0.32 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.10 
[16] Licensor University     0.17      0.381 -0.1  0.21 -0.11 -0.34 -0.04 -0.27 -0.35 -0.18 0.03 -0.07 -0.06 
[17] Licensor Number of Patents 334.927 1.451.046 -0.05 0.16 -0.07 -0.11 0.00 -0.17 -0.11 0.00 0.77 -0.04 0.03 
[18] US Firm     0.898     0.303 0.01 0.12 -0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 0.08 -0.09 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
[19] Log(Number Employees) 7.129 2.844 0.24 -0.52 0.16 0.32 0.08 0.68 -0.25 0.25 -0.08 0.10 0.06 
[20] Average Patenting Time 4.091 5.165 -0.05 0.39 -0.24 -0.38 -0.31 -0.51 0.11 -0.39 -0.07 -0.13 -0.04 
[21] Previous Year Patent     0.766     0.423 0.09 -0.27 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 -0.01 0.63 0.03 0.09 0.06 
[22] Slack 165.471 149.181 0.09 -0.37 0.35 0.28 0.21 0.42 -0.01 0.24 -0.11 0.14 -0.09 
                      
Variable Mean S.D. [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 
[12] Technological Furnishing     0.559     0.497 1.00 
[13] Grant-back Clause     0.242     0.429 0.18 1.00 
[14] Milestone     0.613     0.487 0.17 0.04 1.00 
[15] R&D Intensity 124.633 132.409 -0.06 -0.07 0.15 1.00 
[16] Licensor University     0.177     0.381 -0.32 -0.23 0.08 0.28 1.00 
[17] Licensor Number of Patents 334.927 1.451.046 -0.13 -0.02 0.12 0.21 0.06 1.00 
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[18] US Firm     0.898     0.303 -0.14 -0.05 -0.10 0.08 0.09 0.07 1.00 
[19] Log(Number Employees) 7.129 2.844 0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.60 -0.37 -0.22 -0.20 1.00 
[20] Average Patenting Time 4.091 5.165 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.22 0.03 0.11 -0.49 1.00 
[21] Previous Year Patent     0.766     0.423 0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.36 0.01 -0.09 0.40 -0.55 1.00 
[22] Slack 165.471 149.181 0.14 -0.03 0.12 -0.25 -0.32 -0.16 -0.08 0.54 -0.26 0.25 1.00 
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Table 2. Results of Log-Logistic Hazard Models with Gamma Frailty Predicting the Time to Knowledge Recombination 
Variable  Model  I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI    
Technological Distance 2.439*** 2.339*** 2.446*** 2.019*** 1.915*** 
(0.614) (0.555) (0.605) (0.530) (0.460) 
Technological Distance x Network Density -6.418** -12.107*** 
(2.191) (3.433) 
Technological Distance x Avg. Tie Strength 1.368 0.959 
(1.629) (0.972) 
Technological Distance x Network Diversity -9.815** -10.860** 
(3.234) (4.008) 
Network Density -2.561+ -1.309 -1.160 -1.014 -1.238 -1.097 
(1.484) (2.132) (1.325) (2.075) (1.779) (1.219) 
Average Tie Strength 0.184 0.3 4 0.504+ 0.424 0.535+ .617+ 
(0.312) 0.395) (0.295) (0.419) (0.296) (0.349) 
Network Diversity -1.083 0.332 -0.282 0.123 1.828 0.227 
(1.255) (1.684) (1.070) (1.838) (1.404) (1.330) 
Clustering -0.428 -0.677 -0.933** -0.649 -0.930** -0.867* 
(0.371) (0.526) (0.326) (0.569) (0.326) (0.380) 
Average Path Length  -0.499* -0.633*** -0.688*** -0.584** -0.745*** -0.713*** 
(0.197) (0.177) (0.168) (0.178) (0.163) (0.156) 
Same Sector 0.235 -0.190 -0.103 -0.238 -0.020 -0.198 
(0.457) (0.546) (0.449) (0.581) (0.398) (0.394) 
Co Patent 7.060** 6.449* 3.483 8.458+ 13.465*** 6.821 
(2.401) (3.045) (2.291) (4.779) (3.323) (5.064) 
Prior Citations 0.060* 0.038 0.024 0.032 0.040+ 0.020 
(0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.023) (0.023) 
Scientific References 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Technology Value -0.011*** -0.010** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.008* -0.010*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Technological Furnishing -0.078 -0.360 -0.154 -0.331 -0.323 -0.374 
(0.454) (0.412) (0.383) (0.419) (0.453) (0.397) 
Grant-back Clause -1.186** -1.116** -1.225*** -1.152** -0.823* -1.020** 
(0.429) (0.385) (0.353) (0.394) (0.362) (0.341) 
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Milestone 1.405*** 1.129** 1.353*** 1.073* 1.151*** 1.288*** 
(0.374) (0.430) (0.345) (0.432) (0.329) (0.297) 
R&D Intensity 0.004* 0.007** 0.006*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Licensor University -1.309* -1.413* -1.119* -1.426* -1.048+ -1.034* 
(0.613) (0.703) (0.521) (0.710) (0.557) (0.515) 
Licensor Number of Patents 0.000 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
US Firm -0.880 - .490* -1.323* -1.440* -1.978*** -1.356* 
(0.697) ( .7 9) (0.583) (0.733) (0.584) (0.646) 
Log (Number Employees) 0.574** 0.461* 0.474** 0.448* 0.500*** 0.544*** 
(0.213) (0.183) (0.149) (0.186) (0.144) (0.141) 
Average Patenting Time 0.084 0.002 -0.012 -0.003 0.018 -0.020 
(0.10 ) (0.088) (0. 81) (0.097) (0.061) (0.077) 
Previous Year Patent -4.202** -5.654** -2.385+ -7.873* -11.820*** -5.386 
(1.462) (1.877) (1.331) (3.892) (2.457) (4.381) 
Slack -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 
(0.002) (0.0 3) (0. 02) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -1.818 3.108 3.013 3.405 2.093 1.964 
(4.452) (4.422) (3.139) (4.840) (2.838) (3.054) 
log(G) constant -0.532*** -0.746*** -0.835*** -0.760*** -0.938*** -1.006*** 
(0.154) (0.168) (0.148) (0.165) (0.220) (0.175) 
log ((-)) constant 1.648*** 1.818*** 1.869*** 1.826*** 1.902*** 1.960*** 
(0.245) (0.219) (0.207) (0.218) (0.232) (0.203) 
Number of observations 708 708 708 708 708 708 
Log-likelihood -383.459 -375.553 -372.579 -374.985 -371.680 -365.758 
Chi2 86.523*** 102.335*** 108.284*** 103.472*** 110.081*** 121.926*** 
Likelihood ratio comparison   15.812*** 21.761*** 16.949*** 23.559*** 35.403*** 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3. Difference-in-Differences Estimators with robust standard errors (N=708) 
  Base Line   Follow Up   
Outcome Variable Control Treated Difference   Control Treated Difference Difference-in-Differences 
Number of Citations 0.055 0.031 -0.024 0.055 1.541 1.486 1.510 
Standard Deviation 0.034 0.017 0.038 0.034 0.181 0.184 0.188 
T 1.61 -1.39 -0.63 0.06 8.38 8.18 8.04 
P>|t| 0.107 0.061 0.527 0.107 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
*<0.10, **p<0.05, ***<0.001 
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3. 1 Introduction 
  
Technology licensing is acknowledged as one of the most important contractual mechanisms for 
knowledge transfer between firms (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Indeed, over the last two decades a 
substantial increase in  the number of interfirm licensing agreements has been observed, with 
most deals concentrated in high-tech industries such as the pharmaceutical and ICT industries 
(Arora & Gambardella, 2010). As a consequence of the continuous development of technology 
markets firms have increasingly adopted of less integrated and more open models to manage 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). Although knowledge outsourcing cannot completely replace 
firms’ internal research and development (R&D), licensing-in can be used as a complementary 
part of firms’ overall innovation efforts (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). Furthermore, even for 
large innovative firms, licensing provides greater strategic flexibility and a larger number of 
feasible options for novel combinations as compared to solely in-house alternatives (Laursen, 
Leone, & Torrisi, 2010).   
Despite the evidence that licensing is an important mechanism for knowledge 
acquisition, the literature on markets for technology that has evolved over the years focuses 
almost exclusively on the incentives and motives behind firms’ decisions to trade their 
technologies (e.g., Gans & Stern, 2003, 2010; McGahan & Silverman, 2006; Teece, 1986). 
Although the determinants of technology trade are certainly relevant, understanding the link 
between licensing and firm innovation is also important. In fact, it is surprising that only a few 
empirical studies have considered licensing-in within the context of firm innovation (e.g., 
Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012; Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). These studies have 
found that through licensing deals firms can speed the invention process (Leone & Reichstein, 
2012) and search more distantly in the technological space (Laursen et al., 2010). However, to 
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the best of my knowledge no previous study has investigated to what extent there is a direct link 
between technology licensing-in and firms’ capacity to produce innovations6. Furthermore, apart 
from absorptive capacity (Ceccagnoli & Hicks, 2012; Laursen et al., 2010), organizational 
characteristics have not received enough attention as a determinant of  firms’ ability to deal with 
licensed-in technologies.   
It is well documented that firms do not possess all relevant knowledge in-house 
and therefore need to use external channels to sustain their internal R&D (Cassiman & 
Veugelers, 2006). As a consequence, innovations are generated through a combinatorial process 
in which internally and externally developed knowledge is put together in novel ways (Arora & 
Gambardella, 1990; Fleming, 2001). In fact, the need to feed internal inventive demands is 
increasingly leading firms to use licensing as a mechanism to absorb externally developed 
knowledge (Anand & Khanna, 2000). The idea that licensing-in can be used to support firm 
innovation is evident in the assessment made by the CEO of Iris Pharma regarding the 
licensing-in of a novel technology: "Using this new device into our preclinical models will 
improve them greatly. We will be able for example to assess many other endpoints […]”. In 
another example, the executive director of process science at Boehringer Ingelheim states that 
"We will be able to leverage BaroFold's high pressure refold technology on a variety of proteins 
under development […]”, referring to a technology recently licensed to support the development 
of drugs at the preclinical stage. Those descriptions suggest that licensing-in can be seen as an 
option for firms to access cutting-edge technologies and improve their capacity to produce 
innovations (Atuahene-Gima, 1993; Leone & Reichstein, 2012).  
Building on previous studies indicating a positive effect of technology licensing-in 
on firm innovation, this paper examines the moderating effect that organizational slack and 
                                                          
6 One exception is the work by Johnson (2002), but his study is specifically concerned with how licensing-in adds 
to the R&D productivity of firms in developing countries.  
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myopia have on this main relationship. In the first case, I expect that high levels of slack will 
increase the positive effect of licensing on innovation due to the existence of redeployable 
resources that can be directed to exploit the newly acquired technology. Furthermore, previous 
studies have suggested that under circumstances of high slack it is more favorable for firms to 
engage in experimentation and more risk R&D projects (Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Miller & 
Leiblein, 1996; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Regarding organizational myopia, I build on the “not-
invented-here” syndrome literature to develop the idea that organizations in which inventors 
disproportionally build on internally generated knowledge to the detriment of external 
knowledge are less likely to benefit from licensing-in a technology (Arora & Gambardella, 
2010).  
 The hypotheses were tested in a longitudinal setting in which I tracked the 
licensing and patenting behavior of 206 firms operating in the global pharmaceutical industry. 
This paper is among the first to investigate technology licensing-in using a large longitudinal 
sample that makes it possible to observe how this mechanism for knowledge acquisition can be 
used as an integral part of a firm’s innovation strategy. The empirical analyses were performed 
using the Deloitte Recap Database for the period 1983–2004, which contains detailed 
information on licensing deals between pharmaceutical firms. I integrate this dataset with 
information collected from three other sources: COMPUSTAT, United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) data, and the Harvard Patent Network Dataverse. The resulting 
database contains annual information about firms’ financial records, licensing, and patenting 
activities. Using a firm fixed effects model, I find that licensing-in is positively associated with 
an increase in firm patenting activity in the three years subsequent to the licensing deal. 
Furthermore, the results also confirmed the idea that firm slack increases the positive effect of 
licensing on innovation, while high levels of organizational myopia decrease the main effect.  
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3.2 Theoretical Background  
 
As the traditional integrated R&D models have been replaced for more open and collaborative 
forms of partnerships (Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2006), the importance of markets 
for technology has dramatically increased (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012). In a context of 
knowledge transactions, licensing contracts are one of the main mechanisms used by firms to 
trade know-how and technologies (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). Accordingly, licensing can be 
described as an arm’s length contractual deal through which firms can trade know-how and 
intellectual property (IP) rights (Arora, 1995). Arora & Gambardella (2010) proposes that a 
distinguishing feature of licensing in contrast to other mechanisms for knowledge acquisition 
(i.e., joint ventures, M&A, and the mobility of human capital) regards the contractual nature of 
the knowledge. While ex-ante contracts such as research alliances involve higher uncertainty 
about potential outcomes, in ex-post contracts such as licensing, the traded technology can be 
more easily defined. Furthermore, in most licensing contracts between firms, as in the two 
examples mentioned earlier, the deals involve already developed and proven technologies 
(Atuahene-Gima, 1993; Leone & Reichstein, 2012).   
 As the exchange of knowledge is at the core of technology licensing, it is a 
mechanism that is closely related to the notion of organizational learning. Indeed, the idea of 
organizational learning as “a change in an organization’s capacity for doing something new” 
(Tannenbaum, 1997, p. 438) can be closely connected with the licensee’s position in a licensing 
deal. In fact, existing literature focusing on understating the motives for firms to license-in 
indicates that the acquisition of new technologies through licensing-in positively affects distinct 
dimensions of firm innovation. For example, Laursen et al. (2010) suggested that firms can 
explore more distantly from their current technological trajectory using licensed technologies. 
Leone and Reichstein (2012) found that licensees are able to innovate faster than non-licensees 
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due to the possibility to build on technologies that are already developed. However, although 
previous studies have documented the importance of technology licensing, little is known about 
how the licensee’s organizational characteristics affect its capacity to innovate based on the 
licensed technologies.  
Along this line, it is well established in the organizational literature that one of the 
main determinants of a firm’s capacity to assimilate and integrate external knowledge regards its 
level of absorptive capacity. Accordingly, recent studies on technology licensing have shown 
that firms with high levels of absorptive capacity are better able to deal with technologies 
acquired through a licensing contract (e.g., Laursen et al., 2010; Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012). 
Despite the fact that absorptive capacity is one of the main determinants of a firm’s ability to 
benefit from licensing-in, it is not the only one. Considering the existing literature on technology 
licensing, it is possible to identify other relevant contingencies that are expected to affect the 
licensee’s capacity to draw on and learn from licensing-in. For example, Ceccagnoli & Jiang 
(2012) argue that integration costs caused by a high degree of cospecialization between R&D 
and downstream activities can limit the licensee’s capacity to deal with licensed-in technologies. 
In another example, Arora & Gambardella (2010) call attention to the importance of 
understanding how internal resistance to external knowledge affects firms operating on the 
demand side of markets for technology.  
 Following the idea of integration costs proposed by Ceccagnoli & Jiang (2012), it 
is expected that the successful assimilation and application of licensed-in technologies will 
require the licensee to allocate substantial resources in the exploitation of the newly acquired 
technology. Consequently, unabsorbed resources at the time that a technology has been acquired 
can be necessary for the licensee to be able to deal with integration challenges. Furthermore, 
previous studies have shown that certain levels of organizational slack are not only relevant in 
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terms of the resource availability but also to induce experimentation and risk taking and to 
absorb the uncertainty related to the development and exploitation of new technologies (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Nohria and Gulati, 1996).  
 The second point, regarding the internal resistance that licensed-in technologies 
can experience, is also at the core of the integration process that licensees have to go through in 
order to benefit from licensing-in. Thus, even if a firm spends large amounts to license-in a 
technology, internal resistance from individuals or groups can significantly reduce or prevent the 
newly acquired knowledge from being assimilated and disseminated within the organization. 
This type of resistance against external knowledge can be fostered by lack of familiarity or skills 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), path-dependency (Dosi 1982), and the concern that individuals’ or 
groups’ own ideas may be disregarded within the organization (Katz & Allen, 1982; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000). Considering the impact that internal resistance may have on firm capacity 
to benefit from external knowledge acquisition, I operationalize the concept of myopia using the 
licensee perspective.   
To summarize, previous studies have analyzed whether firms can use technology 
licensing-in as a mechanism to acquire external knowledge, but little is yet known about firm-
specific characteristics that affect the process through which licensed technologies can foster 
organizational learning. In this paper I focus on how the knowledge acquired through licensing 
affects the number of innovations produced by the licensee and also on the moderating effect 
that organizational slack and myopia have on this main relationship.    
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3.3 Theory and Hypothesis 
3.3.1 Technology Licensing and Firm Innovation 
Firms can use licensing contracts as a main mechanism to acquire externally developed 
technologies and feed their needs for inventive knowledge (Laursen, et al., 2010). Indeed, 
through licensing contracts the acquiring firm can improve its innovation performance by 
assimilating and adapting new knowledge connected to the licensed technologies. In this sense, 
the reliance on technologies that have already been developed and proven not only saves efforts 
that would otherwise have been spent on creating a totally new technology, but also provides the 
acquiring firm with a larger set of technological opportunities (Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, & 
Winter, 1995). Furthermore, the fact that the licensed technology was developed by a different 
organization that naturally possesses a different set of capabilities and skills (Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997) opens up new learning opportunities to the licensee.  
Considering the link between licensing and organizational learning, previous 
studies have proposed the term “learning-by-licensing” (Johnson, 2002) to indicate the learning 
possibilities that firms can access when engaging in licensing agreements. According to this 
perspective, the acquisition of new knowledge results in organizational learning through an 
interactive combinatorial process in which new and existing elements are linked together 
through a continuous process of experimentation (Pisano, 1996). In this context, a licensed 
technology can be understood as an input that increases the size and diversity of the firm’s 
knowledge base. Indeed, following the knowledge-based theory of the firm, in order to develop 
and sustain innovation, firms must be able to manage previously accumulated knowledge as 
well as the inflow of knowledge generated outside their boundaries (Deeds & Decarolis, 1999). 
Accordingly, licensing-in is expected to have a positive impact on the number of innovations 
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produced by the licensee, and also provide the grounds for the adoption of new search 
trajectories (Laursen et al., 2010).  
There are at least two distinct mechanisms through which licensing-in leads to 
organizational learning that can be subsequently converted into innovations. First, licensing 
agreements can be considered as an alternative for firms to directly acquiring/buying the IP 
rights to exploit a specific technology (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2011; Ziedonis, 2004). In this case, 
the acquiring firm can experience learning benefits from gaining access to state-of-the-art 
methods and process, which can increase the R&D efficiency and the way that innovations are 
internally produced and managed (Gallini & Winter, 1985). Second, the other possibility for 
organizational learning relates to the acquisition of technologies associated with knowledge that 
the firm knows very little or nothing about. The unfamiliarity of the licensee with the licensed 
technology regards the degree to which the knowledge about the technology is not present 
within the firm. In this situation, the newly acquired knowledge provides the licensee with a 
context for novel combinations between existing and new elements (Grant, 1996; Nooteboom, 
Van Haverbeke, Duysters, Gilsing, & van den Oord, 2007).  
Accordingly, previous research indicates that licensing is an efficient mechanism 
for firms to fill internal gaps in their knowledge bases, complement internal capabilities, and 
create the potential for new knowledge combinations. Therefore, my baseline hypothesis is the 
following:   
     
Hypothesis 1: Engaging in technology licensing will be positively related to a firm’s subsequent 
capacity to produce innovations 
 
However, despite the positive effect that licensing-in is expected to have on firms’ capacity to 
produce innovations, I propose that integrating a new technology can also be challenging for the 
licensee. Indeed, the process of knowledge transfer and integration is directly dependent on the 
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organizational capabilities and resources that the acquiring firm possesses to tap into external 
knowledge sources (Grant, 1996; Van Den Bosch, Volberda, & De Boer, 1999). Therefore, I 
also focus on organizational factors related to resource availability and firms’ capacity to drawn 
on external knowledge to explain cross-firm differences in benefiting from licensing-in. 
Following this baseline hypothesis, in the next sections I will focus on the moderating effect that 
recoverable slack and organizational myopia have on the main relationship between licensing-in 
and innovation. 
3.3.2 Recoverable Slack and Knowledge Integration 
 
Previous studies have pointed out that despite the fundamental role that external knowledge 
acquisition has for firms’ innovation performance, the assimilation and integration of knowledge 
generated outside the firms’ boundaries can pose several difficulties and risks (Grant, 1996). 
Specifically examining the case of licensing-in, there is the possibility that the acquiring firm 
will face significant challenges in understanding and successfully applying the new knowledge 
(Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012). Furthermore, in several cases, firms will have limited 
comprehension of how the new technology can be further developed, becoming dependent on 
the licensor to support the process of knowledge integration (Arora, 1995). Consequently, given 
that external technologies can be difficult to assimilate and integrate, it is not uncommon that 
the acquiring firm needs to invest significant efforts and resources in order to benefit from it 
(Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012; Kotha et al., 2013).In fact, successful integration requires the 
licensed-in technology to go through a process of experimentation, refinement and, especially in 
the case of licensing, adaptation to the specific needs of the acquiring firm (Jensen & Thursby, 
2001).  
The licensee’s difficulties in integrating a newly licensed-in technology increase if 
the licensor and the licensee operate in different industries or at different stages of the value 
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chain (Wilcox King & Zeithaml, 2003). This can be attributed to the fact that in most cases, a 
technology has been developed to be applied and to meet the needs of a firm in a specific 
context (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2012). In fact, it is not uncommon that licensors choose to 
license their technologies only to firms operating in different industries in order to avoid an 
increase in the number of direct competitors with similar technological capabilities (Arora, 
Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Fosfuri, 2006). This fact suggests that the licensee needs to 
possess high levels of absorptive capacity relative to the licensed technology (Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998) or the necessary resources to deal with the integration challenges in a timely manner 
(Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012).     
Given those challenges, the integration process of licensed-in technologies can be 
associated with high uncertainty regarding its potential outcomes. Indeed, several studies have 
pointed out that the process of external knowledge acquisition and development is associated 
with high failure rates (Das & Teng, 2000; Park & Russo, 1996). In this context, Laursen et al., 
(2010) argue that licensing-in can also be considered a form of exploratory search that firms use 
to reach distant (unfamiliar) technological domains. In fact, if we refer back to the seminal work 
of March (1991), exploratory search is described as being directly associated with high risk and 
experimentation.  
    Departing from this perspective, I argue that the level of recoverable slack 
within the acquiring firm is critical for the process of assimilating and integrating licensed-in 
technologies. Organizational literature has conceptualized recoverable slack as “the pool of 
resources in an organization that is in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given level 
of organizational output” (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Indeed, slack resources can be observed in 
the form of excess inputs such as unused capacity, unnecessary capital expenditures, and 
unexploited opportunities to increase outputs (Cheng & Kesner, 1997; George, 2005; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996; Singh, 1986). High levels of slack are particularly useful for firms when dealing 
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with environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982) and engaging in high-risk R&D activities (George, 
2005). Hence, I expect slack to directly affect firm capacity to benefit from licensing-in.  
Therefore, I propose that the positive effect of technology licensing-in on a firm’s 
capacity to produce innovations will be stronger under conditions of high recoverable slack. As 
the level of unabsorbed slack available to the licensee increases, the amount of resources that 
can be redeployed for the successful integration of the newly acquired technology grows. 
Indeed, considering that before being able to benefit from a licensed-in technology a firm must 
first be able to assimilate it, the avaiability of resources can be particularly critical to the 
integration process. Under conditions of resource constraint, firms are more likely to prioritize 
R&D projects that have more certain outcomes and a low risk of failure (Nohria & Gulati, 
1996). Consequently, licensed technologies may remain underutilized in terms of their potential 
as inputs in the generation of innovations under conditions of limited resources. On the other 
hand, when the amount of resources available to be redeployed in the assimilation and 
application of licensed-in technologies is high, firms are likely to increase the effects of 
licensing-in on innovation.  
Therefore, I argue that when the knowledge inputs provided by technology 
licensing-in are held constant, the capacity that the licensee will have to assimilate and to 
produce novel combinations from the licensed technologies will increase under conditions of a 
high level of recoverable slack. Consequently, the positive effect of licensing-in on the number 
of innovations produced by a firm tends to increase with the total amount of unobserved 
resources at the time of the licensing agreement. Based on those arguments I propose the 
following moderating effect for recoverable slack:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of technology licensing on innovation will be moderated by the firm’s 
level of recoverable slack in such a fashion that increasing slack will increase the positive effect 
of licensing on the firm’s subsequent capacity to produce innovations 
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3.3.3 Organizational Myopia and Licensing 
 
My first hypothesis argues that licensing-in increases firms’ subsequent capacity to produce 
innovations. However, this effect may be also contingent upon the openness of the acquiring 
firm to build upon and learn from external knowledge. Katz and Allen (1982)  proposed the term 
“Not Invented Here (NIH) Syndrome” to describe the propensity that stable research teams have 
to systematically overlook and reject the ideas generated by outsiders. As suggested by the NIH 
literature, especially among individuals affiliated with highly cohesive groups within 
organizations, the knowledge possessed by insiders is often seem as superior to the knowledge 
that lies outside the firm’s boundaries (Katz and Allen, 1982). Indeed, Katz and Allen define the 
NIH syndrome as a the fact that “…stable project teams become increasingly cohesive over time 
and begin to separate themselves from external sources of technical information and influence 
by communicating less frequently with professional colleagues outside their teams” (1982, p. 7). 
In this context, it is well known that organizations often draw disproportionally on internally 
developed technologies and do not pay enough attention to external sources (Agrawal, 
Cockburn, & Rosell, 2009; Arora & Gambardella, 2010). This is especially true for large firms, 
where inventors are more likely to find a larger set of technological alternatives generated in-
house (Agrawal et al., 2009).   
 Relying on the NIH syndrome definition, Agrawal et al. (2009) describe as 
myopic organizations firms in which inventors disproportionately build upon their own 
innovations7. The presence of persistent myopic behavior in the process of generating 
innovations is, at least partially, a consequence of the lower incentives that single individuals or 
groups have to use external knowledge as compared to their own (Katz & Allen, 1982). For 
                                                          
7 In their paper, Agrawal et al. propose five different types of myopia: 1) Self-citation to Own Prior Inventions; 2) 
Use of New Knowledge; 3) Technological Myopia; 4) Locational Myopia; and 5) Temporal Myopia. Because I am 
interested in firms’ resistance to external knowledge, I focus in my analysis on the first concept of myopia.  
  
87 
 
example, apart from the fact that inventors are likely to find it simpler to continuously build on 
their own inventions and accumulated knowledge, individuals tend to be rewarded if their ideas 
are recurrently used and applied within the organization (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1994). In fact, 
putting aside the implications related to the lack of access to external knowledge sources, it is 
less costly and simpler to access and use internal knowledge relative to external knowledge. 
However, as the NIH syndrome emerges, organizations’ capacity to absorb and use external 
knowledge becomes jeopardized (Agrawal et al., 2009). Furthermore, given that firms need to 
continuously tap into knowledge sources to learn and absorb new technological knowledge, 
internal resistance can harm their capacity to stay competitive.   
 I expect the deleterious bias created by the NIH syndrome to be particularly 
prominent in the case of licensed-in technologies. Given that licensing agreements often involve 
technologies that are already substantially developed, individuals may not find space to 
incorporate their own previous innovations into the core of the licensed-in technology. 
Consequently, in comparison with strategic alliances, where the output is usually the fruit of 
joint development efforts between inventors in two or more firms (Sampson, 2007; Schilling & 
Phelps, 2007), licensed technologies are more prone to suffer internal resistance. Individuals and 
teams might see their position and expertise threatened if a technology whose development they 
had relatively little, or no, influence on is adopted instead of their own. In other words, they 
have stronger incentives to invest more effort and time into developing and incorporating 
knowledge generated by themselves or by other members of their group. Consequently, 
licensed-in technologies may be overlooked in favor of internally developed ones.   
    Another explanation of why individuals might resist a licensed-in technology is 
related to the path-dependent nature of organizational routines and capabilities (Dosi & 
Marengo, 2007; Pentland, Feldman, Becker, & Liu, 2012). While developing and establishing 
routines that allow individuals to work in teams and facilitate collaboration between employees 
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with different backgrounds is important, it also generates organizational rigidities (Schreyögg & 
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). One way in which those rigidities can manifest themselves is in the form 
of resistance to external knowledge. In fact, the novelty that is usually associated with licensed-
in technologies (Laursen et al., 2010) is likely to require employees to adopt meaningful 
changes such as restructuring their immediate network (Paruchuri & Eisenman, 2012), learning 
new skills, and changing routines in order to accommodate the integration of the new 
technology (Dosi & Marengo, 2007).  
Consequently, even if firms license-in to gain access to external knowledge, the 
process of integrating the licensed technology into the firms’ knowledge base might still be met 
with internal resistance. On the background of these arguments, I expect that firms that exhibit 
high levels of myopic behavior in the way that their inventions are conceived will face 
challenges in integrating licensed-in technologies. Therefore, my final hypothesis states that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of technology licensing on innovation will be moderated by the firm’s 
level of organizational myopia in such a fashion that increasing myopia will decrease the 
positive effect of licensing on the firm’s subsequent capacity to produce innovations 
 
 
3.4 Empirical Design, Data, and Sample 
 
To test the proposed hypotheses, I constructed a panel of firms operating in the global 
pharmaceutical industry. Firms in this industry develop and commercialize drugs, chemical 
components, biological products, and medical devices. Several studies have indicated that 
pharmaceutical firms provide an appropriate empirical setting to test hypotheses related to 
knowledge acquisition and innovation (e.g., Gambardella, 1992; Paruchuri, 2009; Roberts, 
1999). The information used in this study derives from four data sources. First, in order to select 
a sample of firms that use technology licensing-in as a mechanism to acquire knowledge, I 
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closely examined the licensing deals listed at the Deloitte Recap Database in the period 1983-
2004. The Recap database is acknowledged as one of the most accurate and comprehensive 
sources of information regarding partnerships and technology exchange involving 
pharmaceutical firms (Schilling, 2009). This database allowed me to access the original 
licensing contracts, from which it was possible to extract precise information regarding the date 
of the licensing event and to identify unambiguously the firm acquiring the technology. The 
second step was to use the firms’ names and addresses to identify licensing contracts in which 
the licensee was a public firm listed in COMPUSTAT. I decided to focus only on public firms to 
ensure that I was able to obtain consistent financial information over long periods of time and 
also to reduce excessive heterogeneity in the sample. Furthermore, although the Recap database 
covers only pharmaceutical deals, it also includes firms that primarily operate in different 
industries. To overcome this issue, I use the Standard Industrial Classification system (SIC) to 
define empirically whether a firm belongs to the pharmaceutical industry. To do so, I restrict the 
initial sample to firms that have their primary activities in one of the following four-digit SIC 
codes: 28- (2833, 2834, 2835, 2836) and 38- (3826, 3841, 3842, 3844)8. Restricting the sample 
to a limited number of SIC codes reduces concerns about potential bias originating from 
differences in firms’ propensity to innovate across industries (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & 
Winter, 1987).    
After matching those databases I was left with 312 unique firms involved in at 
least one licensing contract9 during the period covered by the data. Because I measure firm 
innovation using patents, I further matched those firms with the NBER patent database and the 
                                                          
8 Those four-digit SIC codes cover the following segments: 2833- Medicinal Chemicals & Botanical Products, 
2834- Pharmaceutical Preparations; 2835- In Vitro & In Vivo Diagnostic Substances; 2836- Biological Products, 
(No Diagnostic Substances); 3826- Laboratory Analytical Instruments; 3841- Orthopedic, Prosthetic & Surgical 
Appliances & Supplies, 3842- Orthopedic, Prosthetic & Surgical Appliances & Supplies, 3844- X-Ray Apparatus & 
Tubes & Related Irradiation Apparatus 
9 I removed the observations regarding licensing contracts signed between firms belonging to the same group (i.e., 
owned subsidiaries) 
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Harvard Patent Network Dataverse. This implied dropping from the sample 68 firms that never 
patented. On the basis of those two databases I was able to compute firms patenting behavior. 
This setting produced a panel structure with unique observations for each firm-year unit of 
analysis. 
Because not all financial information was available for all the years for all firms, 
the resulting dataset has different numbers of time series per firm. This translates into an 
unbalanced panel consisting of 206 firms for which all the variables were available for at least 
three years10. Each firm appears in the sample on average 12.1 times, with a minimum of three 
and a maximum of 22 observations for the same firm11. Because the patent data is censored in 
2004 I limited the last licensing deal in the sample to 2001. This allowed me to observe the 
effect of licensing-in on firm patenting within three subsequent years. I define a licensing year 
event on the basis of whether firm i signs at least one licensing contract in year t. In total there 
are 456 licensing year events in the period 1983-2001, inclusive. Compared to the total sample, 
this number of licensing deals represents 18.17% of all firm-year observations. I also looked at 
the distribution of licensing deals over the years to ensure that there is no overrepresentation of 
licensing activity in certain periods. I observe that the highest number of firm licensing events in 
a single year was 53 in 1997, which represents only 11.62% of the total number of deals 
observed in the sample. Figure 1 displays the yearly distribution of licensing events and the 
number of firms observed in each specific year. It is possible to see a clear drop in the number 
of deals reported in 1998; this pattern is similar to the findings reported by Schilling (2009) and 
is likely to be caused by volatility in firms’ licensing behavior. Furthermore, the average number 
of licensing-in deals per firm was 2.81, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 11. Finally, for 
                                                          
10 I removed from the sample firms that appear for less than three years to increase the overall balance of the panel 
and to ensure enough observations regarding the same firm to run the econometric analysis. 
11 Later in the paper I provide evidence that the unbalanced nature of the panel does not raise concerns regarding 
selectivity bias. 
  
91 
 
firms involved in more than one licensing deal within the same year, I aggregate all the deals 
into one single observation12. Although aggregating the number of licensing deals might lead to 
loss of information, it simplifies the data structure and the interpretation of the results. Overall, 
the dataset this study draws on includes 2,509 firm-year observations regarding 206 firms 
tracked over the period 1983-2004.       
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
3.5 Measures  
Firm Innovation:  I measure firm innovation as the count of successful patent applications from 
firm i in year t. Prior studies have shown that patents are strongly correlated with new product 
introductions as well as with non-patentable innovations (Trajtenberg, 1987). In order to avoid 
noise produced by differences in evaluation procedures across patent offices, I only consider the 
patents applied for at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Given that the 
U.S. market represents the world’s largest market for high-tech products, global firms have large 
incentives to apply for patents at the USPTO (Phelps, 2010; Rivette, 1993). To compute the total 
number of patents firm i applied for in year t, I use the patent application date because it is 
closely related to the timing of knowledge creation (Ahuja, 2000). To account for the 
heterogeneity across patents in terms of value and quality, I weight each patent in the sample 
with the number of forward citations that it received from other patents (Griliches, 1990).  
Although licensing contracts provide a range of legal clauses and mechanisms that 
facilitate the process of knowledge transfer (Choi, 2002; David & Olsen, 1992), the assimilation 
and use of external technologies involve more than the simple permission to use certain 
knowledge covered by a group of patents (Arora, 1995). Therefore, given that firms might need 
                                                          
12 Only 4.8% of the observations in the final sample regard firms that engaged in more than one licensing contract 
in the same year, with the maximum being three contracts per year.  
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more than one period to assimilate and apply the licensed technology to the generation of 
innovations (Leone & Reichstein, 2012), I used three different lags for the dependent variable 
(Patents t+1; Patent t+2; Patents t+3). This strategy not only makes it possible to capture the effect 
of licensing-in on firm patenting over a longer period of time, but also reduces concerns about 
reverse causality13 (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).      
Independent Variables  
Technology Licensing-in. To capture the effect of licensing-in on subsequent firm innovation I 
generated a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if firm i has been involved in at least one 
licensing deal at year t, and 0 otherwise. In this setting firms might enter into several licensing-
in deals over the period covered by the data.  
Recoverable Slack. Several studies have operationalized Recoverable Slack on the basis of 
financial ratio measures (Bourgeois, 1981; Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Miller & Leiblein, 1996). 
Compared to other finer-grained indicators (e.g., surveys), financial ratios offer the advantage of 
being consistent and verifiable indicators of managerial behavior over time (George, 2005). 
Therefore, I measure Recoverable Slack by dividing firm i’s inventory14 in year t by the total 
sales. This variable is intended to capture the amount of resources that the firm has already 
absorbed as excess costs, but can be recovered for necessary redeployment. Instead, one could 
suggest that the use of Available Slack would be more appropriate in the context of this paper. 
                                                          
13 One could argue that firms would first produce an invention and subsequently engage in licensing contracts as a 
strategy to avoid infringing on technology holders’ rights. As a consequence, if this were the case, I would capture 
the effect of innovation on the licensing decision and not the other way around. However, I do not expect that a 
firm producing an innovation at year t will license a technology to avoid infringement problems in year t+1, and 
then patent the initial invention only at year t+3. Especially in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, where 
patents are a major source of competitive advantage, firms try to patent innovations as soon as possible as a way to 
exclude competitors and secure rents (Roberts, 1999).   
14 The COMPUSTAT database describes Inventory as ‘merchandise bought for resale and materials and supplies 
purchased for use in production of revenue’. This is in line with Bourgeois’ (1981) description of recoverable slack 
as being absorbed resources that are recoverable ‘with some effort’. 
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However, as suggested in prior studies, an increase in a firm’s liquidity and the existing amount 
of unabsorbed resources is likely to result from anticipated needs to meet short term obligations 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Cheng & Kesner, 1997). In other words, Available Slack is likely to represent 
resources that are already committed.   
Finally, financial ratio measures, such as recoverable slack, might present exceptionally 
high variance across industries. Therefore, measures regarding financial ratios should not be 
generalized for firms in different industries given that the absolute comparisons mean very little 
(Miller & Leiblein, 1996). To account for this variance, I normalize this measure by dividing 
firm i's recoverable slack by the four-digit SIC code industry median in the year of observation.    
Organizational Myopia. Previous studies have shown several facets of myopia related to 
organizational learning (Levinthal & March, 1993), lack of capacity to identify opportunities 
and threats (Wuyts, Colombo, Dutta, & Nooteboom, 2005), negligence of cross-cultural 
differences (Saner, Yiu, & Søndergaard, 2000), and resistance to new technologies (Mezias & 
Glynn, 1993). In this paper I am specifically interested in firms’ myopic behavior related to the 
use of knowledge generated outside their boundaries. To operationalize this construct I employ 
Agrawal, Cockburn, & Rosell’s (2009) measure of organizational myopia, which is computed on 
the basis of the backward citations of firms’ patents. Patent citations have been recurrently used 
as an indication of built-upon knowledge that firms rely on to produce innovations (Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Accordingly, I calculate this measure in the following 
way:  
Organizational Myopia 
 = 5 
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where 5  represents the total number citations that firm i made to its own patents, and , the 
total number of citations, regardless of the ownership of the cited patent. Following previous 
studies I applied a seven year moving window to allow for enough patents to be produced and to 
account for knowledge depreciation over time (Phelps, 2010).  
- Control Variables  
Presample Patents. To control for unobserved heterogeneity concerning firms’ patenting 
propensity, I use the presample average innovation count proposed by (Blundell, Griffith, & 
Reenen, 1995). To operationalize this variable I calculate the cumulative number of patents 
obtained by a firm in the five years prior to its entry in the sample.    
Industry Competition. Given that both the decision to license in and the decision to innovate 
might be triggered by competitive pressures, I include as a control variable the total number of 
firms listed in the same four-digit SIC code of firm i in COMPUSTAT in year t.        
Technological Collaborator. One way that firms have to deal with problem solving related to 
the assimilation of new technologies is the use of external partners (Powell, Koput, & Smith-
Doerr, 1996). Therefore, I account for the number of co-patents applied for by firm i in the five 
years prior to the licensing-in deal as a proxy for propensity to collaborate with external 
partners.      
Patenting Experience. I control for technological experience using the number of years that 
elapsed between the first time the firm applied for a patent and year t. Firms with more 
experience in innovating might also be better at managing licensed technologies. Furthermore, I 
also expect this variable to be significantly correlated with firm age, which has been shown to 
affect innovation (e.g.,Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Sørensen & Stuart, 2000).     
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Technological Complexity. I control for firms’ ability to handle technological complexity by 
computing the average number of claims on patents applied for in the seven years preceding 
year t. Experience in dealing with complex bodies of knowledge makes it easier for firms to 
integrate the acquired technology into their own knowledge bases (Leone & Reichstein, 2012).  
Evaluation Capacity. Firms differ significantly in their capacity to evaluate external 
knowledge. On the basis of Arora and Gambardella (1994), I calculate the Evaluation Capacity 
variable using the average number of scientific references in the backward citations of patents 
accumulated in the seven years preceding year t. This measure aims to capture firms’ in-house 
scientific capabilities, which reflect both the extent to which a firm’s inventors search the 
frontier of technological space and also their ability to deal with scientific knowledge15.     
Technology Diversity. Higher levels of diversity in a firm’s knowledge base increase the 
likelihood that a licensed technology will be easily absorbed (Laursen et al., 2010). I measure 
firm technology diversity in year t using the Herfindahl index applied to the technological 
classes of the patents that firm i produced before year t:  
Technology diversity 
 = 1 − / 0!! 2
.
3,
 
Where Nit is the total number of patents that a firm accumulated in the previous seven years and 
Njit represents the number of patents in technology class j. The final measure is obtained by 
subtracting 1 from the value reflecting the concentration of patent classes across the different 
technological domains. 
                                                          
15 In their paper, Arora and Gambardella measure Evaluation Capacity using the number of scientific publications 
produced by a firm’s inventors. I do not have information on the scientific outputs of inventors; nevertheless, I 
expect that the extent to which firms rely on scientific references to produce innovations is also a good indicator of 
inventors’ search behavior and their capacity to deal with scientific knowledge.     
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Licensing Experience. Accumulated experience with licensing-in might enhance firms’ overall 
innovation capabilities by establishing internal routines related to the way that licensed-in 
technologies are managed. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the effect of licensing-in on 
innovation might extend over more than one period. I control for the number of licensing deals 
that firm i has accumulated in the three years before year t.    
Firm R&D Intensity. A firm’s expenditure in R&D activities is one of the main determinants 
of its capacity to absorb external knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). So, in order to control 
for firm differences in terms of absorptive capacity, I measure R&D intensity by dividing a 
firm’s R&D expenses by its sales in year t. 
Firm Size. To control for firm size, I used the natural log of the number of employees 
(thousands) for firm i in year t.   
U.S./Canada Firm. I used a region dummy that takes the value 1 if the firms’ headquarter is 
located in U.S. or Canada.   
3.6 Statistical Method 
Given that I measure firm innovation performance using citation-weighted patents, the model 
used to conduct the empirical analysis had to appropriately accommodate non-negative integer 
count values. Furthermore, previous studies have shown that modeling patent count requires 
using a regression approach that deals with many zeros (Sampson, 2007; Ziedonis, 2004). I first 
considered using a Poisson model as it is one of the simplest alternatives to deal with count data 
(Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984). However, the Poisson distribution has the strong 
assumption that the variance is proportional to the mean, #(6) = 7(6) = 8. If this assumption 
is violated, one of the implications concerns the fact that the coefficients will be estimated 
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consistently, but underestimated standard errors might be reflected in spurious significance 
levels (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986; Gourieroux, Monfort, & Trognon, 1984). The test for 
overdispersion provided evidence against using a Poisson model and in favor of a model that 
allows the variance of the dependent variable to exceed its mean. 
The usual alternative to the pure Poisson model is the conditional Negative 
Binomial specification (Hausman et al., 1984), which is a generalization of the Poisson that is 
appropriate under conditions of overdispersion. The estimation of a Negative Binomial model in 
a longitudinal setting allows implementing either fixed or random effects as an alternative to 
deal with unobserved characteristics regarding the subjects in the sample. I chose to use the 
fixed effects specification as it allows for arbitrary correlation between unobserved time-
constant factors and the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2012), providing more conservative 
estimators. In the case of the present study, I expect that not all relevant time invariant attributes 
simultaneously affecting firm capacity to deal with licensed-in technologies and to innovate can 
be successfully incorporated into the model. Furthermore, although the fixed effects estimators 
remove both desirable and undesirable variation across subjects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009), 
failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity might result in significant specification errors 
(Heckman, 1979). 
Despite the large number of studies applying the conditional Negative Binomial 
fixed effects model, this model has been criticized for not providing “true” fixed effects 
estimators as it does not control for all time-invariant attributes (Allison & Waterman, 2002). 
Schilling & Phelps (2007) suggest that incorporating into the model firm attributes to account 
for the residual unobserved heterogeneity specifically associated with firm patenting behavior 
helps to deal with this problem. Following Schilling and Phelps’ steps, in addition to firm fixed 
effects, I also used the presample information approach of Blundell et al. (1995) as an 
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explanatory variable. In their approach, Blundell et al. argued that, in innovation models, one of 
the main sources of firm heterogeneity comes from differences in the knowledge stock that 
firms enter the sample. They propose that using the “entry stock” of patents can adequately 
control for fixed effects and virtually eliminate persistent serial correlation in count models (i.e., 
Poisson and Negative Binomial). This approach has also been applied in several studies related 
to innovation performance as a way to minimize the failure of negative binomial fixed effects to 
capture all firm-specific effects (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Keil, Maula, Schildt, & Zahra, 
2008; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Accordingly, I included in the Negative Binomial model the 
Presample Patents as an explanatory variable. Finally, I also used year and industry dummies to 
control for unobserved industry and period effects not captured by the firm fixed effects.          
3.7 Results  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and simple correlations between the variables used in the 
regression analysis. The reported dependent variable corresponds to the citation-weighted count 
of patents following a one year lag (Patents t+1)
16. Results of the pairwise correlation raised no 
concerns regarding multicollinearity. Particularly, the explanatory variables concerning the 
hypothesized effects do not present any strong correlations among themselves or with the 
control variables.   Additionally, the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) associated with 
any of the independent variables was 2.17 (mean VIF = 1.31), which is well below the rule-of-
thumb value of ten (Gujarati, 2003). On average, 18% of the firm year observations in the 
sample involve a Technology Licensing deal, with larger firms being more likely to license in. In 
line with my expectations, the presample estimator presented a moderate correlation with the 
dependent variable (r=0.29), suggesting that firms’ pre-entry patent stock is positively 
associated with firms’ future capacity to produce innovations. 
                                                          
16 There are no substantial changes in the correlation between the dependent variable and the main explanatory 
variables, except to the fact that some of the correlations decrease in magnitude. 
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[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Table 2 reports the negative binomial panel with fixed effects for the three dependent variables 
(Patents t+1; Patent t+2; Patents t+3). The results for the different year lags are reported in different 
models. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 report the results for a one-year lag between the explanatory 
variables and the citation-weighted patent count (Patents t+1). Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 report the 
results using a two-year lag (Patents t+2). Finally, models 9, 10, 11, and 12 report the results 
using a three-year lag (Patents t+3). In order to check the stability of the coefficients and standard 
errors, I added the main explanatory variables one at a time. For each of the three dependent 
variables, the first models (1, 5, and 9) include the control variables and the main explanatory 
variable Technology Licensing. In the second models (2, 6, and 10), I included the interaction 
Technology Licensing X Organizational Myopia. In the third group of models (3, 7, and 11), the 
interaction term Technology Licensing X Recoverable Slack also enters the regression without 
the previous interaction term. Finally, the final models (4, 8, and 12) include the main 
explanatory variable and the two interaction terms simultaneously. I will focus on the 
interpretation of the coefficients estimated in the final models. To conserve space, the 
coefficients regarding industry and time period effects, while estimated in all models, are not 
reported.     
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
The results provided support for Hypothesis 1, which stated that engaging in technology 
licensing will be positively related to a firm’s subsequent capacity to produce innovation. While 
the reported coefficients for Technology Licensing are positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.001) across all the models, it is possible to observe a decrease in their magnitude from 
Model 4 to Model 8 and Model 12. I estimated the marginal effects for the coefficients regarding 
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the Technology Licensing variable in order to compare their magnitudes in absolute terms17. The 
marginal effects estimated on the basis of the full models indicated that licensing-in is 
associated with an increase of 7.2% in firm patenting after a one-year lag, 5.8% after a two-year 
lag, and 5.2% after a three-year lag.  
Hypothesis 2 proposed that the effect of technology licensing on innovation will be 
moderated by the firm’s level of recoverable slack in such a fashion that increasing slack will 
reinforce the positive effect of licensing on the firm’s subsequent capacity to produce 
innovations. The coefficient for the interaction term between Technology Licensing and 
Recoverable Slack is positive and significant, exhibiting different levels of significance, across 
the models. This result suggests that the positive effect of licensing-in on firm patenting is 
augmented in conditions of high levels of recoverable slack, supporting the effect described in 
hypothesis 2. Additionally, I used a Wald test to verify whether the combined effect of this 
interaction term and Technology Licensing are simultaneously equal to zero, which would 
suggest that removing the interaction term would not significantly reduce the model fit. The 
results for the three dependent variables rejected the null hypothesis that both terms are 
simultaneously equal to zero (for a one-year lag: chi2 (2) = 49.47, p<0.001). 
Finally, the results supported the moderation effect predicted in Hypothesis 3 
regarding the fact that the effect of technology licensing on innovation will be moderated by the 
firm’s level of organizational myopia in such a fashion that increasing myopia will weaken the 
positive effect of licensing on the firm’s subsequent capacity to produce innovations. 
Accordingly, the interaction term between technology licensing and organizational myopia 
produced statistically significant and negative coefficients (p<0.001). This finding supports the 
idea that organizational myopia negatively moderates the relationship between technology 
                                                          
17 The other independent variables were set to equal the sample means.  
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licensing and firm innovation. I also used the Wald test to check whether the joint effect of 
Technology Licensing X Organizational Myopia and the main variable is statistically different 
from zero. The results also indicated that the inclusion of the interaction term creates a 
statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model for the three dependent variables (for 
a one year lag: chi2 (2) = 63.84, p<0.001).  
In sum, the overall results support the idea that recoverable slack and 
organizational myopia are important moderators for firms’ capacity to produce innovations out 
of technology licensing-in. To illustrate the magnitude of the interaction effect, Figure 2 
presents the plot of the two interactions regarding Recoverable Slack and Organizational 
Myopia with the variable Technology Licensing. The graphs are calculated on the basis of the 
effect of one standard deviation above and below the mean. The graphic representation of the 
interaction effects is consistent with the results in model 4 reported on table 2, with increasing 
levels of slack leading to an increase in the positive effect of licensing on patenting. On the 
other hand, the graph shows increasing levels of myopia leading to a decrease in the effect of 
licensing-in on firm patenting.   
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
The examination of the control variables reveals that, as expected, Size and R&D 
Intensity had significant and positive effects on firm patenting. In addition to that, Licensing 
Experience also displays a positive and significant coefficient. This result could be attributed to 
either the residual effect of previous licensing deals on firm patenting or an improvement on 
firm capacity to deal with licensing through accumulated experience. The fact that the 
coefficients for Presample Patents remained significant across all the models reinforces the 
importance of controlling for firm heterogeneity in terms of “pre-entry” knowledge stock. 
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Finally, the result related to the direct effect of Recoverable Slack also merits more detailed 
discussion. The main term for Recoverable Slack remained negative and highly significant 
across all the models (p<0.001), which suggests that this type of slack has a negative effect on 
firm patenting. This result is similar to the one found by Geiger & Makri (2006), which reported 
that for firms with high levels of R&D intensity (which is the case for pharmaceutical firms) the 
effect of Recoverable Slack on the firms’ number of new patents is negative. Furthermore, 
Geiger & Makri also found that Recoverable Slack is particularly important for firms’ 
engagement in exploratory innovation18, which is also in line with my findings. Scholars have 
attributed the negative effect of slack on firm innovation to inefficiencies associated with 
resource allocation and adaptation processes (Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  
3.8 Robustness Checks 
I performed a number of additional robustness checks to verify whether the main results are 
sensitive to alternative specifications. First, I analyzed the data using a Poisson model with fixed 
effects. I chose to re-estimate the analysis using a Poisson model because although it is likely to 
suffer from overdispersion, the estimators can be regarded as true fixed effects providing robust 
results related to unobservable (stable) firm attributes (Allison & Waterman, 2002). Table 3 
reports the results for a one-year lag19 without the time invariant explanatory variables. The 
Poisson model produced similar estimators to the Negative Binomial model with fixed effects, 
suggesting that the specification used in the main regression analysis adequately accounts for the 
simultaneous effect of firms’ stable attributes on the dependent and independent variables. I also 
assessed the marginal effects of the Technology Licensing variable on firm patenting using the 
                                                          
18Laursen et al., (2010) show that licensing-in is an effective mechanism for firms to engage in exploratory search.                
19 I choose to report a one-year lag in the robustness check because that is the period in which the effect of 
licensing-in on patenting is more pronounced, but the results for the other two dependent variables (Patent t+2; 
Patents t+3) are qualitatively similar to the Negative Binomial estimators.   
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Poisson estimator; the result indicates a reduction of 3% compared to the Negative Binomial 
model.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 A source of potential concern regards the presence of significant heterogeneity 
across the technologies in the sample. The empirical strategy that I chose to test the hypotheses 
did not allow me to incorporate variables that relate only to the licensing contracts and the 
licensors. Nevertheless, I also investigated potential bias related to the origin of the licensed 
technology, if it comes from a university or from another firm. In fact, Jensen & Thursby (2001) 
concluded that in most cases, the technologies commercialized by universities are at early 
stages, requiring substantial further work to reach a stage that would allow them to be 
commercially exploited by firms. In my sample, 12% of the licensing contracts have a university 
as the licensor. While this is not a large number, I still decided to investigate whether there are 
difference between those contracts and pure inter-firm agreements. Although I cannot assess 
precisely the stage of development related to the technologies in the sample, I have information 
regarding the age of those technologies20. Considering the full sample, the average age of the 
licensed technologies is 6.3 years. However, the results of a t-test indicate that when accounting 
only for the contracts coming from universities, this value is reduced to 4.8 years. Considering 
this fact, I also estimated the econometric models without university contracts and the results 
remained the same in terms of significance and direction. In addition, I also calculated the 
marginal effect for the variable technology licensing on the dependent variable using a one-year 
lag; the results indicate an increase in the order of 1.8% in the sample without university 
contracts. As expected, if the licensed technology is more developed, the effect on firm 
                                                          
20 While age is not an ideal proxy for the stage of development of a certain technology, I expect that the higher the 
age, the longer the time the technology had to be refined and further developed.  
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innovation is stronger. Given that the effect of university contracts seems to indicate a 
downward bias in my estimators, I decided to keep them in the main analysis.    
Another potential concern regards the unbalanced nature of the panel structure 
used in the regression analysis. If the structure of the panel is unbalanced, some firms might be 
overrepresented in data, leading to potential selectivity bias. I examine this issue using the 
approach suggested by Verbeek & Nijman  (1992), which consists of using a Hausman test to 
compare the coefficients of an artificially generated balanced version of the panel against the 
version used in the original regression analysis (naturally unbalanced). The overall results of the 
Hausman test were highly insignificant (chi2= 1.55, Prob>chi2 = 0.67), with very small 
differences in the coefficients for the main explanatory variables. On the basis of this result, I 
found no evidence that the results are biased due to sample selectivity. 
Further robustness checks, available from the author upon request, are not reported 
here because of space limitations. First, although I track firms’ licensing behavior over a long 
period of time (on average 12.2 years), it is still possible that substantial firm heterogeneity 
explaining the licensing-in decision would affect my results. For example, firms with high levels 
of Organizational Myopia would, in the first place, be less likely to engage in licensing-in and 
also be less likely to improve their subsequent patenting activity. To test whether this is the case, 
I estimated a logit model with random effects predicting the likelihood that firm i will license a 
technology in year t. I used the same explanatory variables reported in the main regression 
analysis, except the variable Technology Licensing-in, which is used as the dependent variable. 
The coefficients for the main explanatory variables were highly insignificant, suggesting that 
neither Organizational Myopia nor Recoverable Slack can explain firms’ decisions to engage in 
licensing-in. Furthermore, in line with the licensing literature, I find that Firm Size is a positive 
and statistically significant predictor for firm licensing behavior.   
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Finally, I also estimated the regressions using the number of technologies a firm 
licensed within the year of interest, instead of a dummy, to compute the variable Technology 
Licensing. The results remained the same, which can be attributed to the fact that a very low 
number of firms engage in more than one licensing deal within the same year.  
3.9 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper was mainly motivated by the scarcity of studies examining the demand side of 
markets for technology. This literature stream has largely ignored the fact that firms can use 
technology licensing-in as a learning mechanism connected to their overall innovation strategy. 
This paper addressed this limitation by examining the effect of technology licensing-in on firm 
capacity to produce innovations. Furthermore, the relationship between licensing-in and firm 
innovation is considered in light of organizational characteristics. The central idea developed in 
this paper is that firms can use technology licensing-in as a mechanism to access external 
knowledge, which provides learning opportunities and opens up new possibilities for knowledge 
generation. However, given the challenges that are associated with knowledge acquisition, I also 
propose that recoverable slack and organizational myopia play a critical role in the extent to 
which firms’ innovation will benefit from licensing. While previous studies have examined 
specific dimensions of the relationship between technology licensing and firm innovation, this 
paper is among the first to investigate how licensing-in affects firm innovation over time. 
Furthermore, it is also one of the first to consider the licensees’ organizational characteristics as 
an integral part of the licensing-in process.         
Consistently with my expectations, the results provided broad support for the idea 
that by engaging in licensing-in deals, firms can increase their subsequent capacity to produce 
innovations. In addition to that, the empirical models also corroborated the idea that if the 
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licensee presents higher levels of recoverable slack at the moment of the licensing agreement, 
the main effect of licensing-in on innovation will be augmented. On the other hand, the higher 
the level of organizational myopia among the inventors within the acquiring firm, the weaker 
will be the effect of licensing-in on innovation. This result is in line with the idea that the NIH 
syndrome can prevent firms from benefitting from licensing in technology. The empirical setting 
used to test the proposed hypotheses was particularly appropriate as it allowed me to 
consistently track both licensing and patenting firm behaviors over long periods of time. This 
setting was also particularly important to observe the effect of licensing-in on innovation in 
more than one period after the licensing deal was signed. The empirical results are robust to firm 
fixed effects, several firm-level control variables, and different estimation strategies.  
 This study mainly contributes to two bodies of literature. First, its main 
contribution is related to the technology licensing research stream (Arora et al., 2001; Fosfuri, 
2006; Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). Understanding the dynamics of the 
demand side of markets for technology is as important as a deep comprehension of the reasons 
behind the decision to license out a technology (Fosfuri, 2006). Given that firms are becoming 
more open to acquiring knowledge from external sources, it is particularly relevant to 
understand the link between licensing-in and innovation. Second, this paper also adds to the 
organizational learning literature by focusing on specific firm characteristics that affect the 
process of integrating external knowledge. Although several studies have discussed the effect of 
slack on innovation (Bourgeois, 1981; Nohria & Gulati, 1996), this is the first paper that I am 
aware of to consider it as moderator for external knowledge acquisition and innovation. 
Furthermore, while the literature on the NIH syndrome is not scarce, the number of empirical 
studies examining it within the context of technology licensing-in is very limited.         
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The findings in this paper also have managerial implications. Considering that the 
relationship between licensing-in and innovation can be significantly affected by recoverable 
slack and organizational myopia, managers should pay attention to those two characteristics 
when deciding to use licensing agreements to acquire new technologies. I acknowledge the fact 
that it might not be simple for managers to directly influence inventors to search more openly 
and incorporate external knowledge as an input in their innovations. Nevertheless, it is possible 
for firms to adopt innovation strategies that are less likely to allow persistent organizational 
myopia to be disseminated among individuals. Regarding recoverable slack, the results in this 
paper provide evidence that firms should provide individuals with an appropriate environment 
for experimentation and risk-taking when inventors are supposed to engage in the development 
of technologies acquired from external sources, as in the case of licensing agreements.  
This study should also be considered in light of some limitations. First, although I 
emphasized the benefits of technology licensing-in for firm innovation, I did not consider that in 
the long-term it might also impose costs. Previous research suggests that firms need to maintain 
a satisfactory level of internal R&D in order to sustain innovation. Therefore, strong reliance on 
mechanisms like licensing agreements may jeopardize the appropriate balance between internal 
and external knowledge flows (Mulotte, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 2013). Furthermore, the licensee 
might become dangerously reliant on the licensor to further develop the licensed technology. 
This is particularly true in licensing contracts trading technologies that are highly unfamiliar to 
the licensee (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). This argument implies that when considering a making 
or buying decision, it is also important for firms to take into account how strategic the 
technology under consideration is for the firm’s main activities.  
Next, because the literature on organizational slack draws a clear line indicating 
substantial differences between potential, recoverable, and available slack, it is important that 
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future studies also consider how the other two forms of slack moderate the relationship between 
knowledge acquisition and innovation. I decided to focus on the recoverable form of 
organizational slack because it was more directly related to risk-taking and resource 
deployability. However, future studies could also consider how available slack affects the 
quality of the innovations that firms acquire through licensing contracts. I tried to provide 
evidence that recoverable slack was not able to predict firm licensing-in behavior, but this topic 
merits further investigation. Another potential issue regards reverse causality. Although the use 
of different time lags alleviates this concern, it is still possible that the licensing decision spans 
over longer time horizons. Along this line, future studies should also consider different types of 
innovation output, for example, exploratory and exploitative innovations. 
Finally, I believe that the robustness of the econometric specifications have 
substantially reduced endogeneity concerns. First, I employed firm fixed effects to control for 
unobserved (stable) firm characteristics. In this case, one potential criticism to my main model 
would be related to the fact that negative binomial estimators do not provide true fixed effects, 
leaving space for bias emerging from cross-firm heterogeneity. Although this might be a 
potential source of concern, the robustness check using the Poisson fixed effects substantially 
mitigates potential concerns with this issue. Second, the use of the pre-sample estimator 
proposed by Blundell et al., (1995) should account for any residual heterogeneity related to 
innovation performance that has not been accounted by firm fixed effects. Furthermore, the pre-
sample estimator is also an efficient way to deal with potential persistent serial correlation 
(Blundell et al., 1995). While this study was mostly concerned with firm-level characteristics 
that can explain differences in innovation performance, future studies should also consider 
examining in detail how differences at the technology level affect the relationship between 
technology licensing and firm innovation.   
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3.11 Figures 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Licensing Events and Number of Firms (1983-2004) 
 
 
Figure 2: Graph of Interactions of Fixed Effects Models (Patents t+1) 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (N =  2.509)                       
    Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Patents it+1   264.138   598.055 1.00 
(2) Technology Licensing     0.180     0.384 0.11 1.00 
(3) Recoverable Slack     1.077     1.114 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
(4) Organizational Myopia     0.335     0.293 -0.03 -0.00 0.03 1.00 
(5) Firm Size     6.548     2.558 0.50 0.08 0.19 0.05 1.00 
(6) Firm R&D Intensity   149.692   286.873 -0.17 0.01 -0.16 -0.07 -0.38 1.00 
(7) Licensing Experience     0.496     0.734 0.10 0.14 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.01 1.00 
(8) Technology Diversity     0.612     0.303 0.23 0.03 0.01 -0.27 0.36 -0.09 0.01 1.00 
(9) Evaluation Capacity    18.239    27.767 -0.18 0.04 -0.21 -0.13 -0.28 0.23 0.13 -0.24 1.00 
(10) Technological Complexity    15.511    11.160 -0.11 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.16 0.04 0.02 -0.42 0.35 1.00 
(11) Patenting Experience     9.279     7.102 0.23 0.02 0.22 -0.03 0.54 -0.26 0.15 0.15 -0.10 0.09 1. 0 
(12) Technological Collaborator     2.747     9.474 0.09 0.05 0.07 -0.04 0.26 -0.05 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.30 1.00 
(13) Industry Competition   146.007    84.928 -0.10 0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.03 0.11 0.23 -0.11 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.13 1.00 
(14) U.S./Canada Firm     0.959     0.198 0.07 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 -0.18 0.02 0.10 -0.10 0.09 0.08 -0.07 -0.14 -0.01 1.00 
(15) Presample Patents    72.675   258.379 0.29 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.44 -0.13 0.02 0.23 -0.13 -0.07 0.35 0.57 -0.05 -0.30 1.00 
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(0.252)    (0.252)    (0.252)    (0.251)    (0.245)    (0.244)    (0.245)    (0.244)    (0.232)    (0.231)    (0.232)    (0.231)    
Industry Competition -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006* * -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Presample Patents 0.000*   0.000*   0.000*   0.000*   0.001*** 0.001**  0.001*** 0.001**  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Constant -5.993*** -5.947*** -6.032*** -5.981*** -6.406*** -6.365*** -6.434*** -6.388* * -6.212*** -6.193*** -6.235*** -6.210*** 
(0.506)    (0.506)    (0.506)    (0.507)    (0.517)    (0.516)    (0.517)    (0.516)    (0.527)    (0.526)    (0.527)    (0.526)    
Chi2 74.994 764.768 763.410 781.696    801.693 812.412 822.163 833.672    819.154 821.640 841.631 845.173    
Log likelihood -990.360 -989.761 -989.684 -988.921   -922.928 -922.351 -921.989 -921.333   -849.586 -849.415 -848.669 -848.431 
Note. All models include firm, time period, and industry effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests for all variables) 
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Table 3: Panel Poisson Regression Model with Fixed Effects and Robust Standard Errors (N= 206 Obs= 2.509) 
Variables Patents it+1 
  1 2 3 4 
Technology Licensing X Recoverable Slack 0.224* 0.257** 
(0.088) (0.091) 
Technology Licensing X Organizational 
Myopia -0.549* -0.630** 
(0.225) (0.238) 
Technology Licensing 0.237*** 0.245*** 0.222*** 0.228*** 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.055) (0.051) 
Recoverable Slack -0.071 -0.124+ -0.072 -0.136+ 
(0.067) (0.072) (0.068) (0.075) 
Organizational Myopia 0.198 0.181 0.305 0.299 
(0.213) (0.213) (0.231) (0.229) 
Firm Size 0.112 0.104 0.109 0.099 
(0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
Firm R&D Intensity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Licensing Experience 0.199*** 0.196*** 0.191*** 0.187*** 
(0.047) (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) 
Technology Diversity 0.221 0.238 0.213 0.231 
(0.182) (0.180) (0.183) (0.183) 
Evaluation Capacity 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Technological Complexity 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Patenting Experience -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.085*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Technological Collaborator -0.008* -0.007* -0.008* -0.008* 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Industry Competition -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Chi2 101.556 121.383 116.299 130.526 
Log likelihood -1.726.659 -1.717.926 -1.717.436 -1.706.114 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests for all variables) 
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4.1 Introduction  
The modern innovative firm operates in a world characterized by specialization advantages, and 
uses many different inputs to its knowledge production (Pavitt 1998). This implies that firms 
can achieve competitive advantage by outdoing the efforts of competitors to combine 
knowledge from internal and external sources in the production of new and superior products 
(Kogut and Zander 1992, Lavie 2006). Licensing agreements are an important channel for 
knowledge exchange: Anand and Khanna (2000) suggest that “Licensing…is one of only a few 
significant methods of technology transfer between firms, and one of the most commonly 
observed inter-firm contractual agreements.”  
However, although there may be potentially large mutual gains from trading in 
knowledge, these transactions may be hampered by the nature of the knowledge. It is not 
possible to specify exactly in a contract knowledge that is not well defined - perhaps because the 
technology includes a strong tacit component. This can make it cumbersome and costly for 
licensees to integrate the licensors’ technology in their own activities (Ceccagnoli and Jiang 
2012). However, it may also give licensee the option to act opportunistically, which hampers the 
licensors willingness to license out technology.  The impossibility of specifying a complete 
contract may prevent trade in cutting-edge technologies because of the possibility it allows for 
the licensee to develop the technology further and to overtake the licensor—the so-called 
“boomerang effect” (Choi 2002, Van Dijk 2000).  
For these reasons technology licensing is not a priority for many high-tech firms 
(Arora and Gambardella 2010). However, some of the problems inherent to licensing can be 
overcome by well-designed contracts that include clauses that align the incentives of the trading 
parties. The strategic management literature suggests that contractual clauses are essential for 
aligning the interests of the parties in an inter-firm relationship such as a strategic alliance. In 
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particular, they may enable transactions that require investment in specific assets by 
coordinating the resources and mitigating the risk of opportunistic behavior (Hoetker and 
Mellewigt 2009, Poppo and Zenger 2002).  
While technology licensing has been investigated in economics (e.g., Arora and 
Fosfuri 2003, Gallini 1984, Rockett 1990 ) and strategic management (e.g., Arora and 
Ceccagnoli 2006, Ceccagnoli and Jiang 2012, Fosfuri 2006), the role played by contract design 
in relation to the specific clauses included in licensing contracts has been mostly ignored. There 
are some exceptions. Hagedoorn and Hesen (2007) assess typical contracting perspectives by 
analyzing the types of clauses included in various contractual agreements such as licensing 
agreements. Hagedoorn et al. (2009) scrutinize licensing to other firms, focusing on the 
conditions that lead firms to use standard licensing contracts or to construct more elaborate 
partnership-embedded licensing agreements. Cebrién (2009) proposes an empirical model that 
includes options for royalties or fixed payments, or a combination of the two, through the 
inclusion of clauses relating to contractual hazards. Somaya et al. (2011) examine the conditions 
leading to licensing agreements including exclusivity clauses.  
While this body of work adds to our understanding of the functioning of 
technological licensing and licensing contracts, we know very little about an important and 
frequent clause in licensing contracts designed to alleviate the boomerang effect mentioned 
above: this is the grant-back clause.21 In many cases that (potentially) involve the dynamic 
effects of licensing on the competitiveness of the licensor in the innovation market (i.e., the 
“boomerang effect”), grant back clauses are essential since they can facilitate trade that 
otherwise would not take place (Choi 2002).  
                                                          
21  Caves et al. (1983) report that in their sample, 43% of firms’ licensing agreements included a grant-
back clause. In our sample 17% of the licensing agreements include a grant-back clause. 
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The grant-back clause “requires the potential licensee to agree to grant back to the 
patentee [i.e., the licensor] rights to improvement patents developed by the licensee that relate to 
the original patent as partial consideration for the license right” (Schmalbeck 1975: 733). In this 
context, Leone and Reichstein (2012) show that generally licensees achieve more rapid 
innovation than comparable non-licensees but that this effect is negated by the inclusion in the 
contract of a grant-back clause. It is argued that this is because the grant-back clause reduces the 
licensee’s incentive to develop the licensed technology further.  
This paper aims to increase our rather limited knowledge on the contingencies that 
determine when the contracting parties agree to the inclusion of a grant-back clause, by focusing 
on the factors that might explain its inclusion in a technology licensing agreement. In this case, 
it is a result of negotiation between licensor and licensee. To our knowledge, this attempt to try 
systematically to explain this phenomenon is unique. We consider especially the characteristics 
of the licensed technology in terms of the similarities between licensor’s and licensee’s 
knowledge bases, and technical uncertainties about the scope, level, and quality of follow-on 
innovations. 
We combine insights from the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm and contract 
economics to build theoretical arguments regarding the inclusion of grant-back clauses in 
technology licensing contracts. Our fundamental theoretical argument centers on the contracting 
firm’s need to balance protection of its technological resources with learning through internal 
and external processes. We argue that licensing agreements are increasingly more likely to 
include a grant-back clause, the closer is the licensed technology to the core of the licensor’s 
patent portfolio. On the licensee’s side, we conjecture that such agreements are decreasingly 
likely to include a grant-back clause, the closer the licensed technology to the core of the 
licensee’s patent portfolio. 
  
127 
 
In addition to those effects described above, we also hypothesize that a licensing 
agreement will be increasingly likely to include a grant-back clause if the licensed technology is 
associated with high uncertainty. We expect that the contracts negotiating uncertain 
technologies are more likely to include the grant-back clause as licensors have incentives to 
reduce future threats that uncertain technologies may pose. However, these variables interact in 
important ways: We would argue that technology licensing agreements involving technologies 
that are core to the licensor and are at the same time uncertain will further increase the 
probability of inclusion of a grant back-clause. We argue also that the lower likelihood of a 
grant-back clause in technology licensing agreements involving technologies that are related to 
the licensee’s core knowledge will be reversed if the licensed technology is uncertain.  
We test the proposed hypotheses using a sample of 404 licensed technologies 
extracted from Recombinant Capital’s Biotech Alliance (Recap) Database for the period 1984-
2004. We merge the information retrieved for licensing deals with patent data from the NBER 
project and with firm information from the COMPUSTAT database. We employ a hierarchical 
nested decision model to account for the fact that the inclusion in a licensing contract of a grant-
back clause is nested in the decision about which technologies to out-license. Accordingly, the 
empirical model comprises a two-level asymmetric nested tree in which the option of a grant-
back clause is available only if the licensor decides to out-license a technology. To implement 
this technique we use the unique USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office) patent 
number assigned to each technology in the licensing database to estimate the likelihood that a 
specific technology will be licensed. Then we estimate the extent to which the licensed 
technology represents a core technological activity for licensor and licensee, and the level of 
technological uncertainty, to estimate the likelihood that a grant-back clause will be included in 
the contract. We find overall empirical support for our theoretical arguments. 
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4.2 Theoretical Background  
The RBV and the competence-based view of the firm highlight that sustained competitive 
advantage can be achieved through ownership of valuable resources that are imperfectly mobile 
and imperfectly imitable (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993, Wernerfelt 1984). We draw on these 
perspectives and the extension proposed by Lavie (2006) who  relaxes the fundamental 
assumption of the original RBV that firms must own or at least fully control the resources that 
confer competitive advantage. Relaxation of this assumption is central to the extended RBV 
which claims that firms achieve sustained competitive advantage through collaboration with 
other firms.  
The conventional RBV frame considers only internal rents. Internal rents are a 
combination of Ricardian rents and quasi-rents derived from the focal firm’s internal resources 
(Lavie 2006, Peteraf 1993). Lavie (2006) also considers three additional types of rents that are 
related to the focal firm’s external relations. Appropriated relational rents refer to the joint 
benefit that accrues to collaboration partners through the combination, exchange, and co-
development of unique resources, and are the rents considered in the relational view of the firm 
(Dyer and Singh 1998). Inbound spillover rents are the private benefits that are derived by the 
focal firm exclusively from external resources subject to unintended leakages of knowledge 
from collaboration partners related to the partners’ shared and non-shared resources.22 Outbound 
spillover rents refer to the opposite situation where the unintended leakage of the resources of 
the focal firm produces private benefits for the collaborating partners, thereby reducing the focal 
firm’s competitive advantage. In our hypotheses we apply these distinctions to the types of rents 
relating to the benefits/rents that can be gained or lost in interactions with collaboration partners. 
                                                          
22  The two-sided nature of spillovers is acknowledged and exploited analytically in Myles, Shaver 
and Flyer (2000). The notion of inbound and outbound spillovers corresponds to Cassiman and Veugelers’s 
(2002) concepts of incoming and outgoing spillovers, which are applied for instance, in Alcácer  and Chung 
(2007).  
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In the present paper, we focus on technological resources. In many industries, technological 
resources are vital for sustained competitive advantage (Silverman 1999).  
To understand the inclusion of a grant-back clause in licensing contracts we 
combine insights from the RBV of the firm with the logic of incomplete contract theory in 
contract economics. Under the assumption of information asymmetry between trading parties, 
incomplete contract theory studies whether either of the contracting parties has an incentive to 
act opportunistically, and relatedly, whether either party has an incentive to invest effort in the 
transaction (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In this context, Choi (2002) is a particularly 
important contribution which is based on incomplete contract theory and addresses the already 
mentioned boomerang effect. The boomerang effect implies that granting licensees the right to 
use the licensors’ intellectual property “may enable them to develop new products, which make 
the licensed technology obsolete and leave the licensor in backwater of technology” (Choi 2002: 
804). This possibility indicates that the risk of increasing future competition can distort the 
licensing relationship, preventing deals to take place. Choi (2002) shows that a quantity-
dependent royalty payment can act as a “hostage” to help facilitate the transfer of the cutting-
edge technology. However, even though the use of royalty payments can deal with the licensor’s 
concerns regarding monetary compensations, the use of a royalty rate might incur in high costs 
for the licensee. Accordingly, if the royalty payments are too high, then the best technology will 
not be traded. As an alternative, a grant-back clause can reduce the costs imposed by a quantity-
dependent royalty payment, thereby facilitating trade by providing both parts the incentives to 
trade cutting-edge technologies. However, depending on the type of technology and its 
importance in the trading parties’ technological portfolios—related to their ability to maintain 
competitive advantage—a grant-back clause will be more or less likely to be included in the 
licensing contract.  
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4.3 Hypotheses  
4.3.1 Licensors’ core technologies 
A given firm possessing technological resources will have a portfolio of core and non-core 
technologies related to its activities (Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt 1997). The firm’s core 
technologies will be underpinned by a set of in-house core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 
1990). 
The licensing literature generally does not consider the licensing out of core 
technologies, because of the potential for loss of competitive advantage (see e.g., Caves, et al. 
1983). However, firms do license-out core technologies if they can avoid creating direct 
competitors (for an overview, see Leone and Laursen 2011). In these cases, licensing contracts 
are more likely to include a grant-back clause for three main reasons. First, the potential 
boomerang effect will be more severe for the licensor if core technology and related core 
competencies are involved, because of the competitive advantage and internal rents they 
provide. If these advantages are eliminated through the boomerang effect and resulting 
obsolescence of the core technology, the consequences for the licensor may be dire: There will 
be a strong likelihood that competition in the market will increase and new competitors will 
emerge. However, a grant-back clause reduces these risks. From the licensee’s perspective, 
although the inclusion of a grant-back may reduce the potential advantages of investing in the 
licensing deal, it still assures access to a technology with a high potential, which subsequently 
may result in a successful commercial exploitation. 
Second, assigning more residual rights of control to the principal (licensor) shifts 
the incentives for opportunistic and distorting behavior as a result of the lower ex-post returns to 
the agent (licensee). As a result, the licensee will commit fewer resources to the development of 
the in-licensed technology since the potential for achieving competitive advantage based on 
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development of the technology will be reduced. Van Dijk (2000: 1433) states that “future 
exchange clauses obviously weaken (licensee’s) incentives to improve current technology.” For 
licensees, the potential competitive advantage deriving from technology improvements is 
reduced because the advances achieved have to be transferred to the licensor. For the licensor, 
the risk of being overtaken by the licensee in a core technology is reduced as the result of a 
grant-back clause which increases the chances of maintaining the internal rents related to the 
core technology.  
Third, the inclusion of a grant-back clause provides an incentive for the licensor to 
assist the licensee in developing the technology further and forging a collaborative learning-
related arrangement based on the license (Leone and Reichstein 2012). A collaborative 
arrangement will increase the possibility of outbound spillover rents from the point of view of 
the licensor. This may be particularly dangerous if the collaboration is related to core 
technologies and the associated core competencies. However, the inclusion of a grant-back 
clause means that the potential outbound spillover rents become realized relational rents. In sum, 
we propose:   
Hypothesis 1: Technology license agreements, ceteris paribus, are increasingly likely to include 
a grant-back clause the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensor’s patent 
portfolio. 
 
4.3.2 Licensees’ core technologies 
There are many reasons why firms choose to in-license technologies. In the standard licensing 
literature, potential licensees are attracted by rapid access to technologies that have been 
developed and proven by their licensors in other competitive arenas (Atuahene-Gima 1992, 
Atuahene-Gima 1993). In this literature, licensing-in is seen as a tactical response to a shortfall 
in internal R&D capabilities (Lowe and Taylor 1998). However, in-licensing is also considered 
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a learning mechanism allowing combinations of complementary pieces of internal and external 
knowledge (Choi 2002, Johnson 2002, Laursen, Leone and Torrisi 2010, Leone and Reichstein 
2012, Lowe and Taylor 1998). According to Choi (2002: 807): “licensing of a new technology 
serves as a stepping stone for further developments of the licensed technology.” 
We hypothesize that a licensing agreement related to a core technology in the 
licensee’s patent portfolio is very unlikely to contain a grant-back clause for two main reasons. 
The first is the level of absorptive capacity needed to integrate the in-licensed technology 
(Laursen, et al. 2010). Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128) argue that a firms’ absorptive capacity 
is “largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge.” This related prior knowledge 
allows “the firm to better understand and therefore evaluate the import of intermediate 
technological advances that provide signals to the eventual merit of a new technological 
development” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990: 136). If the licensee’s core technology and related 
core competencies are technologically proximate to the in-licensed technology, it is likely that 
the licensee firm will have identified the appropriate patent and will be able to assimilate and 
exploit the knowledge contained in the in-licensed technology (for a similar logic applied to 
R&D-related strategic alliances, see Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996): Based on its prior 
knowledge, the licensee will probably understand the externally acquired technology. However, 
in the case of an unfamiliar technology, it will be difficult for the licensee to integrate the 
licensed technology into its activities. In this case, a grant-back clause will create an incentive 
for the licensor to help the licensee to integrate and develop this new technology (Leone and 
Reichstein 2012). This is unnecessary for a technology that is close to the licensee’s core 
technologies.  
The second and closely related reason is that licensing agreements entail the risk of 
involuntary bidirectional spillovers. They hold the potential for outbound spillover rents seen 
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from the point of view of either party. As already mentioned, grant-back clauses are often 
included to facilitate technological cooperation, and provide the licensor with an incentive to 
help the licensee understand, integrate, and develop the in-licensed knowledge. The licensor 
might be encouraged to invest extra time and resources to provide supplementary knowledge if 
there is some potential for future benefits from grant-backs (Parr and Smith 2005). However, 
when the licensed in technology is close to the licensee’s core technology (involving a high 
probability of absorption without direct technological collaboration with the licensor) then the 
licensee will not be keen to work cooperatively. It will be more interested in avoiding leaks of 
knowledge about core technologies and related core competencies to the licensor (inbound 
spillover rents for the licensor/outbound spillover rents for the licensee). Indeed, if the licensee 
is legally committed to transfer back to the licensor any technological improvement related its 
core technologies, there is always the risk that the licensee might lose its competitive 
advantages. On this basis, we posit the following:  
Hypothesis 2: Technology license agreements, ceteris paribus, are decreasingly likely to include 
grant-back clauses the closer the licensed technology is to the core of the licensee’s patent 
portfolio 
 
4.3.3 Licensors and uncertain technology 
Another aspect affecting the structure of contracts is the level of uncertainty of the licensed 
technology. According to Ziedonis (2007: 2624), technological uncertainty is related to “the 
commercial potential of the patent [...] and is likely to be higher for technologies that are more 
‘basic’ or more ‘distant’ from commercialization.” It is more difficult to forecast the technical 
performance and feasibility of these types of technologies since they have not been 
commercialized. In other words, technological uncertainty refers to the uncertain future payoffs 
from investment in the new technology (Ziedonis 2007). In line with this definition, our measure 
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of uncertainty is intended to reflect the level of uncertainty related to the future development of 
the licensed technology.  
If the licensor cannot predict the future trajectory of the licensed technology it will 
be less inclined to license it out. A licensee’s attempt to improve on the original technology may 
fail totally, may result in an incremental improvement to the original technology, or may 
materialize as a radical innovation that challenges the licensor’s competitive advantage. 
Therefore, the licensor cannot predict what might happen but will hedge against the worst 
possible outcome, which could result in it being overtaken by the licensee. As we pointed out 
earlier, the inclusion of a grant-back clause provides a safeguard to the licensor by ensuring it 
access to the results of developments undertaken by the licensee before the latter can exploit 
them in the market (Schmalbeck 1975). Hence, the potential utility of a grant-back clause 
increase with the uncertainty of the technology since such a clause may facilitate technology 
transfer that otherwise would not have happened due to the licensor’s fear of being overtaken by 
the licensee. In the case of uncertainty about the future of a technology, joint learning may 
attribute more competencies to the development of the intellectual asset than possessed by either 
individual firm, as well as introduce risk sharing. This may hence be a feasible way to resolve 
development problems (e.g., Mariti and Smiley 1983, Sampson 2007). A grant-back clause 
provides the licensor with an incentive to collaborate with the licensee over the technology, 
which can benefit both contracting parties. Based on these considerations, we conjecture that: 
Hypothesis 3: Technology license agreements are, ceteris paribus, increasingly likely to include 
a grant-back clause with increasing levels of uncertainty.  
 
4.3.4 Licensors’ core and uncertain technologies 
We have argued that licensing agreements are more likely to include a grant-back clause if they 
represent a core technology of the licensor, or if there is uncertainty about the future 
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development of the technology. When both conditions hold, this should further increase the 
likelihood of a grant-back clause.  
We argue that if the given development of the technology is relatively predictable 
and “safe”, then even if it is a core technology of the licensor, the license may not include a 
grant-back clause because the risk of a critical boomerang effect will be small. If the technology 
is uncertain and non-core, the licensor firm might consider not including a grant-back clause 
because the damage caused by a boomerang effect—and the consequential reduction in the 
internal rents—will likely be small in the case of a non-core technology. However, if the 
technology is core to the licensor and also uncertain regarding future opportunities, the potential 
damage to the competitive advantage of the licensor firm could be huge. Therefore, we posit that 
the relationship between licensors’ core technologies and the likelihood of a using the grant-
back clause will be positively moderated by the level of uncertainty related to the licensed 
technology. In other words, we expect that increasing levels of uncertainty will reinforce the 
positive effect of licensor’s core technology on the likelihood of including the grant-back clause 
in a contract. Consequently, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the increasing likelihood of a grant-back clause appearing in 
technology licensing agreements involving technologies that are core to the licensor increases 
further when the uncertainty of the licensed technology is high. 
 
4.3.5 Licensees, and core and uncertain technologies 
We have argued that the inclusion of a grant back-clause will be less likely if the licensed 
technology is close to the licensee’s core technologies. However, we would argue also that this 
effect will be reversed if the technology is also uncertain in relation to its application and 
development. The theory is that, as discussed above, the effect of uncertainty on its own 
typically leads the licensor to require the inclusion of a grant-back clause to reduce the 
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boomerang effect. However, in the case of uncertain technology, the licensee may require the 
assistance of the licensor to exploit the technology in its processes, especially when it is close to 
its core technological area.  
A technology that is not close to commercialization generally involves a relatively 
high proportion of tacit knowledge. This uncodified knowledge is embedded in the licensor and 
can be transferred only through direct collaboration (Nelson and Winter 1982, Szulanski 1996). 
A grant-back clause secures the sharing of property rights ex post (giving rise to appropriated 
relational rents), and gives the licensor an incentive to assist the licensee in the development of 
the technology (Leone and Reichstein 2012). Given that the licensee’s core technologies are 
critical to the licensee, under conditions of strong uncertainty, the licensee will be inclined to 
plead for a grant-back clause to make sure of the licensor’s assistance in developing the 
technology in the licensee’s context. This argument leads to the idea that, specifically in the case 
of core technologies, it is on the licensee’s best interest to have the grant-back clause in deals 
concerning uncertain technologies. In fact, considering that licensees are likely to be keen on the 
further development of technologies that are core to their activities, high levels of uncertainty 
are expected to switch from negative into positive the likelihood that the grant-back clause will 
be used when the technology is core to the licensee. Indeed, accepting the grant-back clause to 
be included in the contract is an attractive alternative to secure that an important (core) 
technology, for which the licensee has invested on, will continue to be developed by the 
licensor. Accordingly, we conjecture: 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, the decreasing likelihood of a grant-back clause appearing in 
technology licensing agreements involving technologies that are core to the licensee is 
overturned to an increasing likelihood, when the uncertainty of the licensed technology is high.  
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4.4 Data and Method 
4.4.1 Data 
This study exploits multiple data sources. First, it utilizes U.S. pharmaceutical industry 
technology licensing contracts drawn from the Recap database. The Recap database is used 
extensively in the licensing literature making this study comparable with and integral to other 
work in this area (e.g., Ceccagnoli, Graham, Higgings and Lee 2010, Schilling 2009). It allows 
direct access to original contracts, inspection and cross checking of contracts, and extraction of 
detailed and precise information on the technology, the involved parties, and the contractual 
specifications. While Recap includes several types of contracts the present study is interested 
only in technology licensing contracts, and specifically, those involving the transfer of patented 
inventions listed at the USPTO. This allows the extraction of additional data on the traded 
technology from the NBER Patent database, which covers all granted USPTO patents.23 
Matching of these datasets in relation to the technology is based on the 7 digit USPTO patent 
numbers listed in the licensing agreements. It allows us to attach technology related variables to 
the licensing contracts (e.g. technology age and value).  
The licensing agreements also contain licensor and licensee company names. 
Matching licensors’ company names with the patent database identifies sub-contracting deals,24 
which are excluded since sub-contracting generally differs from regular contracting: The 
licensor’s attachment to and insight into the underlying technology is different if it was not the 
original developer. Sub-contracts may also be subject to contractual conditions dictated by the 
original out-licensing to the current licensor.  
                                                          
23 NBER patent data are described in detail in Hall et al. (2001). 
24 We identify cases where the licensor firm is different from the patenting firm. 
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We extracted information on licensors from COMPUSTAT. The two datasets were 
integrated using company name, address, and industry affiliation. This gives the COMPUSTAT 
firm identifier (GVKEY) used also in the NBER USPTO database, and describes the 
technological profiles of licensors ex ante licensing-out. We are able to extract all patents 
applied for by the licensor which eventually were granted, and which the licensor could consider 
potential technologies for licensing-out.   
NBER patent data are matched with the Recap licensees using company name and 
country affiliation, providing the firm’s technological profile. Use of patent data for this purpose 
is imperfect. For example, some firms are not listed as assignees on patents, but this does not 
mean they do not have a technological profile. For these few firms it is impossible to 
operationalize the key variables of interest. Our results therefore are conditional on firms having 
patented at least once before entering into a technology-licensing contract agreement. Although 
this is a second-best solution, the results are comparable to other studies of the markets for 
technology (see e.g. Parrotta and Pozzoli 2012, Ziedonis 2007) 
The USPTO patent numbers are used to combine the licensed technologies with 
the Harvard Patent Network Dataverse. This database contains additional information on the 
nature of the backward citations in each patent. We use the Dataverse database to retrieve 
further information on the number of scientific references cited by the patents in our sample. 
This information is used to calculate the uncertainty related to the licensed technologies. 
4.4.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is built using the portfolio of patents of identified licensors and the 
licensed technology. We scrutinized the contracts for grant-back clauses, generally to the effect 
that the licensee must grant back any future improvements to the licensed technology to the 
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licensor. The dependent variable is a three level categorical variable indicating the status of a 
patent with respect to licensing, and the inclusion of a grant-back clause. Some technology is not 
licensed out, some is licensed out under a contract that does not include a grant-back clause, and 
some technology is licensed in under a contract that includes a grant-back clause. The three 
categorical levels therefore are: (1) non-licensed technology, (2) licensed technology without the 
grant-back clause, and (3) licensed technology with the grant-back clause. The unit of analysis 
for the empirical investigation is the level of the technology. This set-up allows us, at least 
partially, to circumvent any potential self-selection issues that arise from the inclusion of a 
grant-back clause being conditioned by the decision to license the technology in the first place. 
Relatedly, due to self-selection issues, we need also to consider controls for the likelihood of the 
technology being exchanged in the market.  
4.4.3 Independent variables 
The first explanatory variable is whether the license is for the firm’s core technology. This is 
measured by the firm’s patenting activity prior to the licensing agreement. This measure is 
operationalized using the focal index proposed by Ziedonis (2007), which captures the degree of 
overlap of the firm’s core technology with the licensed technology. Higher values indicate that 
the licensed technology is nearer to the licensor’s or licensee’s core technological activity. The 
measure is computed as follow: 
Licensor/licensee core technology = 9∑ ∑ :;<> ??@A ∙B<C∑ ∑ :;<> ??@A ∙B< D, 
where ∑ ∑  E ∙  represents the citation-weighted sum of firm i’s patents applied for 
within six years of the date of the license agreement t and which belongs to the same primary 
patent class c as the licensed technology, and ∑ ∑  E ∙  is the sum of all citation-
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weighted patents issued to the firm j that were applied for by date t. The use of weighted 
citations allows us to capture the relative importance of each patent in the firm’s portfolio 
(Griliches 1990). The index is calculated separately and independently for licensors and 
licensees. It ranges between 0 and 1 where 1 indicates that the technology is a core technology 
and there is a complete overlap of the primary patent class of the licensed technology and the 
technologies of the focal firm.   
The second explanatory variable refers to technological uncertainty. The 
uncertainty of a technology relates to its technical features and potential development into 
commercial products or its market applicability (Huchzermeier and Loch 2001, Rosenberg 
1996). Technological uncertainty is calculated as the share of scientific references listed in 
backward citations on the licensed patent. While “early-stage” technologies are founded on 
basic research (scientific knowledge), technologies that are closer to commercial application 
include fewer references to basic knowledge and a larger share of references to other patented 
inventions (Narin, Noma and Perry 1987, Rosenberg 1996). This measure of technology 
uncertainty also takes account of the qualitative aspects of backward citations.  
4.4.4 Control variables 
Royalty rate: The inclusion of royalty fees in licensing contracts ensures that the licensor will 
generate sufficient revenue from the licensing deal to overcome any decrease in profits caused 
by future competition (Fosfuri 2006). For this reason, licensing deals involving a licensor’s core 
technologies are expected to include higher monetary compensation than contracts dealing with 
peripheral technologies25 (Choi 2002). Also, the inclusion of royalty payments in the 
remuneration structure of licensing contracts gives the licensor a greater incentive to commit to 
                                                          
25 In fact, Choi (2002, p. 812) explicitly proposes that “the increase in royalty income by transferring the core 
technology should be sufficiently large to overcome the decrease in the profit due to future competition”. 
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transferring the knowledge required by the licensee to fully exploit the licensed-in technology. 
Building on this perspective on knowledge transfer and learning possibilities, our conceptual 
model differs from Choi’s in the extent that we don’t expect the grant-back clause and royalty 
rates to be substitutes. In fact, given that we consider the grant-back clause as an indication that 
the licensor is willing to support the licensee to overcome assimilation issues related to the 
licensed technology, we assume that in the presence of the grant-back clause the licensor is 
more likely to require further monetary compensations related to this support. We control for a 
contractually-specified, fixed royalty rate that the licensee must pay to the licensor.26 
Technological superiority: The likelihood of a grant-back clause being included in a technology 
licensing deal may be associated with the licensee’s and licensor’s relative technological 
capabilities. Licensors that are technologically superior will have fewer incentives to demand a 
grant-back clause, given that the recipient firm is unlikely to develop the technology at a rate or 
in a direction that would represent a threat to the licensor in either the technology or product 
markets. Licensors instead will seek to negotiate other conditions favorable to them. The 
licensor’s technological superiority is measured as the difference between the logarithm of 
licensor and licensee’s patent stock accumulated over the eight years prior to the licensing year. 
Positive values indicate that the licensor is technologically superior, negative values indicate 
that the licensee is superior. 
Exclusivity: An important contractual specification in licensing contracts regards the use of an 
exclusivity clause. The inclusion of such a clause in a contract implies that the licensor agrees to 
work with only one licensee, preventing other firms from acquiring the same technology 
                                                          
26 The royalty rate and the grant-back clause may be an integral part of the negotiation of contractual specifications, 
which normally would demand a modeling approach that takes account of the simultaneity in their determination. 
This would redefine the royalty rate from a control to an endogenous variable. We ignore this option since the 
royalty rate is not the main focus of the paper and because the two variables exhibit very low levels of correlation in 
the empirical data (in terms of both Pearson correlations and Chi2 test statistics in a two-by-two matrix).  
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(Somaya, et al. 2011). Therefore, the use of this clause has implication for both parts involved in 
the licensing deal. While for licensee it provides the right incentives to commit more resources 
and actively engage in the exploitation of the licensed technology, for the licensor it is a relevant 
contractual mechanism to ensure the commercial success of the deal. Accordingly, given the 
value creation possibilities associated with this clause, we expect that the grant-back clause is 
more likely to be used in exclusive licensing contracts.  
Technological overlap: The decision to include the grant-back clause in a licensing contract 
might also be affected by the extent to which licensor and licensee build on the same 
technological fields. In order to capture technological overlap we use the measure proposed by 
Jaffe (1986) which indicates the technological position of firm A relative to firm B in terms of 
the technological classes in which both firms have patented. In order to construct our measure 
we generated the technological profile of licensors and licensees by computing the distribution 
of accumulated patents across different classes in the five years previous to the licensing 
contract. Accordingly, we obtained a multidimensional vector  F =  F, … FG where F5 
represents the number of patents assigned to firm i in the patent class s. The final measure is 
computed as follows: 
Technological overlap: 
HIHJ́
L(HIHŃ) HPHJ́ 
This measure takes the value 0 for firms that have orthogonal vectors, value 1 for firms with 
identical vectors, and a value between 0 and 1 for the cases in which there is an intermediate 
degree of orthogonality between the firms. 
Patent value: Following the convention in patent studies (Lahiri 2010, Trajtenberg 1990, Yang, 
Phelps and Steensma 2010, Ziedonis 2007), we proxy the economic value of a technology as a 
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time invariant measure of the total number of forward citations received by a patent from its 
date of publication to 2006.27 
Technology radicalness: Radical technologies have higher potential to produce significant 
changes in the way that economic activities are organized (Shane, 2001). Therefore, we expect 
licensors to be more likely to request the use of the grant-back clause as the level of radicalness 
of a certain technology increases. The radicalness of the technology is measured following 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (1999). They use the number of different three-digit level International 
Patent Classification (IPC) categories related to the patents cited by the patent for the focal 
technology, excluding the class of the focal patent. The fact that a patent’s backward citations 
refer to different classes (from its own) indicates that the invention builds on several different 
technological fields (Shane 2001).  
Technology scope: Technology scope is an indication of its applicability which may be a sign of 
the potential for further development and may increase the licensor’s incentive to include a 
grant-back clause in a licensing contract with another firm. We follow the measure for scope 
proposed in Lerner (1994), which considers the number of IPCs that USPTO assigns to a patent 
as an indication of the breadth of its technology base and intellectual property protection.  
Technology age: The age of a technology can influence the licensor’s decision to commercialize 
it by licensing it out or exploiting it in-house. Several studies suggest that licensors are less 
likely to license out technologies that might undermine their competitive position in the industry 
(see e.g. Leone and Reichstein 2012). Firms will therefore be less likely to commercialize more 
recent inventions, given that these technologies supposedly are at the technological frontier of 
their inventive activities.  
                                                          
27  The latest year available in the NBER patent database. 
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Backward citations: It has been claimed that the total number of backward citations in a patent 
is a good indicator of the size of the technological space and scope of the intellectual property 
rights of a given technology (Harhoff and Reitzig 2004, Reitzig, Henkel and Schneider 2010). 
Technologies with a large number of backward citations may be more likely to be licensed since 
they may overlap more technological actors and be attractive to more agents on the demand side 
of the market for technology.  
R&D intensity: The firm’s relative R&D expenditure may affect its decisions regarding 
technology licensing. Firms that are R&D intensive are likely to be less dependent on specific 
technologies, while firms with low levels of in-house R&D are likely to have fewer 
technological opportunities (Dosi, Marengo and Pasquali 2006). It is likely also that firms that 
invest hugely in R&D are pursuing purely technology driven strategies which do not include 
traditional commercialization, and whose profits lie in exchanges of intellectual property. In 
addition to that, firms that exhibit high levels of R&D intensity are also more likely to have in-
house capabilities to internally develop and exploit technologies. This may introduce 
heterogeneity in the decision to enter the markets for technology. R&D intensity is measured as 
firm i’s total amount of R&D investment divided by its sales in year t. 
Licensor technological specialization: The firm’s level of technological specialization is likely 
to affect the way it operates in the markets for technology: narrower technological scope renders 
the firm more susceptible to rent dissipation when licensing core technologies. Therefore, we 
include a measure of technological specialization by calculating a Herfindahl index for the total 
number of patents in the firm j’s patent portfolio accumulated during in the seven years before 
the license agreement. We operationalize this measure as follows:   
Licensor technological specialization:    ∑ +IP+I 
.
3,  
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Firm slack. The availability of slack resources can affect the novelty of innovations (Nohria and 
Gulati 1996). Given that a firm’s ability to introduce innovations characterized by a high degree 
of novelty may affect the firm’s licensing decision, we control for firm i's slack, using the ratio 
current assets/current liabilities in year t. 
Firm size. We control for firm size using the logarithm of total number of employees in a given 
year. 
Licensor market diversification: We control for the number of different markets in which the 
licensor operates by counting the total number of different SIC codes reported in the 
COMPUSTAT database at year t. This may spread the risks for the licensor, which might 
influence the inclusion or not of a grant-back clause.  
Technological fragmentation. The degree of fragmentation of ownership in the firm’s patent 
portfolio has been shown to affect patenting behavior and the strategic decisions related to 
exploiting the market to commercialize new technologies (Ziedonis 2004). We control for 
fragmentation of ownership rights of firm j’s patents produced at year t are using the 
fragmentation index proposed in Ziedonis (2004):          
Technological fragmentation = 1 − ∑ +QRSUVGIP+QRSUVGI 
. , 
 ≠ Y3, , 
where j refers to the unique entities cited by the patents granted to firm i in a given year. Based 
on this idea, !Z[7\ concerns to the aggregate(total) number of backward citations present in 
firms’ i patents within year t, and !Z[7\ to the number of unique entities listed in those 
backward citations28.      
                                                          
28 In line with how the measure was calculated originally we exclude from the backward citations references to the 
firm’s own patents, to expired patents, and to scientific references. 
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Sales change. Licensors that experience a decrease in their sales may be under pressure to 
generate short-term revenue by licensing their more valuable technologies (Katz and Shapiro 
1986). Percentage change in licensor’s sales between the licensing years t and t-1 is used to 
control for a licensing decision motivated by financial pressures. 
Finally, patenting propensity varies across years and industry segments, resulting 
in the need to protect an invention differing across and within the firms in our sample. To 
account for these effects we include dummy variables for biotech firms and medical firms (in 
the pharmaceutical industry) and year of the licensing contract.    
4.5 Econometric analysis and model choice 
With a categorical multinomial dependent variable, the first modeling choice is a multinomial 
logit. However, the grant-back clause cannot be considered independently of the likelihood that 
a technology is licensed-out. The likelihood of a technology being licensed may have an impact 
on the inclusion of a grant-back clause, and the grant-back clause may be subject to bias 
depending on the possibility of its inclusion. Hence, the different outcomes for the dependent 
variable may not be considered independent irrelevant alternatives (IIA), as assumed by the 
multinomial logit. We investigate also whether the IIA problem persists only theoretically or is 
an empirical challenge as well. Using a Brant test, we find strong evidence of a violation of the 
IIA assumption when applying multinomial logit estimation.  
This paper applies a hierarchical nested logit specification to model the likelihood 
that a grant-back clause will be included in the licensing contract. These specifications split the 
categorical values into nests representing mutually dependent decisions (Manski and McFadden 
1981). The nested logit therefore, is congruent with the decisions over licensing the technology 
and including a grant-back clause being interlinked. This model choice enables joint estimation 
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of the impact of firm and technology characteristics on the licensing decision and inclusion of a 
grant-back clause. The applied specification is a two-level nested logit model with random 
utility maximization (RUM) and full information maximum-likelihood estimation. This setting 
allows separation between use of a grant-back clause and the licensing decision while preserving 
the correlation between these two outcomes (Ziedonis 2007). 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1 shows that the nest splits the sample across the three levels of the dependent categorical 
variable creating an asymmetric tree structure. The first nest utilizes all the USPTO patents 
granted to the licensor in the same year as the licensed technology on the assumption that they 
are all included in the portfolio of technologies that potentially could be licensed out. We 
identified a total of 7416 technologies of which 7012 patents were not included in the Recap 
dataset and we assume they were never licensed out, leaving 404 patents which we classified as 
being licensed out.29  
A potential limitation of this setting is that firms might also license non-patented 
inventions, which are not included in this empirical setting. However, previous studies (Arora 
and Ceccagnoli 2006: 294) show that there is a connection between patenting behavior and 
licensing activity, suggesting “the presence of a patent is almost essential for licensing.” These 
authors show that less than 10 percent of licensors do not patent.30 Additionally, using only 
patented inventions to compare licensed versus non-licensed technologies ensures analytical 
consistency. Another potential issue related to our setting is that a certain technology may have 
been licensed but not reported in the Recap database. However, we have no reason to suspect 
                                                          
29  We excluded 239 technologies produced in the same year as the licensed technologies because they had two or 
more different assignees, indicating that the property rights for those patents were shared among firms.  
30  In the Recap database, after dropping the firms for which there was no publicly available information, we had no 
cases of licensors that did not patent. 
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that, were this the case the technologies not reported in the licensing database would be 
systematically correlated with the likelihood of being licensed under a grant-back clause.       
This study uses interaction terms to estimate the determinants of the likelihood of a 
grant-back clause in a licensing contract. This modeling technique requires some shaping of the 
data (Drucker and Puri 2005) so that observations are classified as: (1) non licensed technology, 
(2) licensed technology without the grant-back clause, or (3) licensed technology with the grant-
back clause. This increases the number of observations threefold, transforming the 7416 
observations into 22,248 and generating three evenly-distributed dummy variables, with 7416 
positive outcomes for the three possible outcomes. Because there is no within-case variability in 
the second nest, following Drucker and Puri (2005) we created pseudo alternative specific 
outcomes for the explanatory variables by interacting them, in this nest, with the outcome 
variable (grant-back clause).  
To assess the magnitudes of the effects of a marginal change in the explanatory 
variables on the probability of observing a grant-back clause in a technology license contract, 
we estimate marginal effects. This requires partially differentiating the probability of the grant-
back clause with respect to the explanatory variables. This is problematic given the equations 
underlying the nested logit. There is no standardized method for capturing marginal effects for 
the nested logit. We follow Cameron and Trevedi’s (2009) recommendations and estimate only 
the marginal effects not their significances. These are estimates at mean values. 
4.6 Results  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables considered in the analysis and their 
Pearson correlation coefficients (N=22 347). None of the correlations suggest any 
multicollinearity problems in the regression analysis. This is confirmed by variance inflation 
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factor (VIF) analysis. The maximum VIF associated with any of the independent variables is 
2.78 (mean VIF = 1.40). Where it is possible to use the entire dataset for those variables, the 
statistics are consistent.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the regression analysis. Model I reports the results considering 
only the controls, while models II-V introduce the explanatory variables and their interactions 
gradually. Table 2 provides support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting technology license agreements 
are increasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause the closer the licensed technology is to the 
licensor’s core technology. Hypothesis 2 is also supported: Technology license agreements are 
decreasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause the closer is the licensed technology to the 
licensee’s core technology. The parameter estimates for licensor’s/licensee’s core technology 
are statistically positively/negatively significant in all the models in which they are considered 
(II-V). The evidence slightly favors Hypothesis 1 compared to Hypothesis 2. However, both 
hypotheses are supported at a minimum 5 percent level of significance.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Table 2 provides also supports Hypothesis 3 that the more uncertain the licensed 
technology, the more likely the technology license agreement will include a grant-back clause. 
The parameter estimates for uncertainty are significantly positive in all the models. Model II 
provides weak support at the 10 percent level of significance; the significance level is higher in 
models III, IV and V.  
The data do not support Hypothesis 4 regarding the likelihood of a grant-back 
clause in technology licensing agreements involving technologies that are core to the licensor 
increasing if the licensed technology is uncertain. None of the interaction parameter estimates 
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between uncertainty and licensor core technology are significant. Accordingly, we find no 
evidence to suggest that the parameter estimate of the interaction between the licensor’s core 
technology and technological uncertainty will be greater in absolute terms than the estimate 
associated with the licensor’s core technology. This is confirmed by a Wald test.   
We find statistical support for Hypothesis 5 that the decreasing likelihood of a 
grant-back clause in a technology licensing agreement involving technology that is core to the 
licensee will become an increasing likelihood if the licensed technology is uncertain. The Wald 
test suggests that the parameter associated with the interaction between licensee’s core 
technology and uncertainty is significantly greater than the absolute value of the parameter 
estimate for licensee’s core technology. Model V shows that (1.8+4.7=0) is statistically greater 
than zero.   
Among the controls we find that contracts specifying higher royalty rates are more 
likely to include grant-back clauses, and that contracts between parties where the licensor is 
technological superior tend not to contain grant-back clauses. The evidence suggests that higher 
value, more radical, and older technologies are more likely to be licensed. We find evidence also 
that technologies that are broader in scope typically are not licensed. Among firm 
characteristics, the empirical results suggest that R&D intensive and more technologically 
specialized licensors tend to engage in licensing activity. In line with previous studies, we find 
that larger firms, and firms characterized by a higher level of technological fragmentation tend 
not to engage in technology licensing.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 In order to test if the inclusion of the main explanatory variables provides 
significant improvement in the model fit, we used a log likelihood test to compare unrestricted 
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models against the restricted ones (reported at the bottom of table 2). Given that the Model 1 
represents a baseline, there are no statistics reported for this model. The comparison for Model 2 
- Model 1 indicates that adding the two main explanatory variables regarding Licensor and 
Licensee core technology significantly increased the overall model fit. To access Models III – V 
we used Model II as a baseline, with the results for all comparisons indicating statistically 
significant improvement in the overall model fit.  
Table 3 reports the marginal effects corresponding to the estimates of Model V in 
Table 2. These estimates basically confirm the direction indicated in the standard nested logit 
parameters. In addition, the marginal effects reveal that a one unit increase in how core the 
technology is for the licensor results in a 0.03 increase in the probability of a grant-back clause 
for the average observation. The corresponding number for the licensee is a 0.035 decrease in 
the probability of a grant-back clause. The comparative effect of the interaction between 
licensee core technology and technological uncertainty is more than double in absolute terms 
exhibiting a marginal effect of 0.076.  
4.7 Sensitivity analysis 
We conducted several additional analyses to ensure that our results were not a by-product of our 
empirical choices. First, we considered those variables where we chose a particular time 
window, and varied the time dimensions (plus/minus 2 years). We found no evidence that our 
choice had any impact on the overall results of the model. 
We considered the fact that some firms appear more than once in the dataset since 
they had licensed-out more than one technology. This means that not all observations are 
independent of one another, which potentially could introduce some bias in our estimators 
because it is standard practice in some firms and not a by-product of a general tendency in a 
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random sample of observations. To consider this potential source of bias, we ran a nested logit 
model with the bootstrap specification on the data. The results were similar to those presented in 
the main analysis. We can conclude that the issue is of limited concern.  
Since the statistical significance of the uncertainty variable increases with the 
introduction of the interaction terms, we investigated the degree to which the statistical evidence 
and support for the hypothesis might be attributable to a potential multicollinearity problem. We 
ran split regressions based on mean values of the uncertainty variable. This provided evidence 
supporting the reported results showing that the analysis is generally robust to this potential 
source of bias.   
4.8 Conclusion and Discussion 
We began the paper by discussing the so-called “boomerang effect” proposed by the theoretical 
technological licensing literature. In this context, we examined the effect of the match between 
licensed technologies, and the characteristics of licensors’, licensees’, and the technology in 
determining the probability of a grant-back clause being included in the licensing agreement. By 
combining insights from the RBV of the firm with contract economics, we proposed theoretical 
arguments related to contracting firms’ need to balance protection of their technological 
resources with learning through internal and external processes. We theorized and found 
empirical support for the idea that licensing agreements are increasingly likely to contain a 
grant-back clause if the licensed technology is close to the licensor’s core technologies. We 
found also that licensing agreements are decreasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause if the 
licensed technology is close to the licensee’s core technologies. We found support for the idea 
that licensing agreements are increasingly likely to contain a grant-back clause if the licensed 
technology is uncertain/unproven.  
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We identified how these variables interact: We argued that technology licensing 
agreements involving technologies that are both core to the licensor and are also uncertain, 
should further increase the probability of a grant back-clause being included. However, we 
found no support for this idea: The two variables have a separate influence, but we observed no 
evidence of complementarity to make their combined effect even stronger. We interpret this 
result to imply that technology licensing agreements involving technologies that are core to the 
licensor and are also uncertain are very rare (this is confirmed by inspection of the descriptive 
statistics); Thus rather than leading to the inclusion of a grant-back clause, this situation appears 
to lead to a break-down in the market for technology. Finally, we explored whether the 
decreasing likelihood of a grant-back clause in technology licensing agreements involving 
technologies that are core to the licensee is overturned if the licensed technology is uncertain. 
We found empirical support for this argument. 
Our work provides two main contributions. First, we extend the theoretical 
understanding of the functioning of the markets for technology as expressed in the strategic 
management literature (e.g. Ceccagnoli and Jiang 2012, Fosfuri 2006), by identifying the 
beneficiaries of the rents from potential licensing relationships, which often preclude potentially 
mutually beneficial deals. We show how these undesirable potential rents can be prevented by 
an appropriate contract design. More broadly, we provide further evidence that the design of 
contracts matters for firm behavior (Li, Poppo and Zhou 2010, Poppo and Zenger 2002). Second 
and related, we extend the RBV to predict important aspects of licensing behavior. Using a 
combination of the RBV and contract economics to highlight the conditions under which 
competitive advantage can be lost (or achieved) through licensing agreements, we propose a 
theory that predicts an important part of contractual behavior in licensing agreements. Basically, 
if the core technologies of the licensor (key resources underlying the licensor’s competitive 
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advantage) are potentially at risk due to follow-up innovations by the licensee, a grant back-
clause will be included in the licensing contract. Peripheral technologies do not pose a major 
threat to a licensor firm’s competitive advantage and in these cases a grant back clause is not 
likely to be observed.  
On the other hand, if the agreement concerns a technology that is core to the 
licensee (key resources underlying the licensee’s competitive advantage), a grant-back clause is, 
ceteris paribus, not likely be included because there is a risk of outbound spillover rents on the 
part of the licensee when engaging in the co-development of the technology with the licensor. 
Moreover, the licensee is not likely to require assistance from the licensor (the licensee has 
strong absorptive capacity in this case), so the incentive for co-development by the licensor is 
not required. However, if application of the technology in question is uncertain, and despite the 
risk of outbound spillover rents, the licensee will prioritize co-development with the licensee 
with the aim of obtaining appropriated relational rents, particularly if the technology in question 
is important (i.e., core) to the licensee. Therefore, the licensee will want to share the relevant 
property rights through a grant-back clause so that the licensor has an incentive to co-invest in 
the follow-up innovation. Note, though, that although we do not directly observe firm 
performance in this research, the actions of firms are very revealing.  
The findings in this study have implications for managerial practice. They should 
help guide managers’ decision making about how to manage and design licensing agreements. 
The licensing literature stresses the importance of contract design to avoid ex-post problems 
such as the boomerang effect. In this context, this paper has implications for firms seeking to 
achieve strategic advantage from a licensing deal. From the licensor’s point of view, if the firm 
decides to out-license a core technology in order to generate licensing revenue and to have a 
technology further developed by a licensee, it is more beneficial to find a partner with a small 
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technological overlap with the technology to be out-licensed. Given that the grant-back clause 
reduces the licensee’s incentive to invest in the technology, striking a deal with a dissimilar 
company could increase the licensor’s advantage. On the licensee’s side, our findings suggest 
that in the situation where the licensee needs support from the licensor to continue development 
of the technology, a grant back clause may be “a price worth paying”. 
This study has some limitations. First, firms may choose not to disclose certain 
licensing deals for secrecy and strategic reasons. If this is the case, then the representativeness of 
our database might be affected by selection issues. However, we have no reason to expect that if 
firms choose not to report certain deals, those unreported observations will be systematically 
correlated with the dependent variable. Second, the use of patents to calculate how core the 
licensed technology is to the contracting parties has some limitations. Firms may rely on other 
appropriability mechanisms than patents to protect their most valuable technologies, which 
would thus not be captured by our core technology measure. Despite this limitation regarding 
the use of patents, we believe that the choice of the pharmaceutical industry as the empirical 
context for this paper to a large degree alleviates these concerns. In this paper we do not 
examine how participation in the licensing market interacts with other types of knowledge 
acquisition (for instance, R&D collaboration). This could be an interesting direction for future 
research and might produce insights that would provide important guidance for managers 
involved in decisions about how to manage and design licensing agreements. 
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4.10 Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 1: The Hierarchical Nested Tree Structure 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (N=22 347) 
  Variables Mean S.D. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
[1] Grant-back Clause Alternative     0.333     0.47  1.00 
[2] Licensor core technology     0.091     0.207 0.62 1.00 
[3]  Licensee core technology     0.034     0.155 0.31 0.18 1.00 
[4] Technological uncertainty     0.171     0.328 .74 0.58 .27 1.00 
[5] Royalty rate     1.888     5.754 0.46 0.36 0.11 0.48 1.00 
[6] Technological superiority     1.386     2 795 0.70 0. 7 .14 0.40 0.29 1.00 
[7] Exclusivity     0.216     0.411 0.74 0.49 0.29 0.58 0.54 0.52 1.00 
[8] Technological overlap     0.073     0.213 0.49 0.41 0.37 0.47 0.29 0.08 0. 9 1.00 
[9] Patent value    14.029    48.672 .0  0. 6 .01 0.02 0.02 - .05 -0.01 0.03 1.00 
[10] Technology radicalness     1.666     2.171 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.12 -0.01 0.03 0.02 1.00 
[11] Technology scope     2.292     1.391 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.11 -0.02 
[12] Technology age     5.586     3.161 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.10 -0.18 0.11 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 
[13] Backward citations   30.394   47.806 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.09 -0.10 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.40 
[14] Licensor technological specialization     0.255     0.157 0.00 0.28 -0.02 0.11 0.14 -0.29 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.21 
[15] Licensor market diversification     4.547     4.835 0.00 -0.09 0.06 -0.05 -0.13 0.06 0.08 0.08 -0.07 0.07 
[16] Firm size     8.651     2.596 0.00 -0.20 -0.01 -0.14 -0.13 0.27 -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 -0.20 
[17] Firm slack   2.079 12.454 0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 
[18] R&D intensity    57.945    73.471 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.08 -0.14 0.11 0.19 -0.02 0.06 
[19] Technological fr gmentation     0.063     0.205 0.00 0.13 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.21 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.38 
[20] Sales change     1.129     5.784 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.05 
 
 
 
 
  Variables Mean S.D. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
[11] Technology scope     2.292     1.391 1.00 
[12] Technology age    5.586     3.161 -0.10 1.00 
[13] Backward citations    30.394    47.806 0.09 -0.20 1.00 
[14] Licensor technological specialization     0.255     0.157 0.14 -0.39 0.27 1.00 
[15] Licensor market diversification     4.547     4.835 -0.05 0.34 -0.03 -0.36 1.00 
[16] Firm size     8.651     2.596 -0.14 0.29 -0.30 -0.66 0.34 1.00 
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[17] Firm slack   2.079 12.454 0.03 -0.07 0.09 0.14 -0.03 -0.18 1.00 
[18] R&D intensity    57.945    73.471 0.08 -0.36 0.24 0.37 -0.06 -0.45 0.06 1.00 
[19] Technological fragmentation     0.063     0.205 0.05 -0.03 0.22 0.51 -0.13 -0.34 -0.01 -0.00 1.00 
[20] Sales change     1.129     5.784 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.04 -0.10 -0.24 0.04 0.15 -0.01 1.00 
  
164 
 
 
Table2: Nested Logit Results for Grant-back Clause and Licensing Decisions 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
Grant-back Clause Equation                                      
Licensor core technology                    1.827*** 2.025*** 1.778**  1.986*** 
                   (0.550)    (0.588)    (0.553)    (0.593)    
Licensee core technology                    -2.049**  -2.004**  -3.162*** -3.151*** 
                   (0.636)    (0.642)    (0.873)    (0.893)    
Technological uncertainty                    0.160+   0.189*   0.216*   0.247*   
                   (0.090)    (0.095)    (0.097)    (0.102)    
Licensor core technology ×  Technological                     -1.407    -1.460    
Uncertainty                    (1.209)    (1.227)    
Licensee core technology ×  Technological                    5.095*   5.233*   
Uncertainty                    (2.451)    (2.523)    
Royalty rate 0.021    0.012    0.011    0.009    0.008    
 (0.017)    (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.018)    
Technological superiority  -0.240*** -0.246*** -0.250*** -0.262*** -0.267*** 
(0.050)    (0.055)    (0.055)    (0.057)    (0.057)    
Exclusivity 1.413*** 1.492*** 1.539*** 1.531*** 1.578*** 
(0.365)    (0.412)    (0.415)    (0.419)    (0.422)    
Technological overlap 0.390*** 0.400**  0.393**  0.387**  0.377**  
(0.113)    (0.127)    (0.129)    (0.129)    (0.130)    
Technology Licensing Equation 
Technology Characteristics                                      
Patent value 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Technology radicalness 0.045+   0.057*   0.057*   0.060*   0.061*   
(0.023)    (0.024)    (0.024)    (0.024)    (0.024)    
Technology scope -0.056    -0.075+   -0.075+   -0.076+   -0.077+   
(0.040)    (0.040)    (0.040)    (0.040)    (0.040)    
Technology age 0.154*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.140*** 0.145*** 
(0.023)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.024)    
Backward citations 0.000    -0.000    -0.000    -0.000    -0.000    
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Firm Characteristics 
Licensor technological specialization 2.599*** 2.179*** 2.118*** 2.126*** 2.063*** 
(0.415)    (0.443)    (0.448)    (0.444)    (0.450)    
Licensor market diversification -0.082*** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.079*** 
(0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    
Firm size -0.205*** -0.188*** -0.184*** -0.188*** -0.184*** 
(0.028)    (0.029)    (0.030)    (0.030)    (0.030)    
Firm slack  0.000+   0.000+   0.000+   0.000+   0.000+   
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
R&D intensity 0.002**  0.002**  0.002**  0.002**  0.002**  
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Technological fragmentation -0.829**  -0.887*** -0.880*** -0.909*** -0.903*** 
(0.262)    (0.259)    (0.260)    (0.260)    (0.261)    
Sales change 0.002    0.003    0.003    0.003    0.003    
(0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 22.347 22.347 22.347 22.347 22.347 
Number of Cases 7.449 7.449 7.449 7.449 7.449 
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Log Likelihood  -1498.681 -1482.662 -1481.949 -1480.158 -1479.414  
Likelihood Ratio Comparison 32.038***  1.426*** 5.007*** 6.495*** 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 3: Marginal Effects (dp/dx) from Table 2, Model V 
Variable (dp/dx) 
Second nest - Grant-Back Clause Equation 
Licensor core technology 0.02935 
Licensee core technology -0.03519 
Technological uncertainty 0.00356 
Licensor core technology ×  Technological 
uncertainty 
-0.01868 
Licensee core technology ×  Technological 
uncertainty 
0.07644 
Royalty rate 0.00011 
Technological superiority -0.00269 
Exclusivity 0.02602 
Technological overlap 0.00568 
First nest - Technology Licensing Equation 
Patent value 0.00007 
Technology radicalness 0.00120 
Technology scope -0.00150 
Technology age 0.00290 
Backward citations -0.00074 
Licensor technological specialization 0.04127 
Licensor market diversification -0.00149 
Firm size -0.00345 
Firm slack  0.00008 
R&D intensity 0.00003 
Technological fragmentation -0.01751 
Sales change 0.00006 
  
166 
 
CHAPTER 5 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE RENT DISSIPATION EFFECT IN 
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING CONTRACTS 
 
 
GORETTI CABALEIRO CERVINO 
 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
gcabalei@emp.uc3m.es 
 
 
SOLON MOREIRA 
 
Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics 
Copenhagen Business School 
E-mail: sm.ino@cbs.dk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
167 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the last years substantial changes have been observed in the way firms organize their 
activities related to the production of new technologies (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). Given 
the strong competition in the product market, the shorter product life cycles, and the increase in 
the use of information and communication technologies, firms are continuously adopting 
business models that allow for more strategic flexibility (Chesbrough, 2003). Accordingly, firms 
rely on networks, new entrants, and technology based organizations in order to generate and 
sustain competitive advantages (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2011). As licensing is a less integrated 
alternative and the most direct way to acquire technologies developed by other companies 
(Fosfuri, 2006), these agreements have dramatically increased in importance and volume over 
the last decades (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Hagedoorn, 2002; Somaya, Kim, & Vonortas, 2011). 
Accordingly, in several industries the use of royalty payments and licensing fees have become 
an important mechanism for firms to profit from their investments in innovation (Arora & 
Gambardella, 2010).  
Surveys conducted by Gambardella, Giuri, & Luzzi (2007) and Zuniga & Guellec 
(2009) show that among the main motivations for companies to license out technologies is the 
revenue that it generates, that is, the present value of the fixed fee and/or the royalties that the 
licensee has to pay to the licensor (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003). Actually, in several industries it is 
common to observe even large established companies actively engaging in licensing to generate 
revenues (Shepard, 1987). Some notable examples of firms profiting from licensing can be 
found in the chemical, computer, and semiconductor industries (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003). While 
the generation of revenues is an important incentive for firms to license out, granting other firms 
access to relevant technologies can also produce negative implications for the licensor 
competitiveness (Choi, 2002). Indeed, as a consequence of licensing out a technology, licensors 
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may also experience a reduction in their market share or price cost margin as a result of the 
additional competition in the product market (Fosfuri, 2006). This reduction in the licensor’s 
market share caused by increased competition has been named the rent dissipation effect. While 
several studies have examined questions related to the revenue generated from technology 
licensing (e.g., Choi, 2002; Sakakibara, 2010; Wang, 1998), empirical research focused on 
explaining the rent dissipation effect is still scarce. 
The central role that the rent dissipation effect plays in licensing contracts is 
evident in comments from the managing director of an intellectual property consulting company 
called Intercap: ‘On the one hand, you don’t want to abandon your patents’ ability to exclude 
competitors from your market. But, on the other hand, you could be talking about hundreds of 
millions of dollars in new revenue from strategic licensing’ (Rivette & Kline, 2000). In this 
regard, firms’ decisions to license a technology have been shown to be grounded on the 
interplay between the revenues generated by the licensing deal and the negative effects resulting 
from additional competition in the downstream product market (Fosfuri, 2006). Despite this 
potential negative effect, prior studies have indicated that not only firms lacking the necessary 
resources to generate commercial value from their innovations, but also large established ones 
use licensing as a strategic alternative to profit from investment in inventive activities (Arora & 
Fosfuri, 2003).  
In one of the few studies examining the rent dissipation effect, Arora & Fosfuri 
(2003) develop a model in which firms with downstream assets decide whether or not a 
technology will be licensed on the basis of the comparison between the rent dissipation caused 
by a new competitor (the licensee) and the revenues generated from the licensing deal. Arora & 
Fosfuri’s findings suggest that firms selling their technologies through licensing can increase 
their share of industry profits while imposing negative externalities upon other incumbents 
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operating in the same product market. In a similar direction, Fosfuri (2006) offers empirical 
evidence of the rent dissipation effect by focusing on the supply side of markets for technology 
to demonstrate how the competition among multiple technology holders triggers a more 
aggressive licensing behavior. In a more recent study, Gambardella & Giarratana (2012) relax 
some of the assumptions found in Arora & Fosfuri’s model to show that high heterogeneity 
among players within the same industry reduces the extent to which licensors will experience 
rent dissipation. Altogether, this stream of literature has consistently indicated that a firm’s 
decision to license out its technologies is directly related to competitive implications 
experienced in the product market (Choi, 2002; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). However, although 
those studies have comprehensively increased our understanding about how markets for 
technology function, to the best of our knowledge no previous study has developed empirical 
evidence directly linking licensing out and the dissipation effect.            
In this paper, we develop and empirically test a model that explains the dissipation 
effect experienced by licensors using a perspective that incorporates three important dimensions 
of the markets for technology: 1) whether the licensors possess downstream assets, 2) licensee 
size, and 3) technological overlap between the licensor and the licensee. The main contribution 
of this paper lies in the development of an empirically testable model concerning one of the 
central assumptions of markets for technology (the dissipation effect), which has not been tested 
against empirical data. Furthermore, we integrate the insights from previous studies in a novel 
way to build and test our hypotheses. First, we drawn on Arora & Fosfuri’ s (2003) proposition 
that the dissipation effect tends to be higher for firms with downstream assets in the product 
market. Second, we also consider the licensee’s perspective (Ceccagnoli & Hicks, 2012; 
Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012; Laursen, Leone, & Torrisi, 2010) to account for the fact that the 
licensee’s capacity to commercially exploit the licensed technology plays an important 
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moderating role between the licensing out of technology and the rent dissipation effect. In this 
regard, Arora & Gambardella (2010) call attention to the fact that the demand side of markets 
for technology has received less attention in licensing literature. Therefore, in our model we 
incorporate the view that licensees differ in their capacity to commercially exploit the licensed 
technology, which naturally impacts on the licensor’s rent dissipation. Finally, our model also 
considers the effect of the technological overlap between the licensor and the licensee. Previous 
research has shown that the licensing decision depends on how technologically close the patent 
portfolios of both companies are (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Laursen et al., 2010). Hence, we apply 
this idea of technological proximity to propose that the dissipation effect resulting from 
licensing out core technologies will be weaker in a context where the technological overlap 
between the parties is low. In testing those three propositions we are not supposing that firms 
make inefficient decisions that lead to rent dissipation. On the contrary, we build on Arora & 
Fosfuri’s (2003) proposition that the licensing decision is based on the balance between 
dissipation and revenue effects31.  
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 163 licensors involved in licensing 
contracts within the U.S. pharmaceutical industry during the period 1984 – 2004. We use 
supplemental data from COMPUSTAT and the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) to obtain specific characteristics of licensors, licensees, and the licensed technology. 
A major strength of our dataset regards the fine-grained information that we were able to obtain 
from the licensing contracts, which allowed us to combine three different data sources to 
estimate the effect of technology licensing on subsequent changes in the licensor’s share in the 
product market. We used a fixed effect model as the econometric technique to model the 
                                                          
31 Given the scarcity of data that make it possible to connect firms’ overall revenues to a specific 
licensing deal, we decided to focus mainly on the dissipation effect and only supplement the main 
analysis with information regarding the remuneration structure of the licensing contracts as a proxy for 
the revenue effect. 
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relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The results offered robust 
support for most of our hypotheses.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present theoretical arguments and 
hypotheses. Second, we describe the databases used in this study and how the dependent and 
independent variables were calculated, followed by the econometric technique used to estimate 
our models. Finally, we present the results and conclusion. 
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses  
5.2.1 Licensing 
Licensing contracts are agreements between companies through which the owner of the 
technology (licensor) allows the other company (licensee) to make, sell, and use a technology 
without transferring its ownership in exchange for economic compensation  (Granstrand, 1999). 
Over the past years there has been an unprecedented growth in licensing agreements 
(Kamiyama, Sheehan, & Martínez, 2006; Zuniga & Guellec, 2009) and, nowadays, they 
represent one of the most important options available to transfer technology (Anand & Khanna, 
2000b; Arora & Fosfuri, 2003). In fact, due to the importance of licensing, the U.S. Department 
of Justice has defined markets for technology as “markets that consist of intellectual property 
that is licensed and its close substitutes” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1995). Although it is also 
possible for firms to enter into licensing agreements concerning the joint development of 
licensed technologies, this type of contract is usually characterized as an arm’s length 
contractual deal with a low level of vertical integration (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013; Grindley & 
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Teece, 1997). Indeed, in most licensing deals signed between firms, the traded technology is 
already developed and commercially proven32 (Atuahene-Gima, 1993).  
In principle, licensing offers strategic advantages for licensors and licensees. On 
the demand side, licensees can benefit from acquiring externally developed and proven 
technologies (Atuahene-Gima, 1993), from reducing product development risks and costs (Lowe 
& Taylor, 1999), and from adopting more diversified and less integrated R&D structures 
(Chesbrough, 2003). On the supply side, licensors increase the possibilities to recover the 
investments and generate revenue from innovations (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Teece, 1986), 
achieve rapid market penetration (Lei & Slocum Jr, 1991), and facilitate the development of 
complementary products (Shepard, 1987). However, using licensing as a means to 
commercialize technologies may also impose risks. On the demand side, licensees could become 
highly dependent on the licensors for the maintenance of the technology (Walter, 2012) and lack 
insight into how to further develop the licensed technology (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). On the 
supply side, in addition to the rent dissipation effect, licensors could lose the control of the 
licensed technology and become heavily dependent on the licensee to generate revenue (Arora 
& Fosfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006). 
As a consequence, the licensing decision is far from straightforward for firms. 
Arora & Fosfuri (2003) focus on the licensors’ point of view to propose a framework for 
predicting the firm’s rate of licensing. In their model, the licensing decision is the result of the 
interplay between two opposite effects: the revenue effect versus the dissipation effect. The 
revenue effect refers to the benefits that licensing generates, which consist of the present value 
of the payments that the licensee will make to the licensor, net of transaction costs. Accordingly, 
                                                          
32 Jensen & Thursby (2001) identified that in most cases the technologies commercialized by universities are at 
early stages, requiring substantial further work to reach a stage that would allow them to be commercially exploited 
by firms. However, we restrict our analysis to licensing contracts between firms.  
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the pecuniary benefits that are connected to licensing contracts are one of the main factors that 
firms take into account when deciding whether or not to license out a specific technology 
(Kulatilaka & Lin, 2006). On the other hand, the dissipation effect refers to the potential 
reduction in the licensor’s benefits, measured as a lower market share or a lower price cost 
margin, as a consequence of additional competition in the final product market. Even though 
previous research has proposed several strategies to limit the latter effect (Cohen, Nelson, & 
Walsh, 2000; Granstrand, Patel, & Pavitt, 1997), an additional competitor may always be 
considered a potential threat for the licensor (Fosfuri, 2006). Therefore, firms seek to balance 
the revenue effect, which is a short-term effect, against the dissipation effect, which can 
influence firm performance in the long run (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006). 
Beyond the monetary compensation that licensing generates, firms may also 
choose not to exploit a technology in house as a consequence of several other factors. First, in 
order to commercialize a technology independently, firms must develop specific assets and 
capabilities such as commercialization channels, a sales workforce, and infrastructure to service 
clients (Gans & Stern, 2003). When considering the expected return from those investments, 
licensing may appear to be an interesting alternative as other firms in the market may already 
possess the necessary assets. Second, established firms launching a new product run the risk of 
cannibalizing their own market and eroding their competitive position (Hill & Rothaermel, 
2003). Third, licensing creates possibilities for cooperation between the licensor and the 
licensee, which mitigate risks inherent to investments that are necessary to turn a technology 
into a marketable product (Gans & Stern, 2003, 2010). In line with the third point, Choi (2002) 
proposed a distinction between the competition that a firm faces in the current product market 
(Kamien, 1992; Katz & Shapiro, 1985) and the competition it faces in the innovation market 
(Choi, 2002; Gans & Stern, 2010). While the first regards the competition that licensing triggers 
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within the product markets that the licensor operates in at the moment of the licensing deal, the 
second is related to a more dynamic process through which competition is increased in the long 
run as a consequence of technological developments in the licensed technology.  
Despite the fact that previous studies have pointed out certain contingencies and 
characteristics related to the licensing process that accentuate the dissipation effect (Arora & 
Ceccagnoli, 2011; Cohen et al., 2000; Granstrand et al., 1997; Helpman, 1998), no empirical 
evidence has been produced indicating the direct relationship between rent dissipation and 
technology licensing. On the basis of previous research, we focus on three main factors 
regarding technology and firm specificities that could influence the dissipation effect 
experienced by the licensor. First, we consider that licensors are more likely to be susceptible to 
the dissipation effect in cases where the licensed technology constitutes a core, rather than a 
peripheral, technology. We expect that the degree to which a technology is connected to the 
licensors’ main technological activities is an indication of the possession of the downstream 
assets. Furthermore, core technologies are mostly observed to be superior to peripheral ones in 
terms of production costs, market value and potential for further refinement (Choi, 2002). 
Second, licensors are more susceptible to the dissipation effect if the licensee is increasing in 
size. Large companies are more able to appropriate value from inward licensing (Walter, 2012). 
Finally, we also expect the magnitude of the dissipation effect to be affected by the level of 
technological overlap between the licensor and the licensee. In this case, it is expected that 
lower technological overlap reduces the dissipation effect resulting from licensing out core 
technologies. 
5.2.2 Licensing out core technologies 
The technological portfolio of a firm is formed by core and non-core technologies that are 
related to the markets in which the firm operates (Granstrand et al., 1997). Core technologies 
  
175 
 
represent a firm’s main source of competitive advantage as they constitute the outcome of a path 
dependent process regarding the accumulations of unique expertise (Prahalad & Hamel, 1993). 
In general, core technologies are distinct, given their potential access to a wide variety of 
markets, their significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end product, and 
how difficult it is for competitors to imitate them (Choi, 2002; Prahalad & Hamel, 1993). Given 
the competitive potential implications of licensing out core technologies for the licensor, the 
licensing literature does not frequently consider it to be a viable alternative for firms. However, 
if the licensor is able to either avoid creating direct competitors (Fosfuri, 2006; Leone & 
Reichstein, 2012) or to receive monetary remuneration that is compatible with the potential rent 
dissipation, core technologies will also be licensed (Choi, 2002).       
In fact, considering both sides of the markets for technologies, deals involving 
core technologies are more likely to take place than deals regarding peripheral technologies. 
Indeed, core technologies are more valuable to licensees as they have the potential to lead to the 
generation of related products in future while at the same time allowing the acquiring firm to 
produce more revenue in the short term (Choi, 2002). Therefore, considering this perspective, if 
the licensor can use licensing payments (e.g., fixed fees and royalty rates) to appropriate a 
sufficiently large amount to overcome the decrease in profits due to future competition, then 
deals exchanging core technologies are likely to happen. Furthermore, even if the uncertainty 
related to the licensed technology is as high as to prevent all contingencies from being fully 
foreseen in a licensing contract, the use of a royalty-based payment is an option to ensure that 
the (valuable) core technologies will be traded  (Gallini & Wright, 1990).     
There are also other factors, in addition to revenue generation, that may affect a 
firm’s decision to license out core technologies. First, by engaging in licensing deals, firms may 
access the licensee’s assets and capabilities, which can be useful in further developing the 
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licensed technology (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). The complexity related to the development of 
certain technologies can lead firms to enter into R&D partnerships (in the form of licensing 
contracts) in order to mitigate risks and increase the chances that a technology will continue to 
be developed (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 2000). This is particularly true for firms that are strongly 
centered around a small group of core capabilities in a particular technological field, as those 
firms are more likely to develop rigidities and are also more susceptible to fail to keep up with 
environmental changes (Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003). Furthermore, licensing is also an 
alternative for firms to implementing open innovation strategies (Chesbrough, 2003). Second, it 
is not uncommon that the development and introduction of a new product require several 
complementary technologies that a single firm may not possess. Under these circumstances 
firms may possess in house a technology that only has the potential to generate rents when 
combined with those of other firms (Fershtman & Kamien, 1992). In this case, a firm may 
pursue the development of technologies that are related to its core business and agree to provide 
its access to other firms in exchange for access to their technologies (Eswaran, 1994).   
In spite of the different motivations that firms might have to license out core 
technologies, we expect that technologies that are close to the firm’s main business reflect the 
areas in which the licensor possesses downstream assets (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001). 
This observation leads to the assumption that licensors will experience stronger competition 
originating from licensing out a technology if it is closely related to the firm’s main line of 
business. Therefore, we follow the argument developed by Arora & Fosfuri (2001) that licensors 
are more likely to experience rent dissipation in cases where downstream assets related to the 
licensed technology are possessed in house. Our baseline hypothesis therefore states:  
Hypothesis 1: The closer a technology is to the licensor’s core technological activities, the 
stronger the dissipation effect, all else being equal. 
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5.2.3 Licensing out core technologies and licensee size 
The relationship between firm size and the propensity to license out has been explored in depth 
by previous literature. Several studies have identified size as one the main determinants that 
explain licensing out activities (Fosfuri, 2006; Gambardella et al., 2007; Kani & Motohashi, 
2012), with the results indicating that as size increases, the propensity to license out decreases 
(Gambardella et al., 2007). In particular, previous research has found that smaller firms license 
out more technologies as a consequence of the lack of legitimacy and the downstream assets. 
Therefore, in most of the cases, licensing out is the only way to appropriate rents from their 
investments (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006). From the point of view of the licensee, size 
is expected not only to increase the propensity to license in, but also to explain the capacity that 
the acquiring firm will need to exploit the acquired technology (Walter, 2012). Indeed, as larger 
firms have several advantages in exploiting resources from the environment (Atuahene-Gima, 
1993), many cross-firm differences in terms of the capacity to exploit licensed-in technologies 
comes from differential advantages related to size and R&D intensity.  
One of the key factors of the licensing process is the efficiency of the licensee in 
applying the newly acquired technology in the product market (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). 
No doubt, this efficiency is highly dependent on the licensee’s capabilities, which in turn, are 
closely connected to firm size. Accordingly, Walter (2012) has shown a positive relationship 
between firm size and the propensity to license in. Given that large firms are characterized by 
greater economies of scale in R&D, faster learning curves and the downstream assets needed to 
commercialize the final product (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Van Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles, 2008), 
they are able to capture more value from licensing in. Although larger firms also have a number 
of disadvantages related to innovation, such as rigidities (Dosi & Marengo, 2007) and 
organizational inertia (Chen & Hambrick, 1995), we expect the effect of size on firm capacity to 
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commercially exploit a newly acquired technology in the product market to be positive. 
Moreover, considering Teece’s (1986) seminal work on firm capacity to profit from innovation, 
the successful commercialization of externally acquired technologies is conditional upon 
capabilities and other complementary resources, which are more likely to be present in larger 
firms.   
Following this line of reasoning, large firms vis-à-vis small firms are more likely 
to invest a substantial amount of resources in the commercialization and manufacturing of the 
licensed technologies (Teece, 1986). This conclusion naturally has implications for the rent 
dissipation effect that licensors experience when licensing out core technologies. Considering 
the baseline hypothesis regarding the extent to which a technology is core to the licensor’s main 
technological activities, we expect that as the licensee increases in size the competition within 
the licensor’s main business lines will also increase. Actually, given that peripheral technologies 
are unlikely to cause meaningful rent dissipation for the licensor, we expect that licensee size 
will increase rent dissipation only when the licensing deal involves licensor’s core technologies. 
Therefore, we expect that the dissipation effect caused by licensing out core technologies will 
increase with licensee size. Our second hypothesis thus states that: 
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, the larger the licensee firm, the stronger the dissipation 
effect caused by licensing core technologies. 
 
5.2.4 Technological overlap between partners 
Another important dimension of the licensing process that directly affects the dissipation effect 
regards the extent to which the licensor and the licensee operate in the same niches within the 
product market  (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2012). Actually, from the licensor’s perspective it 
would be preferable to license to firms that build on a different set of technological capabilities 
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as they would be less likely to turn into a competitor in the product space (Arora & 
Gambardella, 2010). Indeed, if the licensor can supply a technology to a firm with which it has a 
low level of overlap, the effect of increasing competition observed on both the technology and 
product markets will be substantially smaller as compared to licensing to a firm with a high 
technological overlap. Firms operating within close technological fields are more likely to share 
similar resource bases (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), which increases the likelihood that they will 
commercially exploit the licensed technology in similar ways. As a result, high overlap puts 
licensor and licensee in more direct competition with each other (Gambardella & Giarratana, 
2012; Walter, 2012).   
Although licensing out a technology to firms with low technological overlap 
would be an optimal alternative from the licensor perspective, licensing deals between firms 
operating in different technological segments are not always possible. Indeed, markets for 
technology are mainly characterized by asymmetric information between the parties, by 
difficulties in describing and valuing the technology and by uncertainty about the validity and 
applicability of the traded technology (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). As a consequence, firms 
can reduce those problems if they belong to a close technological field (high overlap), which 
significantly limits the extent to which deals between firms with no technological overlap 
happen. In this context, from the licensee point of view, it is easier to identify and understand 
the value of a specific technology when operating with technologies similar to those of the 
licensor (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2012). Furthermore, technologies licensed from a firm with 
a similar technological portfolio are easier to evaluate, assimilate, and apply (Arora & 
Gambardella, 1994; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). On the licensor side, it is easier to screen the 
technological space for potential licensees that operate in closer technological fields. In 
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summary, high technological overlap between the parties reduces search costs and other 
frictions that are inherently present on the markets for technology.  
Building on the arguments presented above, we claim that licensing deals are most 
likely to involve firms with some degree of technological overlap in their portfolio. In other 
words, deals are unlikely to happen between firms with absolutely no overlap as several issues 
ranging from partner identification to technology transferability can prevent those deals from 
happening. On the other hand, firms with perfectly similar technological portfolios are unlikely 
to enter into licensing deals as the risk of generating competition becomes too high33. Those 
arguments lead to the idea that the technological overlap between the firms signing a licensing 
contract will fall between perfect and no overlap.  
Similarities between the licensor and the licensee in the technological space are 
also likely to be reflected in the product market. Accordingly, we consider the effect that a low 
level of technological overlap has on the magnitude of the dissipation effect experienced by the 
licensor. We propose that companies with low technological overlap are less likely to compete 
directly within the same technological niche, which weakens the dissipation effect caused by 
licensing out core technologies. Therefore, we state: 
Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, the lower the technological overlap between the licensor and 
the licensee, the weaker the dissipation effect of licensing out core technologies. 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the conceptual model proposed in this paper34. First, the arrow 
referring to Hypothesis 1 indicates a positive relationship between licensor core technologies 
                                                          
33 Choi (2002) proposes that such deals could still take place if the licensee agrees to pay a high lump-sum payment 
and/or royalty fee to the licensor. However, if the total amount to be paid becomes too high the licensee is unlikely 
to pursue those deals.  
34 Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual model developed in this paper, but the way that the dissipation effect is 
operationalized in the empirical model uses the inverse interpretation for the direction of the coefficients for the 
main independent variables.  
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and the dissipation effect. Second, this relationship is positively moderated by the licensee size 
(H2). Finally, the lower level of technological overlap between licensor and licensee negatively 
moderates the relationship between the licensor’s core technology and the dissipation effect 
(H3).   
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
5.3 Data, Variables & Methodology  
5.3.1 Sample selection and data  
 
Studying the rent dissipation effect empirically is a challenge. The availability of public data for 
systematic quantitative studies that make it possible to model the relationship between 
technology licensing and rent dissipation is limited. Licensors do not usually report publicly 
what technologies they have licensed out, and the financial filings rarely allow for the 
connection of firm revenue to a specific licensing deal. An alternative to overcome the lack of 
public data could be to use interviews or questionnaires, but these methods would impose 
significant limitations. First, respondents may be unwilling to reveal strategic information 
regarding the nature of the licensed technologies as well as the contractual specifications of the 
deal. Second, there are substantial timing effects and cross-firm heterogeneity that could also 
explain a reduction of the licensor’s share in the product market, but which are hard to consider 
without the use of a longitudinal setting. To overcome those issues and test the proposed 
hypotheses we relied on detailed information extracted from a sample of licensing contracts that 
allowed us to link licensing contracts to patent data and the financial performance of the 
licensors. The sample, measures, and methods are summarized below. 
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The research setting for this study is the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Firms in 
this industry produce and commercialize drugs, chemical components, and technologies. Several 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry make it a useful empirical setting for testing the 
relationship between technology licensing and the rent dissipation effect. First, licensing is one 
of the most common methods of technology transfer among pharmaceutical companies. Second, 
the pharmaceutical industry is characterized as technology driven and research intensive, which 
makes technological knowledge a critical component in developing and sustaining competitive 
advantages (Roberts, 1999). Third, since our main analysis relies on patent data, we have chosen 
an industry in which firms routinely and systematically use patents to protect their inventions 
(Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). Those characteristics correspond to an industry in which markets 
for technology are well developed and present lower frictions, which facilitates the transaction 
of technologies using licensing contracts. Accordingly, the fact that the pharmaceutical industry 
presents those specific features creates a trade-off in terms of the generalizability of results and 
how precisely we are able to measure the variables used in the econometric analysis. However, 
given the scarcity of empirical evidences on this topic we believe the purposeful choice of this 
industry to be appropriate to shed light on important, and yet empirically unexplored, aspects of 
technology licensing and the rent dissipation effect. 
The data used to develop the empirical analysis come from three different sources. 
First, as a starting point, we used the Deloitte Recap Database to obtain the licensing contracts 
involving U.S. pharmaceutical firms. We choose this database because it is one of the most 
accurate sources of information regarding partnerships in the pharmaceutical industry 
(Audretsch & Feldman, 2003; Schilling, 2009). Additionally, it allowed us to access the original 
licensing contracts from which we could extract precise information regarding the contractual 
and technological aspects of the licensing deals. Second, we obtained information regarding the 
patenting activity of licensors and licensees from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
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(NBER) patent database. Finally, we extracted firms’ financial information from the Compustat 
database.   
Considering that one of the main ideas developed in this paper regards the degree 
to which the licensed technology represents a core activity for licensors, we focus only on 
contracts in which it was possible to identify the licensed technologies in an unambiguous 
manner. The way to do so was to focus on licensing contracts containing a seven-digit patent 
number connecting a specific technology to the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO). This setting allows for calculating the relative importance of the licensed technology 
in relation to the licensor’s overall activities. Although we use patent data to calculate how core 
a technology is, our analysis only concerns the rent dissipation related to product market 
activity. For example, if licensor A decides to license a specific technology to licensee B, the 
effect that we are trying to capture is a consequence of licensee B commercially exploiting the 
licensed technology and consequently putting competitive pressure on licensor A. Additionally, 
we acknowledge that the dissipation effect can also increase over time as a consequence of 
learning effects experienced by the licensee and not only as a consequence of the immediate 
commercial exploitation of the licensed technology. However, following an innovation 
perspective, the time that licensees may take to assimilate, recombine, and apply the licensed-in 
technology to something new is too long to be captured in the empirical setting adopted in this 
paper. For this reason, we only use licensing contracts that include commercialization clauses in 
their contractual scope, which implies that the licensee is allowed to commercialize the licensed 
technology without the need to further develop or incorporate it in a new product (Parr & 
Sullivan, 1996).  
The matching process between the licensing contracts extracted from the Recap 
and the two other databases was done as follow. The first step was to use the licensor’s name 
and industry as described in the licensing contract to identify the corresponding observation in 
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the Compustat database. Second, using the Compustat firm identifier (GVKEY), we also 
connected the licensors with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) U.S. patent 
data file35. To ensure an accurate match we manually checked each individual GVKEY match 
between the Compustat and NBER datasets. Given that a substantial number of licensees in our 
sample are non-public firms we were not able to satisfactorily match the licensee firms with 
Compustat, but because the patent data is less restrictive36 we were able to connect the licensees 
with the NBER database. In order to drive the matching process for the licensees we relied on 
firm name and country. On the basis of licensors’ and licensees’ patent information it was 
possible to construct measures for the firm’s technological assets using the patenting behavior 
prior to the licensing date. However, measures based on patent information are poor indicators 
of firms’ technological profile in cases where the firm is not listed as an assignee on any patent 
within the years prior to the licensing contract. Therefore, firms that have not filed at least one 
patent during the time frame used to calculate the variables were omitted from the final sample.  
After selecting the contracts that met those specifications and conducting the 
matching process between the three databases, we arrived at an estimation sample of 330 
observations regarding 163 unique licensors and 198 unique licensees involved in licensing 
contracts during the period 1984-200437. This number corresponds to approximately 69% of the 
original contracts that matched the required characteristics to be used in the empirical analysis. 
5.3.2 Method 
To estimate the rent dissipation effect experienced by each licensor after the licensing deal, we 
follow the conceptual references offered by prior literature on markets for technology (Arora & 
                                                          
35 We employed the NBER data version that provides the GVKEY numbers linked to the assignee number of patent 
applicants. 
36 While Compustat only includes public firms, the patent data list all the firms that filed at least one patent between 
1976 and 2006 
37 Although the NBER patent database would allow tracking firms patents until 2006, we decided to include the 
observations only until 2004 as a way to deal with potential truncation issues regarding the number of forward 
citations received by patents.  
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Fosfuri, 2003; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Fosfuri, 2006) and specify the dependent variable as 
a relative change in the licensor market share. Despite the fact that we are not aware of any 
previous attempt at measuring the dissipation effect in this way, a number of studies have 
applied this variable in a similar manner for different purposes (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; 
Giroud & Mueller, 2011). One potential issue in estimating the relative changes in the licensor 
market share after a licensing deal regards the fact that a firm already experiencing financial 
problems may also be more likely to engage in licensing deals as a way to generate short-term 
revenue, which would produce biased estimates due to simultaneity (Verbeek, 2000). In order to 
try to deal with this problem, we added the change on the licensor market share in the year prior 
to the licensing date as one of the predictors that should capture the effect of the past 
performance on the subsequent changes in the licensor market share. As a robustness check, we 
also applied the Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in panel data and the estimators 
indicated no evidence of first-order autocorrelation. 
The first approach we considered to test the proposed hypotheses was a fixed 
effects model as a way to account for the substantial unobserved firm heterogeneity that 
commonly affects studies dealing with corporate performance measures (Coles, Lemmon, & 
Felix Meschke, 2012). However, if the unobserved firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with 
the regressors, the use of the random effects model would be most appropriate since it produces 
more efficient estimators (Greene, 2003). In the case of modeling the dissipation effect, the 
random effects assumption implies that unobserved characteristics of firm i affecting the relative 
changes in the licensor’s market share, such as aspects of corporate governance and firm 
inability to innovate, are not correlated with licensing strategy, technological overlap, and 
licensee size. To test whether the use of random effects is appropriate, we applied a Hausman 
(1978) test to compare the coefficients and capture systematic differences between both fixed 
and random effects. The results indicated significant differences between the random and fixed 
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effects estimators (chi = 69.83, p < 0.001), confirming the suitability of fixed effects to model 
the effect of technology licensing on subsequent changes in the licensor’s market share. 
Additionally, we included year dummies to control for period effects, such as differences in 
macroeconomic conditions that could also affect firm performance. Finally, robust standard 
errors were used to rule out heteroskedasticity concerns (Wooldridge, 2002). 
One of the main advantages of this empirical setting regards the use independent 
data sources to calculate the variables applied in the econometric analysis. The combination of 
multiple sources is a useful strategy to mitigate bias issues related to artificial variance created 
from a single database (Avolio, Yammarino, & Bass, 1991; Doty & Glick, 1998). Accordingly, 
while the dependent variable is calculated on the basis of Compustat information, the main 
explanatory variables are a composition of information extracted from the Recap and NBER 
patent databases.  
 
5.3.3 Measures 
Dissipation effect 
 
We compute the dependent variable as a continuous change in the licensor market share in the 
first year after signing a licensing contract. Following a similar approach to (Ferrier et al., 1999), 
the first step to calculate this variable was to compute the licensor’s market share using the ratio 
between the licensor’s sales and the total sales in the licensor’s industry reported in Compustat. 
The industry sales were calculated on the basis of all U.S pharmaceutical firms operating within 
the same four-digit SIC code at year t. Following prior research (Giroud & Mueller, 2011), we 
used all available Compustat firms within the same licensor’s SIC code. We excluded firms for 
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which the sales were either negative or missing. Our final measure is derived from the 
differences in the logarithm of the licensor’s market: 
 
Dissipation Effect= ln(MS t+1) – ln(MS t) 
 
where ln(MS t+1) represents the licensor’s market share in the first year after signing the license 
contract; and ln(MS t) in the same year. This measure can be interpreted as yielding positive 
values representing an increase and negative values, a decrease on licensors’ relative market 
share in the year subsequent to the license agreement. The rent dissipation effect measure is thus 
consistent with the concepts proposed in the markets for technology literature, according to 
which licensors are likely to experience increasing competition in the product market in the 
period that follows the licensing deal (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; 
Fosfuri, 2006).  
 
5.3.4 Focal independent variables 
Licensor’s core technology  
The extent to which the licensed technology represents a licensor’s core technological activity is 
calculated using the licensor’s overall patenting activity in the years preceding the licensing 
deal. This measure is operationalized on the basis of the focal index proposed by Ziedonis 
(2007). One of the key underlying assumptions in the use of the focal index regards the fact that 
the licensor’s patenting activity represents a good indication of overall technological and market 
activities, which has been shown to be the case in the context of the pharmaceutical industry 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Roberts, 1999). Accordingly, how core the licensed technology is 
to the licensor is then measured on the basis of the patent class connected to the licensed 
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technology and the technology classes the licensor has been active in prior to the licensing 
date38. To illustrate this, if the share of the licensor’s patent portfolio assigned to the same patent 
class as the licensed technology is high then the technology in question is considered a core 
technology. This variable will be calculated as follows: 
 Licensor’s core technology =  9∑ ∑ :;<> ??@A ∙B<C∑ ∑ :;<> ??@A ∙B< D 
 
in which ∑ ∑ C^_` bb-E ∙ ρ_k represents the citation-weighted sum of firm i’s patents that were 
applied for within five years at the time of the license agreement t and belong to the same 
primary patent class c as the licensed patent; and ∑ ∑ C^_` bb-E ∙ ρ_ is the sum of all citation-
weighted patents issued to firm j that were applied for by date t following the same time window 
of five years. The use of weighted citations offers the possibility to capture the relative 
importance of each patent within the firm’s portfolio (Griliches, 1990). Additionally, Hall, Jaffe, 
& Trajtenberg (2001) call attention to the fact that the number of citations received by any given 
patent is naturally right-truncated in time, since it is only possible to observe the citations 
received so far. Furthermore, the fact that patents differ in age results in different degrees of 
truncation39. To overcome this issue we use a multiplier factor that corrects for the truncation 
problem by considering differences between the patent’s grant years and the technological 
categories.  
Technological overlap 
To measure the technological overlap between licensee and licensor we also rely on the patent 
classes in which both firms have been active prior to the licensing contract (Jaffe, 1986; 
                                                          
38 For the contracts negotiating more than one technology we calculated focal index on the basis of the average 
values of all technologies identified by a patent number 
39 50% of citations are made to patents at least 10 years older than the citing patent, 25% to patents 20 years older 
or more, and 5% of citations refer to patents that are at least 50 years older than the citing one (Hall et at., 2001) 
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Sampson, 2007). Prior studies have indicated that patent classes can be used as a reliable 
indicator of the specific technological fields in which the patenting firm operates (Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, 2004; Nooteboom, Van Haverbeke, Duysters, Gilsing, & van den Oord, 2007). 
Therefore, we use the measure proposed by (Jaffe, 1986) to capture the technological position of 
the licensor relative to the licensee in terms of the technological fields in which both firms have 
patented. In order to construct our measure we first generated the technological profile of 
licensors and licensees separately by measuring the distribution of accumulated patents across 
different classes in the five years prior to the licensing contract. Similarly to prior studies (e.g., 
Sampson, 2007), we obtained a multidimensional vector,  F_ =  F_, … F_q, according to which 
F5 represents the number of patents assigned to firm i in the patent class s. Because we are 
interested in investigating how low levels of technological overlap moderate the relationship 
between licensing and rent dissipation, we inverted this variable by subtracting it from 1, as 
follows: 
 Technological overlap=1-  
HIHJ́
L(HIHŃ) HPHJ́ 
Accordingly, this measure takes value 1 for firms that have orthogonal vectors, value 0 for firms 
with full overlap in their patenting activity, and a value between 0 and 1 for the cases in which 
there is an intermediate degree of orthogonality between licensor and licensee.  
Licensee size 
Given that we could not successfully match a satisfactory number of licensee firms with the 
Compustat database, we relied on a patent stock measure as a proxy for licensee size. Therefore, 
the measure for licensee’s size is based on the logarithm of the total number of patents filed by 
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the licensee within 10 years40 before the licensing contract. Although we recognize that this 
proxy has limitations, there are reasons to consider the licensee’s patent stock a reliable proxy 
for firm size. Examining the relationship between patent stock and the number of employees for 
the licensor firms in our sample, we observe a significant correlation of 63% between those two 
variables. Furthermore, a number of previous studies have also proxied firm size using the total 
number of patents accumulated over time (Cantwell & Santangelo, 2000; Quintana-García & 
Benavides-Velasco, 2008). Still, one could argue that in certain circumstances small firms may 
display an extensive patenting activity as compared to large firms, but if that is the case then the 
size measure would lead to a downwards bias (against the results we expect), given that small 
firms are less likely to cause more rent dissipation vis-à-vis large ones.      
Control variables 
To minimize alternative explanations and isolate the effects of the explanatory variables, we 
controlled for several factors regarding firm, contract, and technology characteristics that could 
also explain changes in the licensor’s market share. Regarding firm characteristics, we control 
for size using the logarithm of the licensor’s number of employees at year t. We control for 
licensor’s R&D intensity by including the R&D expenditures divided by the firm total sales. 
How specialized the licensor is in terms of different technological fields may also affect the 
extent to which it is subject to the rent dissipation effect. In order to control for this 
characteristic, we calculated a Herfindahl index on the basis of the classes connected to all the 
patents the licensor successfully applied prior to the licensing date.  
We also control for contractual specification by adding dummy variables capturing 
four legal aspects of the deal. First, licensing contracts that allow the licensee to sub-license the 
                                                          
40 As an alternative, we also estimated the models using 5 and 15 years to calculate the licensee’s patent stock and 
the results remained the same. 
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acquired technology are likely to amplify the dissipation effect experienced by the licensor, so 
we added a dummy variable indicating whether the licensing deal regards a contract that allows 
sub-licensing. Second, licensing contracts may stipulate whether or not the licensee is exclusive; 
we expect that the exclusivity clauses may affect the dependent variable in either a positive or a 
negative way. On the one hand, if the licensee is exclusive, it may be more willing to 
commercially exploit the licensed technology in a more aggressive way. On the other hand, the 
fact that the technology is restricted to a single firm could also reduce the rent dissipation. Third, 
we also use a dummy variable to indicate whether the licensing contract includes royalty fees in 
its remuneration structure (Choi, 2002). Finally, we also include a dummy variable in the 
econometric analysis, indicating whether the licensing contract allows the licensee to further 
develop the licensed technology. We expect that licensees are more likely to require this clause 
to be included in the contract when the licensed technology presents a high potential to be 
further developed and commercially exploited, which may also affect the rent dissipation 
experienced by the licensor.  
The final set of control variables regards specific characteristics of the licensed 
technology. We expect that more valuable technologies are also more likely to result in stronger 
rent dissipation; therefore, following the convention in the patent literature, we use the total 
number of forward citations received by a given technology to proxy value (Trajtenberg, 1990). 
We control for the age of the licensed technology using the time difference between the 
application date of a patent and the date of the licensing deal. Finally, in order to account for 
heterogeneity originating from differences in the technological fields of licensed technologies, 
we follow prior studies (Gambardella, Harhoff, & Verspagen, 2008; Jaffe, 1989; Mowery, 
Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2002) and group the patent classes into four main patent classes according 
  
192 
 
to the relevant fields of technology and generate dummy variables for each of them (Hall et al., 
2001).  
 
5.5 Results  
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation coefficients of the 
variables used in the fixed effects model. The correlation does not warrant further examination 
with respect to multicollinearity. Additionally, the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) 
associated with any of the independent variables was 1.66 (mean VIF = 1.39), which is well 
below the rule-of-thumb value of ten (Wooldridge, 2012). It is possible to observe a moderate 
correlation between licensor’s core technology and the number of employees, indicating that 
larger firms are less likely to license core technologies. We expect this relationship to be a result 
of the fact that larger firms have more diverse (less specialized) patent portfolios given their 
capacity to operate in different technological fields simultaneously. Finally, we used the 
likelihood ratio test to check how the stepwise inclusion of the variables changes the likelihood 
statistics. The results indicate a significant improvement in the overall fit of the Model 7 
(likelihood ratio: 80.506, p<0.001) .  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Table 2 reports the results for the fixed-effects model with robust standard errors. The dependent 
variable across the seven models reported in this table regards the relative changes in the 
licensor’s market share in the year subsequent to the licensing deal. Model 1 reports the 
estimators for the control variables. Model 2 introduces the main independent variable licensor’s 
core technology. The variables technological overlap and licensee size are entered into the 
Models 3 and 4, respectively. The two-way interaction between licensor’s core technology and 
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technological overlap (low) is estimated in Model 5. In Model 6, the interaction between 
licensee size and licensor’s core technology is included in the regression. Finally, Model 7 is 
estimated by including all explanatory variables.   
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the closer a technology is to the licensor’s core 
technological activities, the stronger the dissipation effect. Accordingly, the results of Table 2 
indicate that the coefficient for the licensor’s core technology variable is negative and 
significant at the 1% level when all controls are included in the equation, providing strong 
evidence in favor of our first hypothesis. This result lends support to one of the main ideas 
proposed in this paper, namely, that the closer the licensed technology is to the licensor’s main 
technological activities, the stronger will be the rent dissipation effect experienced in the 
product market.  Hypothesis 2 predicts that the larger the licensee firm, the stronger will be the 
dissipation effect caused by licensing core technologies. As reported in Table 2, the interaction 
term between licensor’s core technology and licensee size consistently presents a negative and 
significant coefficient across the models, suggesting that licensee size negatively moderates the 
relationship between licensing core technologies and subsequent changes in the licensor’s 
market share. This result offers support for the relationship stated in Hypothesis 2. Finally, 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that a lower level of technological overlap between licensor and licensee 
will decrease the negative effect of licensing out core technologies and the licensor’s market 
share. The statistical significant and positive coefficient for the interaction between licensor’s 
core technology and technological overlap (low) lends support for Hypothesis 3.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Concerning the control variables, the results indicate a negative and significant effect of sub-
licensing on the dependent variable. This result goes in the same direction of our expectations, 
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indicating that signing licensing contracts with a sub-licensing clause is negatively related to 
subsequent changes in the licensor’s market share. Indeed, the fact that the licensee is able to 
transfer the commercialization rights of a specific technology to other firms is likely to increase 
the number of potential competitors that will also use the licensed technology to compete 
against the licensor.  
5.6 Supplementary Analysis   
The literature on markets for technology describes the ‘dilemma’ that licensors face when 
deciding whether or not to license out a technology (Fosfuri, 2006). On the one hand, licensing 
creates a dissipation effect caused by increasing competition in the product market (Arora & 
Fosfuri, 2003; Choi, 2002), which we operationalize on the basis of a relative change in the 
licensor’s market share. On the other hand, the decreasing shares in the product market 
experienced by the licensor should be compensated for by licensing revenues; otherwise firms 
would have no stimulus to enter into licensing or other forms of technology exchange (Choi, 
2002). In this paper we focus on the dissipation effect caused by licensing core technologies and 
two main contingencies regarding the licensee size and the overlap between licensor and 
licensee. Given the scarcity of empirical evidence on this topic this focus contributes to a better 
understanding of the rent dissipation effect as an important part of the market for technology 
dynamics. Although relevant, it is still only a partial picture of the licensing ‘dilemma’. 
Unfortunately, the dataset combination that we used to test the proposed hypotheses does not 
allow us to extract information about the revenue generated by each licensing deal. As a 
consequence, we are not able to test whether the licensing revenues will increase as the 
dissipation effect also increases. However, looking into each individual contract we were able to 
extract certain information regarding the remuneration structure of each deal in order to 
supplement the main analysis regarding the rent dissipation effect.  
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In order to do so we estimated an additional econometric model based on the 
remuneration conditions of the licensing contracts. We generated a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the licensing contract includes a granted minimum royalty clause. This clause 
indicates that the licensor will receive a given minimum royalty independently of the licensee’s 
performance in exploiting the licensed technology, even if it is necessary for the licensee to 
supplement the royalty payment to reach the stipulated amount (Battersby & Grimes, 2005). 
Apart from being a contractual mechanism to ensure that the licensor will receive monetary 
compensation regardless of the licensee’s performance, this contractual specification can be also 
used as a way to guarantee that the licensee will not use the licensing agreement to avoid or 
delay the introduction of a competitive technology in the market (Goldscheider, 1995; Welch, 
Benito, & Petersen, 2008). Accordingly, this clause can be applied to contracts that exchange 
valuable technologies with a high potential to generate revenue in order to avoid the risk to the 
licensor of becoming licensee’s hostage in terms of revenue generation. Indeed, according to 
Goldscheider. “minimum royalties may also be used to eliminate licensees who cannot perform 
adequately by providing a mechanism to "weed out" the unsuccessful licensees” (1995, p.12). 
Therefore, we generated a dependent variable calculated on the basis of a binary outcome with 
the observations taking value 1 if the contract includes the payment of minimum royalty fees 
and 0 otherwise. Consequently, we expect that the main independent variables used to predict 
the dissipation effect equation will have the opposite direction when estimated against this 
dependent variable capturing the remuneration conditions of a licensing deal. We expect that the 
negative and significant effect that licensing a core technology has on the licensor’s market 
share will be positive in terms of the likelihood that this remuneration clause will be evoked. 
Following this logic, we also expect the opposite moderating effects for licensee size and 
technological overlap.       
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Considering the discrete nature of the dependent variable we used a logit model 
with robust standard errors to estimate the likelihood that this clause will be used in a licensing 
contract. We included the same explanatory variables used in the fixed effects model, apart from 
the variable Royalty Sales and the licensor market share in the year prior to the licensing date.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
In line with our expectations we find a positive and significant effect of the 
licensor’s core technology on the likelihood that the licensing contract will include a minimum 
royalty fee clause. This result suggests that the licensor is more likely to require safer 
remuneration conditions (that do not depend on licensee performance) as a way to compensate 
for the dissipation effect caused by licensing out core technologies. Examining the interaction 
between the licensor’s core technology and technological overlap (low) between the licensor 
and the licensee, we also find support for the idea that low levels of overlap between both parts 
negatively moderate the relationship between core technology and remuneration conditions. Our 
results do not lend support to the moderating effect that licensee size is expected to have on the 
remuneration conditions of licensing contracts.  
5.7 Discussion and Conclusions  
This article started by developing a conceptual model to explain the rent dissipation effect using 
the concepts found in the markets for technology literature. Despite the fact that the dissipation 
effect has been recurrently mentioned as one of the main dimensions of technology licensing, 
only few studies have examined this topic. In this paper, we focus on the extent to which the 
licensed technology represents a licensor’s core technology. We posit that licensing core 
technologies is more likely to increase the dissipation effect caused by the existence of 
downstream market assets. Furthermore, we incorporate into our model the licensee’s point of 
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view by considering that licensee size plays an important role in moderating the negative effects 
of licensing core technologies. Finally, we draw on recent advances in the markets for 
technology literature and test the effect of technological overlap in the context of licensing 
contracts. Indeed, the fact that the licensor and the licensee operate in different technological 
niches within the same industry alleviates the rent dissipation effect experienced by the licensor. 
The results should also be considered in light of some limitations. First, the 
literature on markets for technology conceptualizes the dissipation effect as a direct effect of 
increasing competition on the licensor’s product market. However, the way that we are able to 
operationalize our dependent variable does not allow us to distinguish between a relative 
reduction in the licensor’s current market share as a consequence of fiercer competition and the 
cases in which firms purposefully choose to reduce their share in the product market (e.g., by 
licensing out a specific line of business). This is a limitation that future research should try to 
deal with. Second, although we try to rule out issues of reverse causality (a firm licenses a core 
technology because it is experiencing financial problems), it is possible that other unobserved 
factors related to firm performance could lead to the decision to license core technologies. 
However, we believe that the use of fixed effects associated with several firm, technology, and 
industry control variables from the econometric model offers a robust setting to minimize such 
concerns. Third, because our proxy for how core a technology is to the licensor is based on 
patenting information, the most appropriate solution would be to use a measure connecting the 
licensed technology directly with produce market. Nevertheless, several studies have indicated 
patent data to be a robust indicator of firm technological activities, which is naturally reflected 
in the firm’s product market. Fourth, despite the fact that we believe the number of patents to be 
a reliable proxy for licensee size, further studies should use a more precise measure that makes it 
possible to examine how the licensee downstream assets affect the rent dissipation. Finally, the 
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results are not directly generalizable; the pharmaceutical industry is a specific case in which 
several characteristics offer the necessary conditions for a well-functioning market for 
technology where patents work as the main appropriability strategy. Despite those limitations 
we believe that this paper contributes by shedding light on important, and relatively unexplored, 
dimensions of the licensing literature. We encourage future research to explore further the 
contingencies related to the dissipation effect against empirical data. Along these lines, a 
possible extension would be how firms can use the contractual design of licensing contracts to 
prevent licensees from becoming potential competitors.  
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5.9 Appendix 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Coefficients (N = 334) 
  Variables  Mean S.D. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
[1] Licensor’s core Technology  0.35 0.30 1.00 
[2] Technological Overlap (Low) 0.70 0.34 -0.12 1.00 
[3] Log(Licensee Size)  3.32 2.67 0.19 -0.25 1.00 
[4] Previous Change in Licensor's Market Share 0.02 0.99 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 1.00 
[5] R&D Intensity 3.87 15.37 0. 4 -0.09 0.11 -0.32 1.00 
[6] Log (Employees) 5.96 2.68 -0.35 0.10 -0.37 0. 1 -0.17 1.00 
[7] Licensor Technological Specialization 0.40 0.24 0.46 -0.02 0.21 -0.04 0. 1 -0.47 1.00 
[8] Sub-Licensing 0.73 0.45 0. 7 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 0.04 -0.11 0.08 1.00 
[9] Exclusivity 0.74 0.44 0.21 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.07 -0.21 0.21 0.44 
[10] Royalty Sales 0.85 0.36 0.02 0.03 -0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 
[11] License Development 0.70 0.46 0.09 -0.16 -0.00 0.07 -0.06 -0.13 0.16 0.25 
[12] Technology Value 95.62 213.35 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.13 -0.01 -0.22 
[13] Technology Age 6.65 3.69 -0.20 -0.00 -0.14 0.05 0.10 0.19 -0.16 -0.12 
            
  Variables  Mean S.D. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
[9] Exclusivity 0.74 0.44 1.00 
[10] Royalty Sales 0.85 0.36 0.05 1.00 
[11] License Development 0.70 0.46 0.17 0.09 1.00 
[12] Technology Value 95.62 213.35 -0.23 0.02 -0.11 1.00 
[13] Technology Age 6.65 3.69 -0.22 0.01 -0.15 0.13 1.00 
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Table 2. Results of Fixed Effects Panel Linear Regression Analysis Predicting  Dissipation Effect 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Licensor’s core Technology  -1.179** -1.440** -1.440** -1.402** -1.368** -1.351** 
(0.441) (0.439) (0.435) (0.420) (0.419) (0.413) 
Technological Overlap (Low) -0.685** -0.712** -0.753** -0.724** -0.758** 
(0.224) (0.229) (0.237) (0.229) (0.236) 
Licensee Size -0.012 -0.014 -0.006 -0. 10 
(0.026) (0.026) (0. 26) (0.027) 
Licensor’s core Technology x 
Technological Overlap (Low) 1.403* 1.250* 
(0.618) (0.608) 
Licensor’s core Technology x 
Licensee Size -0.128* -0.098+ 
(0.062) (0.059) 
Previous Change in Licensor's Market 
Share -0.338** -0.337** -0.351** -0.349** -0.352** -0.347** -0.350*** 
(0.128) (0.111) (0.107) (0.110) (0.107) (0.106) (0.104) 
R&D Intensity -0.010 -0.011+ -0.013+ -0.012+ -0.014* -0.013* -0.014** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0. 06) (0.006) 
Log (Employees) 0.112 0.161 0.166 0.173 0.121 0.216 0.160 
(0.223) (0.224) (0.194) (0.193) (0.192) (0.182) (0.181) 
Licensor Technological 
Specialization 0.085 0.361 0.090 0.094 -0.254 0.230 -0.111 
(0.719) (0.649) (0.581) (0.582) (0.618) (0.537) (0.571) 
Sub-Licensing -0.306* -0.324* -0.303* -0.303* -0.255+ -0.251+ -0.221 
(0.137) (0.140) (0.146) (0.146) (0.140) (0.143) (0.141) 
Exclusivity -0.049 -0.035 0.002 -0.003 0.022 -0.035 -0.005 
(0.151) (0.157) (0.157) (0.154) (0.154) (0.145) (0.147) 
License Development 0.022 -0.000 -0.106 -0.110 -0.075 -0.131 -0.095 
(0.116) (0.118) (0.113) (0.112) (0.103) (0.109) (0.100) 
Royalty Sales 0.113 0.077 0.103 0.106 0.054 0.063 0.027 
(0.159) (0.162) (0.140) (0.139) (0.137) (0.147) (0.143) 
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Technology Value 0.003 0.030 0.039 0.039 0.052 0.033 0.046 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.026) (0.031) 
Technology Age 0.833 0.793 0.317 0.313 0.840 0.382 0.835 
(2.186) (2.074) (1.821) (1.813) (1.698) (1.793) (1.698) 
Technology Field Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.767 0.720 1.007 1.024 1.385 0.855 1.215 
(1.308) (1.305) (1.122) (1.123) (1.129) (1.060) (1.070) 
Number of observations 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 
R2 0.348 0.416 0.461 0.462 0.483 0.473 0.489 
Ll -195.045 -176.932 -163.597 -163.348 -156.849 -159.843 -154.792 
Likelihood ratio comparison - 36.226*** 62.896*** 63.395*** 76.391*** 70.403*** 80.506*** 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 at a two sided test, Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses 
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Table 3: Results of Logit  Model Predicting Remuneration Clauses 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Licensor’s core Technology  1.546*  1.765* 1.822* 2.065** 1.819* 2.117** 
( .694)  (0.742) (0.736) (0.751) (0.760) (0.792) 
Technological Overlap (Low) 1.199+ 1.375* 1.712* 1.374* 1.732* 
(0.657) (0.666) (0.694) (0.669) (0.701) 
Licensee Size 0.075 0.086 0.075 0.090 
(0. 64) (0. 66) (0. 64) (0. 67) 
Licensor’s core Technology x 
Technological Overlap (Low) -4.060* -4.155* 
(1.670) (1.657) 
Licensor’s core Technology x 
Licensee Size 0.006 -0.067 
(0.207) (0.205) 
R&D Intensity -0.001  -0.002  -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log (Employees) 0.141+  0.161*  0.147+ 0.175* 0.172* 0.174* 0.180* 
(0.076)  (0.077)  (0.078) (0. 81) (0.085) (0.086) (0.088) 
Licensor Technological Specialization 0.925  0.072  -0.128 -0.277 -0.172 -0.281 -0.128 
(0.764)  (0.866)  (0.945) (0.955) (0.968) (0.967) (0.975) 
Sub-Licensing 0.293  0.229  0.173 0.145 0.066 0.144 0.068 
(0.414)  (0.410)  (0.412) (0.408) (0.413) (0.407) (0.416) 
Exclusivity 0.328  0.384  0.361 0.391 0.497 0.392 0.493 
(0.387)  (0.388)  (0.385) (0.384) (0.395) (0.385) (0.397) 
Royalty Sales 2.652*  2.673*  2.588* 2.665* 2.732* 2.665* 2.740* 
(1.064)  (1.099)  (1.086) (1.133) (1.117) (1.134) (1.116) 
Technology Value -0.056  -0.027  -0.022 -0.020 -0.026 -0.020 -0.028 
(0.112)  (0.101)  (0.111) (0.112) (0.101) (0.112) (0.101) 
Technology Age 1.238  2.939  3.385 3.664 2.492 3.662 2.484 
(5.015)  (4.947)  (4.959) (5.107) (5.347) (5.104) (5.362) 
License Development -0.001  0.052  0.197 0.224 0.189 0.226 0.168 
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 (0.443)  (0.430)  (0.445) (0.446) (0.455) (0.454) (0.468) 
Technology Field Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -4.128*  -3.661*  -3.603* -3.970* -4.273** -3.965* -4.338** 
(1.666)  (1.711)  (1.582) (1.607) (1.638) (1.616) (1.644) 
Number of observations 319  319  319 319 319 319 319 
Ll -126.718  -124.303  -122.162 -121.593 -119.537 -121.593 -119.491 
Chi2 56. 95**  59.016**  63.575*** 66.565*** 68.624*** 69.949*** 69.694*** 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 at a two sided test, Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses 
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CHAPTER 6 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This PhD dissertation aims to improve our understanding of firms’ use of technology licensing 
as a complementary part of their efforts to innovate. The main question concerning the 
relationship between licensing and innovation was explored using a combination of different 
theoretical perspectives based on contract theory, organizational learning, network analysis, and 
industrial organization. Additionally, the point of departure for all four papers was the 
implications and the benefits that firm may experience by entering into licensing deals. 
Although prior studies have comprehensively increased our understanding of the use of 
licensing contracts as a mechanism to trade technologies and exchange know-how, several 
important questions remain open. Accordingly, the papers in this dissertation join the existing 
literature that aims at understanding how technology licensing is used by firms to tap into 
external sources of knowledge.  
More than just exploring the relationship between technology licensing and firm 
innovation, this dissertation’s contribution also lies in understanding a set of contractual and 
organizational contingencies that are prominently relevant for organizations involved in 
licensing deals. For example, in the third paper of this dissertation I examine the use of the 
grant-back clause in licensing contracts. While contractual mechanisms shaping knowledge 
spillovers between firms are relevant in several contexts, this clause is used distinctively in 
licensing contracts. Another example can be observed in the first paper of this dissertation, 
although the notion of speed of external knowledge recombination can be applied to different 
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settings, the use of licensed technologies is a critical methodological and conceptual instance to 
identify the precise time of knowledge acquisition and recombination. 
The findings in this dissertation also have managerial implications for firms 
operating in both the demand and the supply side of markets for technology. From the licensee’s 
perspective, this dissertation offers managers a reference framework to consider how specific 
organizational characteristics such as inventor networks can affect a firm’s capacity to deal with 
licensed-in technologies. These findings call attention to the fact that a firm’s decision to 
outsource part of its internal R&D should be made in alignment with other important 
dimensions of the internal organization of innovation activities. From the licensor’s perspective, 
even though in a less pronounced way, this dissertation emphasizes the market implications that 
licensing out core technologies may impose on the licensor. Understanding the dissipation effect 
and the contingencies that can make it more or less stringent can be crucial for managers when 
deciding to license a certain technology. Additionally, another important aspect that is also 
considered in the third paper in this dissertation regards the use of contractual mechanisms to 
avoid competition created from licensing. Indeed, contractual clauses can shape incentives and 
also avoid undesirable outcomes related to the loss of control of the licensed technology. Those 
points represent relevant aspects that managers can consider when deciding to enter into 
licensing deals.           
This dissertation also opens several directions for future research. First, future 
research could look at different organizational factors that affect firms’ capacity to benefit from 
licensing in new technologies. In particular, I believe that it is relevant to increase our 
understanding of the importance that employees, in isolation or in teams, have for the process of 
knowledge acquisition and assimilation at the firm level. Although in first and second papers I 
use different levels of analysis regarding organizational characteristics affecting firms’ capacity 
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to deal with licensed technologies, I believe more research should be done in this area. Second, 
despite the fact that the grant-back clause is a major contractual clause in licensing contracts, 
several other clauses merit attention in future research. For example, the technology furnishing 
clause, which commits the licensor to support the licensee to understand the technology that is 
being negotiated is very important for the function of markets for technology. Despite its 
relevance, I am not aware of any existing study aiming at explaining its use. In fact, the existing 
literature on technology licensing has mostly looked at contractual clauses as important 
moderators for specific outcomes (e.g., innovation and market performance), but very few 
empirical studies have tried to explain when or under what circumstances they will be used in 
licensing contracts. This is one of the approaches that future research on this topic should try to 
pursue. In a broader perspective, future research should aim at integrating different dimensions 
(e.g.,technological, contractual or competitive) of the licensing process within the same 
analytical framework 
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